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Abstract 
 
Why does the public so staunchly support harsh criminal justice policies when the 
social, fiscal and political costs are so great? Individuals in countries such as Canada, 
the UK and USA continue to want criminal offenders to receive stiffer sentences despite 
growing prison populations and some indication of lower crime rates (Cullen, Fisher & 
Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007; King, 2008; Raphael, 2009; Tseloni et al., 2010; 
Useem et al., 2003; Walmsley, 2009). Criminological research has identified cognitive 
and affective pathways that predict punitiveness toward crime, such as the judged 
wrongfulness and harmfulness of crime, and moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). 
The overall contribution of the five papers presented in this thesis is to identify the 
cognitive, affective and behavioural pathways that link social perception of criminals to 
punitiveness toward crime. Working at the intersection of social psychology and 
criminology, the thesis applies theoretical frameworks such as the Stereotype Content 
Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002) and Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and 
Stereotypes map (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) to identify the functional relation 
between social perception and punitiveness. Using different methodologies and at 
different levels of analysis, this thesis provides strong evidence that the content of 
criminal stereotypes is associated with specific cognitive (e.g., perceiving crime as being 
more serious), affective (e.g., feeling anger and a lack of compassion) and behavioural 
(e.g., wanting to exclude and attack) responses. In turn, criminal stereotypes and their 
outcomes engender punitive intuitions, decisions and attitudes. These findings reconcile 
extant criminological research on punitiveness with social psychological research on the 
function of social stereotypes. This thesis also speaks more broadly to the association 
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between punitiveness toward crime and basic social psychological processes related to 
interpersonal perception and relations. In this respect, this thesis makes a significant 
contribution to the study of punitiveness toward crime and has important social policy 
implications. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite growing prison populations (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007; 
Walmsley, 2009; King, 2008) and some indication of decreasing crime rates (Tseloni et 
al., 2010; Raphael, 2009), individuals in countries such as Canada, the UK and USA 
continue to want criminal offenders to get stiffer sentences than they seem to be 
receiving (Useem et al., 2003; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000). The public desire for 
increasing punitiveness stands in contrast to the tremendous fiscal, social and political 
costs of harsh criminal justice policies. In the UK, the prison service budget for 2009 
was £4.7 billion, which is equivalent to roughly half the budget for housing 
development (£10.3 billion) and one fifth of the amount spent on primary education 
(£23.7 billion) (HM Treasury, 2010). In the USA, the prison service budget for 2009 
was roughly six times that of the UK, a staggering $50.4USD billion (£30.2 billion), 
which is just slightly less than government spending on hospitals ($56.9USD billion or 
£34.1 billion) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
1
 
In addition to fiscal costs, harsh criminal justice policies have devastating social 
and political costs. Spending some time in prison is associated with being exposed to 
serious violence and health risks (Roberts & Hough, 2005). Once released from prison, 
individuals face unemployment or low wages, family instability (Pettit & Western, 
2004; Wakefield & Uggen, 2010), the breakdown of important social and political ties 
to the local community (Uggen, Manza & Thompson, 2006) and an increased chance of 
returning to prison in the future (Chen & Shapiro, 2007). The effect of increasingly 
harsh criminal justice policies has been felt most strongly by those in the margins of 
                                                 
1
 The difference in prison service budgets between the UK and the USA is roughly proportional to the 
population size difference between the two countries.  
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society, for example the youth, the poor and ethnic minorities (Pettit & Western, 2004; 
Bazemore, 2007; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Helms, 2009; Wakefield & Uggen, 2010). 
Why does the public so staunchly support harsh criminal justice policies when 
the social, fiscal and political costs are so great? Some evidence suggests that public 
punitiveness partly reflects a retributive reaction that demarks typical responses to norm 
violations or crime. However, a number of individual-level factors also affect 
individuals’ punitiveness, including perceptions of crime, emotion, psychological needs, 
political orientation and ideology (Bazemore, 2007; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; 
King, 2008, Maruna & King, 2004; Roberts, 1992; Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Carroll, et al., 1987; Cullen, Cullen 
& Wozniak, 1988; Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000; McKee & Feather, 2008).  This 
thesis extends the literature by considering the role of criminal stereotypes in 
engendering public punitiveness toward crime. Although a number of studies suggest 
that endorsing stereotypes about criminals is associated with expressing more support 
for harsh criminal justice policy (Roberts, 1992; Gordon & Anderson, 1995; Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1997; Johnson, 2009), it is not clear why believing that criminals are, for 
example, poor and evil is associated with expressing a strong desire to punish crime. 
The term ‘criminal stereotype’ is in itself a loaded term. The word ‘criminal’ 
clearly has stronger connotations than other terms such as ‘offender’ or ‘law-breaker’. 
Refering to ‘crimininal stereotypes’ is purposeful as the aim of this research is to draw 
out stereotypes about those who are ascribed a ‘criminal’ label meant to designate the 
fact that they have broken the law and become involved with the criminal justice 
system. This thesis unpacks what is contained in the ‘criminal stereotype’ and 
14 
 
investigates how the endorsement of these particular stereotypes is associated with 
punitiveness toward crime. 
Before moving on to discuss the theoretical and empirical motivations of this 
thesis, a brief discussion of what constitutes public punitiveness is warranted. This thesis 
treats punitiveness in absolute and relative terms. The decision to punish as opposed to 
not punish a specific crime represents punitiveness in the absolute sense, and can 
separate a punitive individual from a non-punitive other. For instance, if an individual 
believes that all crime should be punished, regardless of the circumstances, this 
individual could be said to demonstrate more punitiveness than an individual who thinks 
punishment should depend on the context (e.g., mitigating factors). Punitiveness can 
also be relative, to the extent that one person decides to punish a crime more harshly 
than another, or endorses more punitive policies than another. This thesis seeks to 
explain both what pushes individuals to make punitive decisions, and what leads to 
harsher punitive decisions or attitudes.  
The nature and extent of public punitiveness is a question that many 
criminologists have considered, with some evidence suggesting that in fact, the public 
are not as punitive as public opinion polls would lead us to believe. In his review of the 
evidence, Roberts (1992) argued that ‘surveys in criminal justice have all too often 
reflected mass opinion rather than public judgment’ (p.109). Roberts argues that the 
evidence strongly suggests that survey items often over-simplify the question of whether 
individuals seek harsher punishment of crime, for instance by asking individuals 
whether they believe ‘the courts are too lenient’. The main problem is that answers to 
this question are assumed to result from individuals’ careful consideration of actual 
15 
 
sentencing practices, and of whether these sentences are appropriate. In reality, these 
types of measures may beckon rapid responses, perhaps based on recent media coverage 
of a case where the sentence was perceived as not being tough enough. These broad 
questions tend to overlook variation in punitiveness and public concerns about fairness 
and efficiency. These measures can also generate an inflated sense of public 
punitiveness, in part because of factors that affect superficial measures of public opinion 
and judgment such as limited public knowledge of the criminal justice system, the 
media’s role in shaping public knowledge about crime and psychological features of 
human knowledge acquisition and attitude formation. 
The malleability of public punitiveness may suggest that punitive attitudes – as 
measured by support for harsh criminal justice policy – are unreflective of deeper-seated 
principles of justice or fairness, and variation in punitiveness toward crime. This thesis 
therefore addresses the question of how social perception relates to punitiveness toward 
crime at three levels: first, in terms of punitive attitudes, second with respect to punitive 
decisions and third by studying punitive intuitions.  
This thesis argues that expressed punitive attitudes should be considered in 
tandem with individuals’ punitive intuitions and judgments (i.e., decisions to punish 
specific crimes). Punitive intuitions can be understood as the sudden appearance in 
consciousness of a desire to punish crime without any conscious awareness of having 
gone through the steps of searching, weighing evidence and inferring that crime should 
be punished.
2
 Individuals’ punitive intuitions and judgments should be front and centre 
for three reasons. First, punitive judgments often tend to reveal a less punitive public 
and are partly explained by the same factors that explain punitive attitudes (e.g., 
                                                 
2
 This definition of punitive intuitions is based on Haidt’s (2001) definition of moral intuition.  
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negative emotional responses) (Johnson, 2009; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Second, 
because of their top-of-the head nature, punitive intuitions may provide insight into 
punitive attitudes or into the mechanisms that very rapidly come to shape these attitudes. 
Lastly, punitive attitudes should remain an object of study in as long as they are used to 
justify or support the implementation of harsh criminal justice policies. For these 
reasons, this thesis will treat punitiveness as the explicit or implicit desire to inflict 
suffering or see to the punishment of specific crimes, and of crime more generally. To 
provide a comprehensive study of punitiveness toward crime, the following studies draw 
from theories and empirical evidence in the areas of expressed punitive attitudes, 
intuitions and judgments or decisions. 
This thesis aims to show that individuals’ strong desire to see to the punishment 
of crime and firm belief that criminals should be punished emerge from a range of 
cognitive, affective and attitudinal factors that are partly explained by the widespread 
endorsement of particular criminal stereotypes. This research draws on criminological 
theories of punishment and social psychological theories of interpersonal and intergroup 
perception to study the relation between the endorsement of social stereotypes about 
criminals and punitiveness toward crime. The overarching argument of this thesis is 
two-part. First, it is argued that stereotypes about criminals reflect fundamental 
dimensions of social perception that are brought about by systematic cognitive and 
social structural processes. Second, stereotypes about criminals not only shape social 
perception of criminals (e.g., perceptions of the extent to which criminals have the intent 
to commit crime) but also engender strong cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
responses that contribute to public punitiveness toward crime.  
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 Amongst the two dominant theoretical streams used to explain individuals’ 
punitiveness toward crime, the present research is more in line with moral as opposed to 
utilitarian theories. Utilitarian theories of punishment put forth by key thinkers of the 
Enlightenment such as John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria form part 
of the Positivist Revolution in criminology (Jenkins, 1984; Donohue, 2007). 
Utilitarianism is essentially a normative theory as to what punishment should 
accomplish, that is, cooperation and rule following. This instrumental and functional 
view of punishment is premised on the assumption that individuals are driven by 
rational choice, and that cooperation can be achieved through a careful balance of costs 
and benefits (i.e., through specific and general deterrence). Based on this view, 
individuals seek to punish others in order to deter future crime. Increases in crime rates 
or in the perceived risk of being a victim of crime should therefore engender more 
public punitiveness. Although some evidence suggests that individuals explicitly 
endorse deterrence goals, their punitive behaviour does not follow deterrence principles 
(Carroll et al., 1987; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Carlsmith, 2008). The 
absence of a positive association between crime rates and prison rates also suggests that 
the increased threat of crime, alone, does not explain increases in punitiveness (Jacobs 
& Carmichael, 2001). Further, reviews of the deterrent effect of punishment on actual 
crime rates in the USA have led some to conclude that ‘punishment [is] ineffective, 
irrelevant, or even provocative with respect to crime’ (Fagan & Meares, 2008).  
Moral theories of punishment are apparent in Durkheim’s theory of the function 
of punishment, that is, to engender social cohesion. According to Durkheim, punishment 
is the embodiment of society’s moral order and contributes chiefly to social solidarity 
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(Garland, 1990). Punitiveness thus emerges from a moral imperative to reinforce shared 
and deeply held moral values, as unpunished infractions erode moral order and social 
cohesion. Research by Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) lends support to Durkheim’s view 
as it suggests that individuals tend to be more punitive when they perceive a lack of 
social cohesion. However, recent research recasts this finding, suggesting that political 
ideology partly explains the association between perceptions of social cohesion and 
punitiveness toward crime (Jackson, Gerber & Côté-Lussier, 2011).  
 Although it has adopted a decidedly less functional interpretation of 
punitiveness, current social psychological research on punitiveness provides some 
support for the moral view of punitiveness. Factors such as the judged wrongfulness and 
harmfulness of crime contribute to individuals’ moral outrage toward crime (Alter, 
Kernochan & Darley, 2007; Darley & Pittman, 2003). Moral outrage itself is part of a 
range of affective, cognitive and attitudinal factors (e.g., political ideology) that play an 
important role in engendering punitive responses to crime (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; 
Jost et al., 2003). The present research is therefore most in line with contemporary social 
psychological or moral theories of punishment, as opposed to utilitarian theories of 
punishment. Still, this thesis does not make strong claims regarding the function of 
punishment. Rather, the interest is in investigating the processes that link the 
endorsement of stereotypes about criminals to individuals’ desire for harsh punishment 
of crime.  
Where criminological theory and research on punishment of crime is less 
developed is in the area of interpersonal perception and behaviour. Moving away from 
the specificity of punishment in the criminological context, punishing behaviour itself is 
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an integral part of social life and has been linked to basic cooperative and competitive 
behaviour (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet & Villeval, 2008; Price, Cosmides & Tooby, 
2002; Trivers, 1971). Yet, much of the criminological research that considers the role of 
stereotypes in engendering punitiveness has stopped short of considering the 
interpersonal processes that link social perceptions to policy preferences. The theoretical 
argument made in this thesis is that punishment of crime should be situated within the 
broader framework of social behaviour. In studying individuals’ punitiveness, more 
attention should be given to the fundamental processes that affect social behaviour, such 
as person perception, cognition and affect.  
Studying the interpersonal processes that link social perception to punitiveness 
can provide insight into what some have called individuals’ ‘intuitive’ desire to punish 
criminals. Robinson and Darley (2007) have argued that support for harsh criminal 
justice policy is likely to reflect rapid or intuitive punitive responses as opposed to 
careful consideration of the costs and benefits of sweeping harsh criminal justice 
policies. They partly base this claim on inconsistencies between individuals’ explicit and 
implicit punitive desires and behaviours. For instance, despite explicitly endorsing 
punishment goals such as deterrence, individuals tend to punish along retributive lines 
and place great importance on the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Hoffman and Goldsmith (2004) have gone so far as to 
suggest that the urge to punish is biologically rooted and is modulated by a sense of 
fairness. The literature therefore suggests that emotional and other rapid cognitive 
processes, such as social perception and ideological preferences, are at the root of 
individuals’ intuition that criminals should be punished. 
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This thesis builds on criminological research on punishment of crime and on 
social psychological research on social perception. Specifically, this research focuses on 
the effect of stereotypes’ cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes on punitiveness 
toward crime. Early on Asch (1946), and later Rosenberg et al. (1968), recognized the 
ambivalent nature of person perception and impression formation, and the importance of 
situational or contextual factors in shaping social perception. This perspective suggests 
that rather than being univalent, perceptions of others are complex, multidimensional 
and dynamic. Research on person perception and stereotyping eventually moved away 
from these tenets and instead became interested in the processes that engender and 
support stereotyping, such as cognitive load and social power (Fiske, 1992).  Fiske 
(1992) called for a return to a pragmatic view of social cognition, that is, one which 
takes into account the goals, motivations and cultural context of social perceivers (see 
also Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, on a functional perspective of social perception). This 
thesis adopts this pragmatic view of social perception and considers the function of 
criminal stereotypes in engendering punitiveness toward crime. 
Current research on stereotypes has reached widespread consensus that, cross-
culturally, stereotypes about social groups represent two fundamental dimensions of 
social perception: warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Cuddy et al., 
2009; Judd et al., 2005; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & 
Wojciszke, 2008; Wiggins, 1979). These dimensions answer questions that are 
fundamental for survival and social relationships: What are this individual/group’s 
intentions (i.e., how warm are they)? How capable is this individual/group of carrying 
out their intentions (i.e., how competent are they)? Perceptions of others’ warmth are 
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especially important as they are fundamental to human survival, and inform basic 
approach and avoidance behaviour (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998).  
Concerning the etiology of stereotypes about others’ warmth and competence, 
the extant literature suggests that stereotypes are brought about both by systematic 
cognitive processes and by social structural determinants. Stereotyping is a cognitive 
process that results primarily from a basic tendency to engage in cognitive economy or 
demonstrate a preference for thinking that provides maximum information with the 
‘least cognitive effort’ (Rosch, 1978; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). A tendency to commit 
fundamental attribution errors and other cognitive processes lead individuals to draw 
inferences from other groups’ competitiveness and social status to their dispositions and 
traits (Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; 2006; Fiske, 2009). For instance, a group seen as 
competing for resources or power will be inferred to be cold and uncaring, or in other 
words, as lacking warmth (e.g., immigrants) (Lee & Fiske, 2006). Perceptions of others’ 
competence and intelligence flow from the ubiquity of status hierarchies and from 
making basic inferences regarding the deservingness of others’ high (and low) social 
status (therefore supporting beliefs in a just world) (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007).  
 Stereotypes about others’ warmth and competence are especially important 
because of their interpersonal and intergroup functions. According to the Stereotype 
Content Model (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) discrimination can be differentiated on the 
basis of its cognitive, affective and behavioural components. Based on perceptions of 
other groups, individuals experience a range of emotions that result from interpersonal 
comparisons. For example, upward assimilative comparisons engender admiration and 
pride, whereas downward contrastive comparisons elicit contempt (Cuddy, Fiske & 
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Glick, 2007). Emotions in turn are key in activating behaviour, but can also function to 
inform attitudes at an intuitive level (Frijda, 2010; Haidt, 2001; Roseman, West & 
Swartz, 1994). For instance, emotions such as anger may support aggressive behaviour 
but also a preference for aggressive social policies toward the object of anger (Skitka et 
al., 2006).  
The central thesis of this research is that variance in the endorsement of criminal 
stereotypes can help explain variance in attitudes and responses toward crime. While it 
is clear that individuals’ reliance on stereotypes can differ according to personal 
ideology and circumstance, this research also implies that the content of criminal 
stereotypes can vary, for instance on dimensions of warmth and competence. The idea 
that a criminal could be perceived as being warm is certainly counterintuitive. However, 
it is important to bear in mind that criminal stereotypes can vary to the extent that 
individuals perceive certain criminals (e.g., mass murderers) as being more cruel than 
others (e.g., common thieves). Criminal stereotyping also implies overlooking the 
multidimensionality of convicted criminals. For instance, criminals may be perceived as 
being cold and incompetent because of their involvement in crime, but these perceptions 
could change if individuals are told that the criminal in question is a loving father, 
involved community member or successful businessman.   It is in this context that the 
following research treats criminal stereotyping as variant and malleable.  
This research addresses three key questions. First, studying the effect of criminal 
stereotypes on punitiveness requires a solid understanding of the content and predictors 
of criminal stereotypes. It is not enough to know that the public generally believe that 
criminals are poor, cruel, unattractive and social outcasts (Roberts, 1992; Reed & Reed, 
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1973; Emsley, 1996; Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Steen, Engen & Gainey, 2005; Plant et 
al., 2005; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Chapman, 1968; Roberts & White, 1986; Carroll et 
al., 1987; Sargent, 2004; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; 
Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Van Knippenberg et al., 1999). What dimensions 
underlie these beliefs, and what function do these beliefs play in social perception and 
interpersonal relations? Studying the content of criminal stereotypes removes this area 
of inquiry from the criminological context and implants it firmly in the domain of 
interpersonal and intergroup perception. Stereotypes about criminals can then be 
understood as reflecting basic dimensions of social perception, and as coming into place 
as the result of social structural factors that are partly static (e.g., the perception that 
criminals compete against society), and partly dynamic (e.g., the perception that 
criminals have a low social status). 
Next, this thesis addresses the cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes of 
criminal stereotypes. The questions addressed here concern the role of stereotypes and 
their outcomes in shaping individuals’ punitive intuitions, attitudes and decisions. 
Stereotypes form part of individuals’ implicit social cognition and can play an important 
role in shaping attitudes and social behaviour (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Attitudes 
themselves can be based on affective (e.g., emotion, drives) and cognitive factors (e.g., 
thoughts, judgments), and function to fulfil basic psychological needs (Edwards, 1990). 
The functionality of social stereotypes in guiding interpersonal relations suggest that 
increased attention should be paid to the effect of criminal stereotypes on the predictors 
of public punitiveness, such as emotions of anger or moral outrage. 
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Lastly, this research tests the effect of criminal stereotypes on individuals’ very 
rapid or intuitive desires to punish criminals harshly. This part of the thesis makes an 
important methodological and empirical contribution to the literature. Although a major 
debate in criminology regards the origin of public punitiveness – reasoned responses or 
rapid intuitive or affective responses – most of the methodologies used in previous 
research (e.g., paper and pencil questionnaires) are not designed to capture intuitive 
responses. The final part of this thesis addresses this gap in the literature by developing 
and applying a methodology that allows to experimentally test the effects of criminal 
stereotypes and affect on punitive intuitions. This part of the thesis also speaks directly 
to earlier claims regarding the importance of addressing the association between social 
perception and punitiveness in its different forms (e.g., attitudes, judgments and 
intuitions).  
Of course, there is much more to public punitiveness than the endorsement of 
stereotypes. Although the present research cannot address the full range of social and 
cultural factors that influence individuals’ punitiveness, some consideration will be 
given to the direct and indirect effects of political ideology on punitiveness toward 
crime. Ideological positions such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social 
dominance orientation (SDO) have both been linked to stereotyping, prejudice and 
punitiveness toward crime (Bassett, 2010; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; 
Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009; Kreindler, 2005; 
Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007).  In times of economic strain and social insecurity, 
individuals generally tend to become more politically conservative and adopt more 
conservative ideologies such as RWA and SDO (Jost et al., 2003). The endorsement of 
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stereotypes and its effect on public punitiveness can therefore be shaped by dispositional 
and situational factors, such as ideology and social or existential threats, respectively 
(Bassett, 2010; Blasi & Jost, 2006; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). By broadening the scope of 
this research to consider political ideology, the aim is to explain some of the variance in 
individuals’ endorsement of stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime.  
To summarize, one of the key aims of this research is to add to the body of 
evidence that suggests that the public’s desire for harsh criminal justice policy is partly 
based on the endorsement of criminal stereotypes.  This thesis argues that criminals 
stereotypes, which are brought about by systematic cognitive processes and social 
structural determinants, influence individuals’ punitive intuitions, cognitive, emotional 
and attitudinal responses.  By shaping the way individuals perceive and feel toward 
crime, stereotypes about criminals’ evilness or cruelty can have serious social, political 
and fiscal consequences.  
An implication of this research is that harsh criminal justice policies put into 
place on the basis of public support could be detrimental not only to those caught up in 
the criminal justice system, but also to the social and political system. Recent evidence 
suggests that although individuals may explicitly endorse harsh punitive policies, they 
fail to support these policies when in practice they run counter to individuals’ intuitive 
sense of justice (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Notions of justice are deeply tied to 
concepts of fairness or equity (Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004; Hsu, Anen & Quartz, 2008; 
Moll et al., 2005), one of the moral dimensions upon which individuals intuitively 
decide whether something is right or wrong (Haidt, 2001). Criminal justice policies 
implemented on the basis of public support but that go against the public’s deep seated 
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notions of justice and fairness – for example by disproportionately punishing the poor or 
young, or by imposing mandatory and lengthy prison sentences in cases where such 
sentences are deemed unnecessary – could have the effect of threatening the perceived 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tyler, 1990). 
Soundings of public support for criminal justice policy should therefore consider the 
nature of individuals’ punitive intuitions and attitudes, and the role of interpersonal 
perception in shaping social and policy preferences.  
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Thesis Structure 
 
The substantive component of this thesis consists of five papers. Two of the papers have 
been submitted for publication to peer-reviewed journals, and the remaining three are 
ready for submission. This section will provide a brief overview of the structure of this 
thesis and the major contributions of each paper.  
The first paper is entitled ‘The evil, poor and disliked: Applying the Stereotype 
Content Model to study the content and structural determinants of the criminal 
stereotype’ and was submitted to Law and Human Behavior. This paper systematically 
investigates individuals’ stereotypes about criminals as a social group. The overarching 
argument is that stereotypes about criminals reflect fundamental dimensions of social 
perception and are predicted by social structural determinants. In Study 1, participants 
were asked to freely list the words that come to mind when they think about who and 
what a ‘criminal’ is. Study 2 builds on the first study by looking at the content of 
criminal stereotypes and how they are predicted by social structural determinants of 
competition (e.g., for resources) and social status. The final study presented in this paper 
moves beyond the two previous correlational studies by experimentally instantiating the 
criminal stereotype and observing its effect on individuals’ perceptions of others (e.g., 
resemblance to the stereotypical criminal), distinguishing between street criminal and 
white-collar criminal stereotypes. Together, the results of this first paper suggest that 
when thinking about criminals, individuals spontaneously think of individuals who lack 
warmth and of society’s responses to these individuals. These findings are partly 
replicated in the experimental study, where being labelled a criminal leads individuals to 
be perceived as lacking warmth and as being lower on social status, particularly when 
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labelled as a street criminal. In line with predictions made by the Stereotype Content 
Model (SCM), the results suggest that criminal stereotypes are not haphazard nor 
derived solely on the basis of criminals’ behaviour. Rather, the stereotype that suggests 
that criminals’ lack warmth and competence is predicted by individuals’ perceptions of 
criminals’ competitiveness and social status.   
The second paper of this thesis is entitled ‘Criminals as a social group: Applying 
the Stereotype Content Model to public attitudes toward punishment’ and was submitted 
to  a special issue of Social Psychology dedicated to the ‘Big Two’ dimensions of social 
perception. This paper builds on the first paper by investigating the affective and 
behavioural outcomes of the criminal stereotype and their effects on punitive attitudes. 
In Model 1, the Stereotype Content Model and the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect 
and Stereotypes map are applied using structural equation modelling in order to 
simultaneously estimate the paths linking stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth 
and competence to specific emotional, behavioural and punitive responses. In Model 2, 
the model is expanded by considering the role of political ideology in shaping social 
perception and responses to criminal stereotypes. The results suggest that endorsing 
stereotypes regarding criminals’ lack of warmth is associated with feeling more 
uneasiness and anger, and less compassion toward criminals. In turn, negative emotions 
of uneasiness and anger predict exclusionary and attacking behaviour. However, when 
controlling for individuals’ political ideology and negative emotional responses toward 
criminals (e.g., anger), a lack of compassion appears to be an important predictor of 
individuals’ punitive attitudes. This research is line with previous findings that suggest 
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that compassion is a key predictor of attitudinal and behavioural responses toward norm 
violators and criminals.  
The third paper is entitled ‘A crime is only as bad as the person who commits it: 
The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and punishment of 
crime’ and will likely be submitted to Experimental Social Psychology. This paper 
moves the level of analysis from punitive attitudes to punitive judgments and considers 
the effect of criminal stereotypes on social perception and cognition. Previous research 
suggests that perceptions and judgments of crime (e.g., about a crime’s wrongfulness) 
contribute to its perceived seriousness and emotions of moral outrage, and in turn to 
harsh punishment. This study experimentally manipulates the criminal stereotype and 
incrementally builds a full model of the cognitive and affective predictors of punishment 
decisions. The aim is to identify some of the pathways that link social perception to 
strong cognitive and emotional outcomes in the context of crime.  The results suggest 
that perceiving criminals in stereotypical ways (i.e., as lacking warmth) is associated 
with attributing crime to internal (e.g., personality) as opposed to external (e.g., stress) 
factors and with judging crime as being more harmful and wrongful. The judged 
wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime in turn contributes to moral outrage and 
judgments about a crime’s seriousness, the latter of which is a key factor in determining 
how severely a crime should be punished. This study also considers the role of political 
ideology in shaping social perception and punitive responses. Criminal stereotypes 
therefore shape not only the way individuals feel toward crime, as suggested by the 
second paper presented in this thesis, but also how individuals perceive crime. Moving 
away from perceptions of specific crimes and toward perceptions of crime in general, 
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the results could suggest that stereotypes about criminals also engender beliefs about the 
nature of crime more broadly (e.g., about crime’s seriousness). It remains an empirical 
question whether these beliefs in turn influence broader punitive attitudes toward crime.  
The fourth paper of this thesis is a brief article to be submitted to Cognition 
entitled ‘Kicking them while they’re down: The effect of low perceived warmth and 
social status on punitive intuitions’. The fourth paper moves beyond paper-and-pencil 
methodologies and uses a response-time study to get at the effect of criminal stereotypes 
on individuals’ intuitive desire to punish crime. Although previous work has discussed 
punitive intuitions, they have not used methods that allow for the detection of intuitive 
or rapid punitive responses. By developing and using a methodology that allows for the 
measurement of individuals’ intuitive decisions to punish others, this paper makes an 
important methodological contribution to this stream of research. The paper also uses a 
method of analysis that has not yet been used to analyze response-time data in social 
psychology: multilevel quantile regression. This method is used in order to model the 
entire response time distribution while taking into account the clustered nature of the 
data. The results of binary logistic regression modeling suggest that participants were 
more likely to harshly punish convicted criminals who were low on perceived warmth. 
However, the results of multilevel quantile regression modeling reveal that perceived 
social status can be equally important in shaping intuitive punitive responses. This is the 
first paper presented in this thesis speaking directly to the role of intuition in generating 
punitiveness toward crime, and to the role of criminal stereotypes in shaping those 
intuitions.  
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The fifth and final paper is a research report to be submitted to Psychological 
Science entitled ‘Fight fire with fire: The effects of perceived anger on punitive 
intuitions’. This paper uses the same methodology as in the fourth paper to observe 
whether criminals’ perceived anger and sadness influence punitive intuitions. This 
research builds on cognitive research on the human capacity to identify, simulate and 
respond to the affective states of others, a process that neuroscientific research suggests 
is related to neural substrates called ‘mirror neurons’. The hypothesis tested in this paper 
is that perceiving anger in criminals generates an angry response in the observer and 
punitive intuitions. The opposing hypothesis is that perceiving sadness in criminals 
generates compassion in the observer and slows punitive intuitions. The results of 
multilevel quantile regression suggest that criminals’ perceived anger is associated with 
harsh punitive responses early on in the decision-making process. Perceived sadness on 
the other hand has a weaker but marginally significant slowing effect on rapid punitive 
responses. These results build on the findings of the second paper by demonstrating that 
anger is an affective response to criminals that engenders rapid or intuitive desires to 
punish crime harshly.  
These five papers provide strong empirical evidence that, both at the individual 
and group-level, criminal stereotypes reflect fundamental dimensions of social 
perception and result from systematic cognitive and social structural factors. Moreover, 
this body of research suggests that criminal stereotypes engender specific cognitive, 
affective and behavioural responses that contribute to punitiveness toward crime. The 
fourth and fifth papers successfully address an important gap in the literature on punitive 
intuitions by demonstrating that the same cognitive and affective processes that shape 
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punitive attitudes and decisions also shape intuitive punitive responses. One key 
implication is that punitiveness toward crime results in part from intuitive processes, 
though both intuition and reasoning appear to be shaped by the endorsement of criminal 
stereotypes.  The results are discussed in terms of the contributions this research makes 
to the criminological and interpersonal perception and relations literatures, as well as in 
terms of the social policy implications.  
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Thesis Materials 
 
The thesis materials submitted herein are in line with the Methodology Institute’s paper-
based thesis guidelines for a PhD. These thesis materials consist of an introductory 
chapter, a literature review chapter, five constituent papers of the thesis and linking 
materials between each paper, and a conclusion chapter. All papers presented here are 
single authored.  
The reader will find that there is some repetition between each section. Because 
each paper is to stand-alone as a published paper, some repetition (particularly of major 
theoretical constructs and arguments) is inevitable. Because each paper is designed for 
publication, the papers presented herein reference each other.  
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Literature Review 
 
The punishment of rule-breakers is a prominent feature of social and political life: It 
manifests early on in parent-child relations, in school, in work, in religious, as well as 
criminal justice settings (Garland, 1990; Ignatieff, 1981; Newman, 1978; Skinner, 
1979). Punishment has been linked more generally to basic cooperative and competitive 
behaviour that makes up any functioning society (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet & 
Villeval, 2008). Yet, there are widely held concerns about the extent to which society 
punishes law-breakers. Societies have long punished law-breakers. Indeed punishment is 
for all purposes qualitatively milder than it was only a few hundred years ago. But crime 
control policies have become increasingly harsh in countries such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom in the final quarter of the 20
th
 century.  
Increasing punitiveness is seen most visibly in growing prison populations 
(Walmsley, 2009). In the United States alone, the prison population has risen six-fold in 
a quarter of a century, with estimates of the prison population in the early 2000s ranging 
from 1.2 million to 2 million  (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007). In 
the United Kingdom, the prison population had reached its capacity of 80,000 in 2006 
(King, 2008). In the USA, such increases in prison populations appear to reflect 
increases in the length, as opposed to the number, of prison sentences (Frost, 2008; 
Raphael, 2009). Lengthier prison sentences and growing prison populations are only 
part of the punitive trend. Other features include heavy-handed laws and policies (e.g., 
mandatory and indeterminate sentencing, harsh drug laws, three-strikes-and-you’re-out 
and zero-tolerance legislation, the removal of voting rights from prisoners in the USA, 
and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the UK).  
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The increasing harshness of criminal justice policy appears to be partly due to 
widespread public support for such policies, as evidenced in opinion polls and surveys 
of attitudes in Canada, the UK and the USA (Doob & Roberts, 1984; Hough & Roberts, 
1999; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). Popular desires to punish law-breakers may be 
reflective of deep-seated needs to punish norm violators, for instance in response to 
strong emotional responses such as anger (Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004).  There is 
mounting evidence that punishment of crime is an intuitive response that is retributive in 
nature, reflects perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, and is related to individuals’ 
moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). But there are still variations in the degree to 
which individuals are willing to punish: not everyone unequivocally expresses harsh 
punitive preferences. Though evidence suggests that there is a high level of strong 
support for punishment of serious offenders, individuals’ punitive desires and 
behaviours are related to a range of factors including individual differences (e.g., 
political orientation), sentencing options and goals, beliefs about the function of 
punishment, and perceptions of the offence and offender (Bazemore, 2007; Cullen, 
Fisher & Applegate, 2000; King, 2008, Maruna & King, 2004; Roberts, 1992).  
The purpose of this research is to focus on the effect of criminal stereotypes, and 
their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes, on punitiveness toward crime. The 
main hypothesis is that individuals’ punitiveness toward criminals is partly explained by 
the endorsement of stereotypes which suggest that criminals are essentially poor and 
evil. A secondary aim of this research is to contribute to the literature that suggests that 
punitiveness toward crime results from intuitive as opposed to reasoned processes. A 
key implication of this research is that basing criminal justice policies on public support 
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could lead to policies that, in practice, are both ineffectual and unreflective of 
individuals’ actual punitiveness. In Canada, for instance, public support has contributed 
to the recent decision to implement harsher policies and build more prisons, despite 
declining crime rates. One of the upshots of harsh criminal justice policies has also been 
their disproportionate effects on those in the margins of society (Bazemore, 2007; Curry 
& Klumpp, 2009; Helms, 2009; Pettit & Western, 2004). Yet it seems unlikely that 
individuals would knowingly support policies that disproportionately punish the youth, 
poor and ethnic minorities, given deep seated concerns for fairness. Responding to 
individuals’ seeming insatiable desire for harsh punishment, which appears to be shaped 
in part by the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and punitive intuitions, contributes to 
disproportionately punishing and marginalizing specific social groups. Putting into place 
such policies can additionally have the effect of placing a large social and fiscal burden 
on society.  
This review roughly consists of three parts. First, findings that have emerged 
from the study of individuals’ punitiveness toward crime will be reviewed. 
Methodological issues in measuring punitiveness will also be discussed. Next, 
individuals’ punitiveness will be placed within the broader context of social life. The 
association between punishment and basic competitive and cooperative behaviour will 
be addressed from the perspective of human development and social cognition. The 
criminological audience will then be introduced to a growing literature on fundamental 
dimensions of social judgment and social stereotypes. In this section, stereotypes about 
criminals and features of person perception will be linked to the determinants of 
punitiveness. Lastly, variation in individuals’ punitiveness will be discussed in terms of 
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differences in political ideology. More than shaping voting behaviours, political 
ideology is associated with socio-cognitive differences and with strong emotional 
responses, both of which have a role in shaping public punitiveness toward crime. 
Determinants of Individuals’ Punitiveness 
In the past 30 years, individuals’ punitiveness has come to the fore, in part due to issues 
such as penal populism (i.e., the politicization of punishment) and the implementation of 
increasingly harsh criminal justice policies (Beckett, 1997; Bottoms, 1995; Doob & 
Roberts, 1984; Garland, 2001; Loader, 2009; Maruna & King, 2004; Pratt, 2007). 
Seemingly widespread support for harsh treatment of offenders and the mass 
incarceration of segments of the population have led criminologists to consider why 
such trends have emerged in countries such as the UK, Canada and the USA. Up until 
the 1990s, commentators argued that this punitive trend was indicative of a public who 
wanted more punishment and harsher treatment of criminals, in part due to widespread 
fear of crime, dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system and ignorance about actual 
crime rates and sentencing practices. Although there is a high level of public support for 
punishment of serious offenders, much of the evidence suggests that individuals’ 
punitive desires and behaviour are influenced by a number of social psychological 
factors.  
The extant literature suggests that individuals’ punitive desires or attitudes are 
partly explained by a range of social, cultural, cognitive and emotional responses to 
crime and criminals.  For instance, criminologists and social psychologists have 
considered the role of anger, fear of crime, political ideology, economic insecurity, 
perceptions of crime (e.g., seriousness) and the endorsement of criminal stereotypes in 
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engendering public punitiveness (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; 
Johnson, 2009; King & Maruna, 2009; King & Wheelock, 2007; Langworthy & 
Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). 
The following review is broken up into three parts in order to account for differences in 
individuals’ punitive dispositions, motivations and goals. By drawing distinctions 
between levels of analysis, the aim is to underscore the interrelatedness of predictors of 
punitiveness toward crime.  
Dispositions to Punish 
Punitiveness toward crime is related to a range of factors: People who are more punitive 
tend to be male, older, politically conservative, have lower education and income, 
although these patterns are at times inconsistent (across studies) and explain relatively 
little of the variance in punitiveness (Costelloe et al., 2002; King & Maruna, 2009; 
Shoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007). A major weakness of some of these findings is 
that they are often descriptive and lack theoretical grounding. In this section, some of 
these predictors will be considered in relation to dispositional factors that are associated 
with punitiveness toward crime.   
Individuals’ disposition to punish relates fundamentally to differences in 
underlying social psychological processes. Punitiveness is associated with a range of 
personality and ideological differences (e.g., Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social 
Dominance Orientation, dogmatism, political orientation), cognitive styles and 
psychological needs (e.g., attributional complexity, need for cognition, internal locus of 
control), social and moral values (e.g., vengefulness, benevolence) and social perception 
(e.g., perceived social cohesion, change and threat) (Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008; Sargent, 
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2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; King & Wheelock, 2007, 
Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). All of these dispositional factors suggest a desire to 
preserve the status quo, and to achieve certainty, closure and predictability. According 
to the motivated social cognition perspective, the endorsement of specific ideologies, 
beliefs and attitudes is predicted by individuals’ psychological needs (Jost, Federico & 
Napier, 2009). Punitiveness can therefore be understood as fulfilling needs which vary 
according to individuals’ dispositions.  
Dispositional factors can also interact with each other and with higher level 
factors, such as motivations to punish (see also Methodological Issues). For instance, 
socio-cognitive motivations (e.g., need for cognition) may interact with personality 
differences (e.g., authoritarianism) to contribute to sophisticated arguments that justify 
punishing certain social groups (Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008). Dispositions to punish also 
seem to mediate punitiveness through factors associated with motivations to punish such 
as attributing criminal behaviour to internal dispositions (Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & 
Leung, 2008). 
Lastly, evidence suggests that state and trait emotions such as fear, disgust, 
anger, empathy and vengefulness can influence punitive behaviour and attitudes directly 
and indirectly through moral judgment and behavioural attributions (Johnson, 2009; 
Jones & Fitness, 2008; Gault & Sabini, 2000). Emotional responses to crime can 
therefore engender and support cognitive processes that in turn increase individuals’ 
punitiveness toward crime.  
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Motivations to Punish 
Motivations to punish crime are partly related to perceptions and judgments of the 
offence and the offender. Generally, the seriousness of a crime is a key determinant of 
how much people are motivated to punish it. Discrepancies in how much punishment 
offences typically receive reflect cultural consensus that, for example, violent crimes are 
more serious than white-collar crimes (e.g., embezzlement) (but see Cullen, Hartman & 
Jonson, 2009, for social and cultural features that may change perceptions of crime, and 
Roberts, 1992, for differences in ordinal and cardinal seriousness, and in consensus over 
seriousness). The determinants of seriousness are difficult to disentangle, however. 
Some evidence suggests that the perceived wrongfulness of crime, demarked by 
perceptions of intent or blameworthiness (e.g., offenders’ remorse or social motives), 
outweighs its harmfulness as a determinant of seriousness and punitiveness (Alter, 
Kernochan & Darley, 2007; Fragale et al., 2009). Other research suggests that the type 
of offence can shift the focus for assessments of seriousness, with wrongfulness being 
key in property offences and harmfulness in personal offences (Warr, 1989). Cushman 
(2008) further teases apart the harmfulness of an offence in terms of (a) the 
consequences of the offence and (b) the offender’s causal responsibility 3 , and the 
wrongfulness of an offence in terms of (c) the offender’s intent to harm and (d) belief 
that they would cause harm.  He found that in assigning punishment, individuals pay 
comparable attention to whether the offender caused and intended to cause the harm, 
specifically in terms of the offender’s belief that they would cause harm. These findings 
                                                 
3
 In Cushman’s (2008) operationalization, causal responsibility refers to whether the individual caused the 
harm, and not to whether their causal responsibility is attributed to internal dispositions.  
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point to the importance of social perceptions of the offence but also of the offender in 
decisions to punish crime.   
Perceptions of offenders’ intent and causal responsibility may therefore be key in 
motivating punishment. Causes of crime can include individuals’ dispositions (e.g., 
laziness, evilness or callousness), social (e.g., drug use, criminal associates) and 
economic factors (e.g., poverty, inequality). Individuals typically punish more harshly 
when they perceive intent and attribute the causes of crime to individuals’ dispositions 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; 
Roberts, 1992; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar findings in moral judgment). 
Other features of the offender such as criminal record, afrocentric features, social status 
and social motives (i.e., self-concerned vs. other-concerned) are also associated with 
punitiveness (Blair et al., 2004; Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Kliemann et al., 
2008). The violation of social expectations can also lead to more punishment, for 
instance when high-status offenders commit low-status offences (Christopher, Marek & 
May, 2003).  
The motivational link between perceptions and punitiveness is emotion. Features 
of the offence and offender lead to increased moral outrage, an emotional response most 
strongly associated with the emotion of anger (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; 
Montada & Schneider, 1989; Batson et al., 2007; Hoffman, 1989). Strong negative 
emotional responses such as moral outrage or anger in turn increase punitiveness toward 
crime (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & 
Robinson, 2002).  
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To date, however, little research has considered dispositional factors that could 
affect individuals’ motivations to punish crime, such as personality and ideological 
differences (Carroll et al., 1987). For instance, people may pay more attention to certain 
features of the offence and offender (e.g., perceived intent) in order to justify their 
dispositional punitiveness. Later this review will consider some of the ideological 
positions that influence individuals’ endorsement of criminal stereotypes and 
punitiveness toward crime.  
Punishment and Goals 
Criminological theory and research on public punitiveness has focused in part on the 
role of punishment in fulfilling various social goals, such as instrumental goals of 
inducing cooperation and preventing future harms (e.g., deterrence, incapacitation) and 
moral goals of repairing harms (or restoring justice) (Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Carroll, et al., 1987; Cullen, Cullen 
& Wozniak, 1988; Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000; McKee & Feather, 2008). 
Though often framed in opposition, utilitarian and moral theories seem to be unified by 
their functional treatment of punishment.  
Utilitarianism was put forth by key thinkers of the Enlightenment such as John 
Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria and is part of the Positivist 
Revolution in criminology (Jenkins, 1984; Donohue, 2007). Utilitarianism’s appeal is 
two-part. First, it has as a central goal to ‘humanize’ punishment. Second, it has the 
added advantage of rendering the world a predictable, orderly place (Garland, 1990; 
Ignatieff, 1981; Kateb, 2007). Utilitarianism is essentially a normative theory as to what 
punishment should accomplish, that is, cooperation and rule following. This 
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instrumental and functional view of punishment is premised on the assumption that 
individuals are driven by rational choice, and that cooperation can be achieved through a 
careful balance of costs and benefits (i.e., through specific and general deterrence). 
Contemporary offshoots of this theory place an emphasis on the role of concerns about 
crime, rule-breaking and victimization in contributing to punitiveness (Tyler & 
Boeckmann, 1997).  
Moral theories of punishment are perhaps most apparent in Durkheim’s analysis 
of the functions of punishment. Punishment is seen as the embodiment of society’s 
moral order and as contributing chiefly to social solidarity. Punitiveness thus emerges 
from a moral imperative to reinforce shared and deeply held moral values, as 
unpunished infractions run the risk of eroding moral order and social cohesion. The 
association between punishment and justice is also emphasized in other moral 
perspectives such as retributive theory (which argues that punishment equates justice) 
and just deserts theory (which argues that an offender should be punished in proportion 
to the harm committed).
4
 To the extent that punishment is seen as restoring shared 
values, repairing harm or achieving justice, moral theories can also be seen as adopting a 
functional or instrumental view of punishment. Moral theories, however, additionally 
underscore the emotional aspect of punishment and its association with deep-seated 
notions of justice. 
Recent research has called into question the notion that individuals endorse and 
apply functional theories of punishment. Grounded in research which suggests that there 
is a disjuncture between why people punish and why they say they punish, a number of 
                                                 
4
 Retributive and just deserts theory are often considered in tandem, but see Wenzel et al., 2008, on 
distinctions in retributive and restorative justice, and Tonry, 2007, for an opposing view. 
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social psychological studies explore the association between punitiveness and 
underlying goals of punishment. For instance, in experimental studies, deservingness 
(e.g., based on the perceived seriousness of the crime) and deterrence (e.g., based on the 
perceived likelihood of reoffending) factors are manipulated in order to assess the role 
of retributive versus utilitarian motives to punish, respectively (Carlsmith, Darley & 
Robinson, 2002; Carlsmith, 2008). In these and other studies the evidence 
overwhelmingly suggests that retributive factors are more predictive of punitiveness 
than utilitarian factors, suggesting that underlying goals of punishment are closer to just-
deserts than to behaviour-control (e.g., deterrence, incapacitation) (Carlsmith, 2008; 
Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 
2002). Similar findings emerge in public goods studies, where punishment tends to be 
retributive in nature and is independent of expectations of future cooperation (Masclet & 
Villeval, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2000).  
The discrepancy between individuals’ expressed endorsement of utilitarian goals 
but implicit endorsement of retributive goals lends support to the idea that people’s 
desire to punish is an intuitive, automatic response, premised on ideas of fairness and 
justice (Robinson & Darley, 2007).  
Social and Cultural Factors 
While social psychological factors are key in predicting punitiveness, these processes do 
not operate independently from individuals’ social and cultural setting. Support for 
harsh punitive policies is associated with broader factors such as economic insecurity, 
crime and victimization rates, racial composition of neighbourhoods, media coverage of 
crime and exposure to crime news, social perceptions of collective efficacy, trust and 
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generational anxiety (see Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; King & Wheelock, 2007; 
King & Maruna, 2009). Theoretical frameworks that link punitiveness to social and 
cultural factors suggest that punitiveness is associated with prejudice on the basis of 
class and racial divides,  consumerism in the construction of attitudes that support 
punishment, cultural differences in the relative importance placed on honour (social 
status) and the cultural acceptance of vengeance as a response to perceived slights and 
threats (for example, in the Southern and Western United States) (Unnever, Benson & 
Cullen, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007; Cochran & Chamlin, 2006; McKee & Feather, 
2008; Loader, 2009). For instance, the ‘angry white male’ theory links punitiveness to 
dispositional factors such as being male, having a low education and income, but also to 
social factors such as experiencing economic insecurity (Costelloe, Chiricos & Gertz, 
2009).  
More broadly, the politicization of punishment, general anxieties about social 
change, economic insecurity and declining morality, and concern about crime are 
hypothesized to catalyze punitive responses, especially toward marginalized groups, due 
to factors such as the channelling of anxious insecurities and scapegoating (Hogan, 
Chiricos & Gertz, 2005; Soss, Langbein & Metelko, 2003; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; 
Costelloe, Chiricos & Gertz, 2009). Though the present research does not take into 
account broader social and cultural factors, due to time and space constraints, these are 
issues that should be addressed in any comprehensive theory of punishment.  
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Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Punitiveness 
Issues in measuring individuals’ punitiveness are closely tied to what it means to punish. 
At its core, punishment has three discernable components: deciding to punish, deciding 
on the appropriate punishment, and the meting out of punishment. In the context of 
criminal justice, measures of punitiveness can address not only individuals’ desire to 
punish and the degree to which they are willing to punish, but also beliefs about the role 
of the criminal justice system in administering punishment.  
Punitiveness has been measured by investigating (a) the assignment of punitive 
sentences (e.g., jail term); (b) the endorsement of punishment goals (e.g., ‘More 
emphasis should be placed on keeping criminals behind bars’); (c) beliefs about the 
functions of punishment (e.g., ‘Capital punishment reduces crime in the long run’); (d) 
support for harsh punitive responses (e.g., ‘Making sentences more severe for all 
crimes’) and policies (e.g., ‘Taking away television and recreational privileges from 
prisoners’); and (e) support and trust in the criminal justice system (e.g., ‘The courts are 
too lenient with criminals’). There is some consistency in terms of what constitutes 
punitiveness in absolute terms as recurrent themes include measuring support for the 
death penalty, mandatory sentencing (e.g., three-strikes laws) and harsh treatment of 
juvenile offenders. However, there is often a failure to address the complexity and 
subjectivity of punitiveness, a tendency to conflate punitive components and a lack of 
standardization in measures of punitiveness.  
First, not all studies measuring punitiveness allow for the measurement of 
individuals’ decision to punish. Indeed, certain studies bypass the decision to punish by 
forcing participants to assign a punitive sentence and circumventing responses other 
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than punishment. In measuring decisions of the appropriateness of various punishments, 
some studies, fail to address subjective understandings of what constitutes harsh 
punishment, and prohibit measurement of complex responses to crime by placing non-
punitive preventative responses (e.g., investing in crime prevention efforts) at the end of 
a supposed punitive continuum. Some evidence suggests that individuals may adopt 
non-punitive preventative responses in addition to punitive responses, if given the 
opportunity, and that there is variation between individuals’ assessment of severity of 
punishment warranted and punishment assigned in absolute terms (e.g., length of jail 
term) (Cullen, Cullen & Wozniak, 1988; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000).  
A more widespread and troubling issue in measuring punitiveness is the frequent 
conflation of punitive dimensions. Both social psychologists and criminologists are 
guilty of using composite measures of punitiveness that consist of an assortment of 
components (b) to (e) described above. Moreover, single items designed to measure 
punitiveness often fail to discriminate between individuals’ desire to punish from their 
attitudes toward the criminal justice system. For instance, asking individuals to report 
the extent to which they agree with statements such as ‘people who break the law should 
be given stiffer sentences’ could generate agreement on the basis of beliefs that 
criminals should be given stiff sentences or on the basis that criminals do not currently 
receive stiff sentences. Though composite measures tend to converge, as suggested by 
moderate to high factor loadings in factor analyses, it is important to distinguish 
between the beliefs that people harbour about the function of punishment, and of the 
criminal justice system, from their punitive desires or attitudes. Indeed, evidence 
suggests that some individuals who harbour deterrence beliefs are unwilling to adopt 
58 
 
corresponding harsh punitive responses such as mandatory or determinate life sentences 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008).  
Measures of punitiveness also tend to vary across researchers and research aims 
though some efforts have been made toward standardization.  For instance, McKee and 
Feather (2008) developed the Sentencing Goals Scale, a 20-item questionnaire designed 
to assess agreement with sentencing goals such as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation 
and rehabilitation. Carlsmith, Darley and colleagues developed and used a 13-point 
sentencing scale ranging from no punishment to life in prison (with some variation) in 
many of their studies. Still, a lack of standardization and weak measures make it 
difficult to elucidate the complexity of punitiveness and of its determinants.  
Most pertinent to this research is the failure to develop an adequate measure of 
individuals’ intuitive desires to punish criminals. In the past, researchers such as 
Robinson and Darley (2008) have argued that a discrepancy between explicit and 
implicit endorsement of punishment goals suggests that individuals rely on punitive 
intuitions as opposed to reasoning processes when expressing punitive desires or 
attitudes. However, previous research typically employs paper-and-pencil questionnaires 
that prohibit measurement of individuals’ intuitive or rapid punitive desires. It is likely 
that the effects of stereotypes and political ideology are most apparent in intuitive or 
rapid punitive desires. In the fourth and fifth papers of this thesis, this methodological 
gap is addressed by developing and applying a methodology that allows for the 
measurement of punitive intuitions. 
The goal of this thesis is not to systematically address the methodological issues 
in measuring punitiveness. However, this thesis overcomes some of the aforementioned 
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limitations in two ways. First, this thesis investigates the association between criminal 
stereotypes and punitiveness by measuring punitiveness at different levels (e.g., 
attitudes, decisions, intuitions). By considering different types of punitiveness, the aim 
is to provide a comprehensive body of research demonstrating a robust association. 
Second, at each level of punitiveness, this research uses some of the best measures of 
punitiveness outlined in this section, and when necessary new measures were developed 
(i.e., a measure of punitive intuitions).  
Summary 
A review of the literature suggests that individuals’ punitiveness is partly explained by 
dispositional (e.g., being more punitive due to attributional complexity) and 
motivational factors (e.g., punishing based on a crime’s perceived seriousness), and that 
individuals are more likely to punish according to retributive than deterrence goals. An 
inconsistency between explicitly and implicitly endorsed punishment goals has led some 
to argue that punishment is an intuitive response to crime – that is, a response that is part 
of ‘judgments, solutions, and ideas that pop into consciousness without our being aware 
of the mental processes that led to them’ (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). However, current 
research has failed to adopt methodologies that allow for the measurement of 
individuals’ rapid or intuitive punitive desires and attitudes.   
These findings cast doubt on the notion that individuals are categorically 
punitive toward crime and that public punitiveness is based on a careful consideration of 
crime trends and of the efficiency of the criminal justice system. At best, simple 
measures of individuals’ punitiveness may provide some indication of individuals’ 
punitive intuition and of an overall tendency to support harsh criminal justice policies, 
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but these measures do not address the complex nature of punishment nor the gamut of 
factors that influence individuals’ punitiveness toward crime.  
Punishment in the Broader Context of Social Life 
One of the aims of this thesis is to demonstrate that individuals’ punitiveness toward 
crime relates in important ways to basic interpersonal perception and behaviour. Placing 
punitiveness in its broader social context provides a rich backdrop upon which to 
understand punishment of crime. This section will therefore consider how punishment 
relates to basic competitive and cooperative behaviour, using theories from evolutionary 
social psychology and empirical findings on human development and social cognition. 
To be clear, this thesis does not apply evolutionary psychology frameworks, nor does it 
look at the effect of punishment on competitive and cooperative behaviour. However, 
these literatures are reviewed to provide the reader with a bigger picture of the origins 
and functions of punishment than that typically provided in the criminological literature.  
This section will also reconcile theories and research on interpersonal behaviour 
with theories of punishment of crime emerging from social conflict, utilitarian and 
moral perspectives. Recent criminological advances on individuals’ punitive intuition 
will also be discussed in relation to the two processes that inform human behaviour: 
cognition and emotion.  
Broadly, this section is a step away from the criminological literature before 
moving on to introduce the main theoretical frameworks applied in this thesis (i.e., the 
Stereotype Content Model and the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective). This is an 
important step as it suggests that punishment of crime is associated with universal and 
basic features of social life, and provides further theoretical and empirical grounds for 
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studying the role of social perception in engendering and supporting punitiveness 
toward crime.  
Fundamental Features of Social Life: Competition, Cooperation and Punishment 
Although this thesis does not measure punitiveness outside of the context of crime, a 
first step in situating punishment of crime in the broader context of social life is to 
consider punishment as it relates to human development, social behaviour and cognition. 
Again, as a reminder to the reader, the following theoretical and empirical questions are 
not tested directly in this thesis. This section is simply to broaden the theoretical scope 
typically discussed when studying punitiveness toward crime. Following this section, 
the reader will be introduced to the theoretical frameworks that will be applied in this 
thesis.  
Evolutionary social psychological theory posits that many of the behaviours and 
psychological processes that can be observed here-and-now can be explained by insights 
about the complex genetic and neural substrates of such processes (i.e., the genetic and 
neurological structures that affect social cognition and interpersonal relationships). 
These substrates are hypothesized to be the result of a rich developmental history, 
shaped by the local environment, culture and opportunities in which humans evolved 
(Kenrick, Schaler & Simpson, 2006; Adolphs, 2009; see also Boyd & Richerson, 2006, 
on the rapidity of cultural as opposed to genetic evolution).  
Although empirically it is impossible to test many evolutionary social 
psychological theories, studying the differences between humans and apes’ social 
cognition and brain structure provides some insight into the importance of the 
development of the prefrontal cortex in human social cognition.  The prefrontal cortex is 
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involved in basic functions such as reward-based learning, the modulation of emotional 
responses, the acquisition of social and moral knowledge during development, in 
punishment (e.g., perceptions of the threat of social punishment, integrating the benefits 
and costs of punishing) and in more general competitive and cooperative social 
behaviour (Adolphs, 2009; Koenigs et al., 2007; Spitzer et al., 2007; de Quervain et al., 
2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Other processes such as self-control, long-term planning 
and sensitivity, key features of modernity and of the ‘civilizing process’, are also 
attributed to the prefrontal cortex (Pinker, 2007). Neurobiological studies therefore 
suggest that in human social cognition, neural substrates related to punishment are 
shared with other processes such as the modulation of emotion, the acquisition of moral 
knowledge and basic social behaviour (e.g., cooperation and competition). It is against 
this backdrop that punishment will be considered in relation to basic competitive and 
cooperative human behaviour, and later to fundamental dimensions of social perception 
and ideological preferences. 
It is tempting to consider punitiveness as reflecting a form of aggression or 
cruelty, particularly from an evolutionary or ontological perspective. From an 
evolutionary perspective it seems likely that both punitive and aggressive behaviours 
first evolved in small groups where intra- and inter-group competition and conflict 
appears to have been an important catalyst (Boyd & Richerson, 2006; Wenzel et al., 
2008; but see Nell, 2006, for a discussion of the manifestation of aggression in earlier 
predatory and hunting behaviours). Ontologically, punishment, much like aggression, is 
used to appropriate resources, defend against attack, ascend hierarchies, control 
behaviour, and is defined by its retributive nature (Buss & Duntley, 2006; Carlsmith, 
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Wilson & Gilbert, 2008; Duntley, & Shackelford, 2008; Nell, 2006; Pinker, 2007; 
Skinner, 1979; Trivers, 1971). At a societal level, decreases in levels of violence (e.g., 
tribal and clan wars) have coincided with decreases in cruel forms of punishment 
(Pinker, 2007). Considering punishment as a form of aggression therefore suggests that 
punitiveness is intimately tied to competition and power.  
Competition is a key theme of criminological theories that argue that punishment 
is a process related to power, often enacted by those with power against those with less 
power. Such a view draws on the Marxist tradition, but is also apparent in the work of 
other theorists such as Rusche and Kircheimer, Pashukanis, and Hay (Garland, 1990). 
These works discuss the specificity of penal methods and their relation to modes of 
production, the reflection of law and class struggle in punishment, and the ideological 
functions of punishment, respectively (Garland, 1990). This conflict perspective, which 
has gained prominence in criminological theory, coalesces with viewing punishment as 
a form of aggression that results from competition between groups.  
Punishment is also a key feature of cooperation or reciprocal altruism (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000; Masclet & Villeval, 2008; Price, Cosmides & Tooby, 2002; Trivers, 
1971). From an evolutionary and etiological perspective, punishment is seen as an 
important element in establishing cooperative norms or rules. For instance, cooperation 
can be induced by punishing non-cooperators and non-punishers of non-cooperators, by 
extending the impact of punishment through stigma, and through altruistic punishment 
by third-parties (Henrich & Henrich, 2006). In public goods studies, punishment has 
been shown to result from perceptions of inequality, which is thought to engender strong 
negative emotions and retributive punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet & 
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Villeval, 2008). Hoffman and Goldsmith (2004) have gone so far as to suggest that the 
urge to punish is biologically rooted and is modulated by a sense of fairness.  Cross-
cultural evidence suggests that fairness and reciprocity are in fact stable features of 
human behaviour (Henrich et al., 2005; but see Baron, 1997, on self-interest and 
cooperation), as is punishment of those who fail to act prosocially (although forms and 
degrees of punitiveness vary socially and culturally) (Gächter, Herrmann & Thöni, 
2005; Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004). Punishment is therefore associated with 
establishing and enforcing cooperative rules and norms, and is strongly related to 
perceptions of fairness and equality.  
Criminological theories of punishment such as utilitarianism and social 
functional moral theories pick up on the importance of cooperation in social life. Both 
perspectives suggest that punishment accomplishes important social functions, notably 
rule following, social cohesion, order and justice. While utilitarian theories place the 
onus on individuals’ rational choice in achieving rule following, moral theories place the 
onus on groups and social solidarity. In line with research on interpersonal behaviour, 
moral theories emphasize that individuals are deeply concerned with fairness or justice, 
and that these concerns are at the heart of punitive desires or attitudes.  
An alternative approach to situating punishment in the broader context of social 
life is to consider it as it relates to the life course of individuals. Studies of learning and 
the life course suggest that children learn early on that harming others is prescriptively 
and generalizably wrong, and that this rule is universal (i.e., independent of social 
setting and social constructions of appropriate behaviour and rules) (Smetana, 2006). 
The first developmental goal of an infant is in fact to achieve basic trust, which is 
65 
 
founded on a ‘friendly otherness’ (Erikson, 1959). While competition and hierarchy are 
important features of social life, these features appear to be secondary to the more 
central goal of cooperation. Cooperation and the formation of cooperative groups rest 
primarily on individuals’ expectation that others will also cooperate and reciprocate 
(Price, 2008).  
Punishment is therefore tied to expectations of cooperation, notions of trust, 
empathy and equity, which are all important in social development. Some have argued 
that empathy is also a key component in perceptions of justice. For instance, Hoffman 
(1989) has outlined a comprehensive theory of justice which hinges on the importance 
of empathy in moral affect, judgment, behaviour and notions of justice. According to 
Hoffman, individuals feel sympathetic and empathetic distress toward victims, and 
empathic anger toward victimizers. Individuals are especially sensitive to information 
relating to whether others are empathetic or not, and are faster to process this 
information (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; see also Adolphs, 2009, on the neural 
substrates of empathy, and de Waal, 2008, on the continuity of these substrates with 
other species). These and other findings suggest that individuals learn early on that trust, 
empathy and equity are fundamental in social life. Perceptions of others’ empathetic 
dispositions engender emotional responses and inform basic help versus harm 
behavioural responses such as exclusion and persecution (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007; 
Harris & Fiske, 2006).  
Adopting a broader perspective based in part on theories and evidence emerging 
from evolutionary psychology and neurobiology suggests that punishment of crime is 
related to basic competitive and cooperative behaviour. From a human development 
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perspective, neuroanatomical studies reveal that punishment processes share neural 
substrates with key features of human social cognition such as the acquisition of social 
and moral knowledge, and the modulation of emotion. In the context of social 
behaviour, punishment can be understood as being a form of aggressive behaviour 
emerging in competition, but also as a means to establish norms and achieve 
cooperation. Some of these themes are reflected in criminological social conflict, 
utilitarian and moral theories of punishment. From a lifecourse perspective, it becomes 
clear that a key developmental goal is to form empathic, trusting and cooperative 
relationships. Perceptions of others’ empathy and trustworthiness are therefore 
important in social cognition, emotion and cooperative behaviour, and are an important 
point of departure for the study of punitiveness toward crime.  
Punitive Intuitions: Cognition and Emotion 
The ubiquity of punishment and its relation to fundamental features of social life have 
led to the question of whether there is such a thing as an ‘intuition’ to punish (Robinson 
& Darley, 2007) and whether this intuition is biologically rooted (Hoffman & 
Goldsmith, 2004). Having punitive intuitions would suggest that the desire to punish is 
in a sense independent of explicitly endorsed goals, or as political theorist George Kateb 
(2007) prosaically stated, that ‘[t]he will to punish seems to precede any theory of 
punishment’. Evolutionary psychological theories posit that the intuition to punish could 
be tied to the coevolution of adaptations to defend against victimization (e.g., by 
recognizing likely victimization) due to a history demarked by conflict, or to pro-social 
intuitions due to desires to induce cooperation and mitigate competition (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2006; Duntley & Shackelford, 2008). Although it is impossible to test these 
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hypotheses, there are theoretical and empirical grounds to argue that the intuition to 
punish is related to the two psychological processes that inform human behaviour: 
cognition and emotion (Darley & Pittman, 2003).  
From a cognitive perspective, the intuition to punish should relate to the way in 
which individuals make sense of others and of their social environment. An early 
proponent of the fundamental attribution error (i.e., the tendency to overweigh internal 
causes in attributing behaviour), Heider worked to draw theoretical links between causal 
attributions and the need to restore balance or order through punishment. Heider (1944) 
draws a close connection between attributions of causality and the desire to view people 
as absolute causal origins. Accordingly, viewing a person as the object of a ‘disturbing’ 
change and the act of revenge presents the opportunity to ‘transform irreversible 
changes into reversible ones’ (Heider, 1944, p. 361) (see also Shweder et al., 1997, on 
individuals’ ‘orders of reality’ and on the role of causal ontology in rendering suffering 
meaningful, and Callan, Ellard & Nicol, 2006, on order and immanent justice 
reasoning).  
The tendency to attribute others’ behaviour to their internal dispositions in order 
to render the world a meaningful and predictable place may also help explain 
stereotypes that suggest that criminals do bad things because they are bad people. The 
association between individuals’ epistemic need for order (and fundamental attribution 
errors), criminal stereotypes and punishment is put succinctly in the following quote by 
sociologist Paul Fauconnet (1928): 
It is easy to assume that persons are responsible who are not loved. In a general 
way, 'antipathy' arouses suspicion; and a special 'antipathy' arouses a special 
suspicion. Persons dreaded for their brutality are the first ones to be suspected of 
a violent crime; despised persons, of a mean act; and those who arouse disgust, 
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of an unclean act. People with bad reputations are accused and convicted on the 
basis of evidence which one would consider insufficient if an unfavorable 
prejudice did not relate them to the crime in advance. On the contrary, if the 
accused has won our favor we demand irrefutable proof before we impute to him 
the crime (as cited in Heider, 1944, p. 266). 
 
The link between causal attributions and the need to restore order may help explain 
puzzling punitive behaviours such as the criminal prosecution and punishment of animal 
offenders (e.g., rats, oxen, pigs) from the later Middle Ages until the 18
th
 century 
(Beirnes, 1994). The association between cognitive needs for order, stereotypes and 
punishment is further supported by evidence that suggests that making internal 
attributions for crime (i.e., believing that individuals commit crime because of their 
personality) is associated with increased punitiveness (see also Ideology) (Carroll et al., 
1987; Jost et al., 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Solloway, 2003; Langworthy & 
Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992). 
While punishment is tied to cognition, it is also a decidedly emotionally laden 
response (De Haan & Loader, 2002; Karstedt, 2002). Indeed, there is increasing 
evidence that much of human cognition is affect laden, and automatic (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999). Robinson and Darley (2007) have argued that individuals’ ‘intuitions 
of justice’ are similar to the perceptual system (‘System 1’ in Figure 1) in that they are 
relatively automatic and effortless, and involve emotion. While there is little empirical 
research linking emotion to the intuition to punish, evidence emerging from studies on 
justice and morality in areas such as neuroanatomy and social cognition call attention to 
the importance of moral emotion (e.g., guilt, compassion, embarrassment, shame, pride, 
contempt, gratitude, disgust, awe, indignation, anger) in motivation and judgment 
(Haidt, 2008; but see Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2009, on the primacy of cognition in 
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moral judgment). Moral emotions are elicited in response to violations or enforcements 
of social preferences and expectations, in which perceptions of fairness and equality 
play a key role (Moll et al., 2005). This evidence provides strong support for theories 
that suggest that punitive intuitions are associated with emotional responses, such as 
moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Hoffman & Goldsmith, 2004; Moll et al., 
2005). Moreover, this evidence suggests that the deontological principle that justice is 
rooted in a sense of fairness emerges from emotional, as opposed to reasoned processing 
(‘System 2’ in Figure 1) (Hsu, Anen & Quartz, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1. Process and content in two cognitive systems, adapted from Robinson & 
Darley (2007). 
 
 In this thesis, punitiveness is studied at both the reasoning and intuition level. In 
the second and third papers, individuals are given time to engage in controlled and 
effortful processing before expressing their punitive attitudes or making punitive 
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decisions. In the fourth and fifth papers, participants are asked to very quickly make 
punitive decisions, relying in part on social perception and emotion.  
Summary 
This thesis applies a theoretical framework emerging from the interpersonal perception 
and relations literature to study the association between criminal stereotypes and 
punitiveness toward crime. Before introducing the reader to this theoretical framework, 
a brief side-step was taken to consider punishment as it relates more broadly to social 
life.  This section of the review therefore does not set out what will be tested in this 
thesis, rather it draws the reader’s attention to the very basic nature and function of 
punishment.   
Evolutionary social psychological theories and neurobiological evidence suggest 
that punitiveness is a universal feature of human social cognition and behaviour. 
Punishment is manifested in many spheres of social life, notably in basic competitive 
and cooperative behaviour, and is associated with fundamental features of social life 
such as social perception of fairness, social status and power, and in the enforcement of 
norms and rules.  Punishment is also tied to human empathy and trust, key 
developmental goals that begin early on in the lifecourse. Theories of punishment of 
crime put forth over the last two centuries such as utilitarian and moral theories 
incorporate some of these features of punishment and provide additional insight on the 
social, cultural and political aspects of punishment.  
In situating punishment of crime in the broader context of social life, two 
overarching elements emerge. First, punishment is decidedly related to order, both in 
terms of its association with power or social status (hierarchy) and with the enforcement 
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of cooperative norms (rules). Second, punishment is tied to basic cognitive and 
emotional processes, and some have suggested that the desire to punish reflects an 
intuition or urge that arises out of the perception of injustice. Cognitively, punishment is 
associated with making internal attributions for others’ unjust behaviour. Emotionally, 
punishment is associated with feeling anger or a lack of empathy toward wrongdoers. 
These two overarching elements are expanded on in the following review of 
fundamental dimensions of social perception and political ideology.  
New Directions in the Study of Public Punitiveness: The Stereotype Content Model and 
the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective 
The first section of this literature review discussed the criminological study of 
punitiveness. In the context of crime, punitiveness is associated with individuals’ 
dispositions and motivations to punish (e.g., in response to the moral outrage individuals 
feel toward crime, based on a crime’s perceived seriousness, and on offender’s 
perceived intent and causal responsibility). In the second section, the review was 
broadened to consider how punishment is also a fundamental feature of social life that is 
related to a number of basic cognitive and emotional processes. For instance, 
punishment is related to notions of trust, empathy and equity, and may reflect an 
intuition or urge to respond to cognitive needs for order and emotional responses to 
perceived inequity.  
The following section builds on the criminological and social psychological 
literature on punitiveness, and focuses in on the theoretical frameworks that will be 
applied in this thesis. This thesis considers the role of fundamental dimensions of social 
perception, warmth and competence, in engendering specific cognitive, affective and 
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punitive responses toward crime. Emerging findings in political psychology, such as the 
effect of political ideology and socio-cognitive motivations on the endorsement of 
criminal stereotypes and on punitiveness, are also considered. This section provides an 
overview of literatures on stereotyping, person perception, and political ideology, and 
presents some preliminary hypotheses. 
Stereotyping as a Cognitive Process 
Stereotyping is a cognitive process that results primarily from a basic tendency to 
engage in cognitive economy or demonstrate a preference for thinking that provides 
maximum information with the ‘least cognitive effort’ (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Rosch, 
1978). Stereotypes about individuals and groups come into play in three steps (Casper et 
al., 2010). First, the individual or group is categorized (e.g., on the basis of age or sex) 
(Cloutier, Mason & Macrae, 2005). Second, a stereotype is activated automatically, and 
stereotypic expectations are formed. Finally, following the activation of a stereotype, 
others’ behaviour will be interpreted in stereotyped terms (Taylor et al., 1978). 
Stereotypes can also generate specific emotional and behavioural responses on the part 
of the observer (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). Stereotypes can therefore be seen as 
‘simplify[ing] perception, judgment and action’ (Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994), 
although researchers are careful to draw distinctions between stereotype activation 
(which is automatic) and application (which can be controlled) (Monteith et al., 1998). 
 The ability to process new information using existing categories is a distinctly 
beneficial social cognition tool (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Monteith et al., 1998; Taylor et 
al., 1978). For instance, having access to stereotypes can free up cognitive resources, 
such as information processing and attention, in separate unrelated tasks (Macrae, Milne 
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& Bodenhausen, 1994). Perceiving others in terms of categories also streamlines 
processes associated with person perception such as decision making and memorial 
functioning (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Monteith and colleagues (2009) argue that 
four core motives underlie stereotyping: ‘the need to deal with cognitive overload and 
simplify complex information, to belong and be part of a group, to enhance and maintain 
feelings of self-worth, and to justify the status quo’ (p.212).  For instance, endorsing 
complementary stereotypes such as ‘poor but happy’ and ‘rich but miserable’ can lead to 
increased perceptions that society is fair, and that inequality is legitimate (Kay & Jost, 
2003). These core motives are not only interrelated, but also serve to support the use and 
maintenance of stereotypes.  
 According to Gilbert and Hixon (1991) stereotypes are forms of information 
‘stored in memory in a dormant state until they are activated for use’ (p. 509). 
Stereotypes are therefore consistently available in the cognitive repertoire and may be 
drawn upon given certain contextual factors (e.g., salience, cognitive resources). The 
strength of individuals’ stereotypic associations can also influence the tendency to use 
category-based impression formation (Gawronski et al., 2003). A distinction has, 
however, been drawn between individuals’ implicit stereotypes (i.e., that are active but 
not necessarily personally endorsed) and explicit stereotypes (i.e., that are personally 
endorsed). Based on data from 2.5 million tests of individuals’ implicit associations, 
Nosek and colleagues (2007) have established that implicit stereotypes are pervasive, 
and that although implicit and explicit stereotypes are related, they are distinct. The 
automaticity of stereotypes have lead Blair and Banaji (1996) to warn of the pitfalls of 
stereotyping, such as leading individuals to misattribute their stereotypic responses to 
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justifiable causes (e.g., attributes of the target). The automaticity of stereotypes and the 
human ability to introspect also means that individuals may be under the illusion that 
they can ‘control more about [themselves] and [their] universe than [they] actually do, 
and that [they] know what [their] preferences are and why [they] have them’ (Stanley, 
Phelps & Banaji, 2008, p. 164).  
 Although stereotyping can produce positive outcomes (e.g., freeing up cognitive 
resources), stereotyping can also have negative consequences, particularly for the 
stereotyped. Thinking in terms of categories can have the effect of maximizing the 
perceived differences between categories and minimizing the perceived differences 
within categories (Corneille et al., 2002; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Taylor et al., 1978). 
Stereotypes can also influence the tacit inferences individuals make about individuating 
information (Dunning & Sherman, 1997), so that ‘good’ deeds done by stereotypically 
‘bad’ groups can be easily dismissed. The fact that stereotypes can be semantically 
primed (Blair & Banaji, 1996) means that, for example, reading a sentence about a 
Black criminal as opposed to a Black politician can engender dramatically different 
stereotypes about Black people more generally. Stereotypes can therefore create a world 
in which individuals are pigeonholed into distinct categories, and where there is little 
room for mobility and variance.  
Stereotypes are especially likely to come into play given specific contextual and 
individual level factors. Because automatic processes require less cognitive resources 
than controlled processes, stereotypes are more likely to be used when individuals are 
facing cognitive load or constraints (Blair & Banaji, 1996). Stereotypes may therefore 
come into play precisely when they can do the most damage, for instance when 
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individuals are making decisions about how to respond to a situation (and must consider 
many different factors), or when individuals very quickly formulate and express 
attitudes (e.g., about social policies). However, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) show that the 
activation of stereotypes may be less likely under conditions of cognitive load, although 
once activated, their application may be facilitated. And while high and low prejudiced 
people may show the same stereotype activation, personal standards can influence the 
application of stereotypes (Kawakami et al., 2002). There is therefore variance in 
individuals’ propensity to activate and apply stereotypes, and this variance is partly due 
to individuating but also to contextual factors.  
 Stereotypes themselves can change over time and in different contexts. Far from 
being rigid, stereotypes are thought of as being malleable and subject to contextual 
factors (e.g., priming) and personal experiences (e.g., diversity education, receiving 
instructions to change stereotypes) (Bosak & Diekman, 2010). For instance, stereotypes 
(e.g., about Arabs) may only become activated if specific contextual factors (e.g., in the 
context of an airport) are present (Casper et al., 2010). Stereotypes can also change on 
the basis of new or contradicting information, although this is likely to engender ‘sub-
typing’ so as not to make changes to the dominant stereotype (Weber & Crocker, 1983).  
 Stereotyping can also be countered when individuals intend and have the 
cognitive resources to do so (Blair & Banaji, 1996). Internal motivations to control 
stereotypes include feeling a moral obligation to control prejudice, while external 
motivations to control stereotypes include self-presentation concerns (Monteith et al., 
2009). The use of stereotypes can be controlled using top-down processes (e.g., by 
searching for additional non-stereotypical information, or by consciously replacing 
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stereotypic associations with non-stereotypic associations), although these processes are 
more likely to have an effect in the application of stereotypes as opposed to the 
activation of stereotypes (Monteith et al., 2009). Bottom-up processes, such as the 
automatic detection of conflict between implicit and explicit beliefs, can also be 
effective in regulating the use of stereotypes (Monteith et al., 2009; Stanley, Phelps & 
Banaji, 2008). Perspective taking has also been shown to be an effective way to reduce 
the accessibility and application of stereotypes, in part because it increases the overlap 
between representations of self and of outgroups (Galinski & Moskowitz, 2000). 
Although some evidence suggests that stereotype suppression can engender a ‘rebound’ 
effect whereby stereotypes become more accessible, other evidence suggests that factors 
such as individuals’ personal prejudice and reprehension of specific stereotypes can 
result in successful stereotype application suppression (Monteith et al., 1998).   
In summary, social psychologists generally agree that stereotypes are functional 
and are an inevitable feature of social cognition that favours placing new information 
into existing categories (Park, 1992; Taylor et al., 1978). The contentiousness of 
stereotyping, for many researchers, is therefore the content of stereotypes, how 
stereotypes come into being and their effects on attitudes and behaviour (Park, 1992). 
Against the adage that individuals engage in stereotyping because stereotypes ‘work’, 
Park (1992) argues, ‘the particular content of currently shared cultural stereotypes has 
tended to “work” for White men. Women, and most ethnic groups, would see it 
differently’ (p. 182). Such concerns have led some researchers to argue that the 
processes that generate stereotypes and the content of stereotypes should be studied 
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separately (Taylor et al., 1978). The following section turns to the content of stereotypes 
and their role in interpersonal relations.  
Fundamental Dimensions of Interpersonal Perception: Warmth and Competence 
One of the aims of this review is to introduce the criminological audience to an 
important stream of social psychological research on the two fundamental and universal 
dimensions of social judgment and person perception. Bakan (1966) first introduced the 
terms agency (competence) and communion (warmth), and argued that these are ‘two 
fundamental modalities in the existence of living forms, agency for the existence of an 
organism as an individual and communion for the participation of the individual in some 
larger organism of which the individual is part’ (p. 14–15). Competence refers to a 
competent and goal-directed independent orientation (e.g., competent, intelligent, 
assertive, ambitious and decided versus unintelligent, inefficient, passive, lazy and 
indecisive).
5
 Warmth refers to a warm interpersonal orientation (e.g., warm, kind, caring 
and sympathetic versus cold, cruel, egoistic and hardhearted). These two dimensions 
have come to be widely recognized as fundamental and universal dimensions of person 
perception (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, 
Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). For 
the sake of parsimony, the person perception literature will be introduced summarily and 
its relation to crime and punishment will be discussed in more detail. 
                                                 
5
 Those who study dimensions of warmth and competence draw a slight distinction in the features of 
competence. Some scholars, particularly those who study competence as it relates to the self or to 
individual level perceptions, focus on human agency and goal-directedness. On the other hand, those who 
study competence as it relates to intergroup perception focus on inferences drawn from social status and 
deservingness.  
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The two fundamental dimensions of social perception, competence and warmth, 
have been the object of study in personality and in judgments of the self, others and 
social groups (Abele, Cuddy, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2008). Some studies find that perceptions 
of warmth and competence account for as much as 82% of the variance in perceptions of 
others (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998).
6
 Among the dimensions, warmth is 
considered of primary importance and, from a socio-functional perspective, as relevant 
in perceptions of others in every type of social relationship (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; 
Cottrell, Neuberg & Li, 2007). From a relational standpoint, warmth signals the 
intentions of individuals, that is, to help versus harm or to cooperate versus compete, 
and is seen as a more stable feature of personhood (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; 
Kenworthy & Tausch, 2008).  From an ontological perspective, the concept of warmth is 
closely tied to the conception of personhood and, perhaps, by extension to what people 
expect from others (Conway, Côté-Lussier, Giannopoulos & Tabri, unpublished 
findings; Uchronski, 2008; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). Perceptions of warmth are also 
more affect-laden and related behaviours receive more extreme evaluations than 
competence behaviour (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). It is no surprise that 
traits associated with warmth are attended to and processed more quickly, that 
individuals are more sensitive to information relating to warmth and are more likely to 
heed to information that disconfirms rather than confirms warmth (i.e., to demonstrate a 
negativity bias) (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006).  
Although warmth is perceived as being most important in perceptions of others, 
competence is most important for the self (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). For the other, 
                                                 
6
 Note however that this study failed to control for other factors influencing global impressions of others, 
and failed to include traits other than warmth and competence traits.  
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competence is a valued feature and is closely associated with perceived social status, 
especially in individualistic cultures (Judd et al., 2005).  The inference of competence 
from others’ high social status is partly due to the tendency to justify hierarchical 
systems and is even stronger amongst individuals with ideologies that include just-world 
and meritocratic beliefs (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). The inference of competence from 
social status may also be partly due to fundamental attribution errors, as individuals tend 
to attribute others’ behaviour or achievements to internal as opposed to external factors 
(Russell & Fiske, 2008). Wojciszke et al. (1998) found that in evaluating behaviours, 
warm people are liked more when they are higher on competence, than when they are 
low on competence. People low on perceived warmth, on the other hand, are disliked 
independent of competence. 
For criminologists who study punishment, perceptions of others’ and social 
groups’ warmth and competence are of interest for three reasons: perceptions (a) are 
shaped by social structure, (b) they engender strong emotional responses and inform 
approach and avoidance, as well as help versus harm behaviour, and (c) they lead to 
differential causal inferences about behaviour. According to the Stereotype Content 
Model (SCM) inferences about others’ warmth and competence flow from social 
structural factors, with perceived competition (over power and resources) predicting 
perceptions of warmth, and perceived social status predicting perceptions of competence 
(Caprariello, Cuddy & Fiske, 2009; Fiske et al., 2002; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007; 
Russell & Fiske, 2008). Perceptions of these dimensions also fall along dimensions of 
age, gender, ethnicity, income and education (Conway et al., 1996; Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
Perceptions of warmth and competence functionally answer two crucial questions about 
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individuals’ and groups’ good or ill intentions, and their ability to carry out those 
intentions, respectively (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). Typically a positive correlation 
of perceived warmth and competence is found at the individual level (i.e., a halo effect), 
particularly for high-status or ingroup members, and a negative correlation is found at 
the group level (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Kervyn, Judd & 
Yzerbyt, 2009). 
Perceptions of warmth and competence have cognitive, affective and behavioural 
outcomes. First, perceptions of warmth and competence influence cognitive responses 
and inform expectations, evaluations and behavioural attributions (Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). For instance, perceptions of a lack of warmth are diagnostic of 
individuals, such that corresponding behaviour is interpreted as being attributable to 
people’s dispositions as opposed to external factors (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). 
Social status also influences behavioural attributions as individuals tend to place 
insufficient attention on situational factors influencing the behaviour of low-status 
individuals, thus increasing the likelihood of making fundamental attribution errors 
(Conway et al., 1996). The formation of expectations, evaluation and attributions on the 
basis of social perception can partly be explained by the functional link between goals, 
motivation, cognition and attention. For instance, having the goal to avoid certain 
stimuli influences category activation and can lead to narrower conceptual frameworks 
(i.e., mental representations), thus increasing reliance on stereotypes (Forster et al., 
2006). The effect of social stereotypes on cognitive responses is therefore also 
influenced by goals, motivation and socio-cognitive differences (e.g., attributional 
complexity) (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995).  
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According to Fiske and colleagues, perceptions of warmth and competence elicit 
functionally relevant emotions (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). For instance, 
perceiving a successful competitive outgroup would engender perceptions of 
competence, but a lack of warmth. These perceptions would in turn be expected to elicit 
emotions of envy, an ambivalent emotional response that can support taking action 
against this outgroup (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Combinations of perceived 
warmth and competence make up a 2 X 2 circumplex model that specifies specific 
emotional outcomes (see Figure 3).   
         
Figure 2. Quadrants of social perception, emotional and behavioural responses 
according to the SCM and BIAS map. 
 
For those perceived as high on competence, perceived high warmth leads to 
pride or admiration whereas perceived low warmth leads to envy. Those perceived as 
high on warmth and low on competence elicit pity, whereas those low on both elicit 
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contempt and disgust. Neuroimaging studies provide some support for the association 
between social perception and emotion, as brain areas corresponding to specific 
emotions are activated differentially depending on the perceived social group (Harris & 
Fiske, 2006). A summary review of the social perception literature suggests that people 
like warmth, and respect competence. 
Emotional responses elicited by social perception are important in informing 
interpersonal behaviour, such as helping others actively (e.g., assisting, giving, 
promoting equality) or passively (e.g., affiliating with, hiring) and harming others 
actively (e.g., harassing, bullying, discriminating against) or passively (e.g., excluding, 
ignoring) (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). According to Roseman, Wiest and Swartz 
(1994) emotions can be distinguished on the basis of their distinct action tendencies (i.e., 
the impulse or inclination to respond with a particular action) or the ‘emotivational’ 
goals that they elicit. For instance, emotions of fear are most strongly related to 
avoidance action tendencies such as wanting to run away and wanting to get to a safe 
place. On the other hand, emotions of anger are most strongly related to approach action 
tendencies such as wanting to take action, to be aggressive (e.g., lashing out, kicking) 
and to get back at someone (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994). More broadly, this 
perspective suggests that emotion is key in motivating adaptive behaviour. 
Stereotypes About Criminals 
Now that the literatures on punishment and stereotyping have been introduced, the 
reader can be introduced to the criminal stereotype literature. By introducing the 
criminal stereotype literature here, after laying down much of the theoretical and 
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empirical groundwork, the aim is to identify some of the gaps in the literature and 
specify some of the hypotheses addressed in this thesis.  
Stereotypes about criminals suggest that criminals are evil, poor and disliked 
(Carroll et al., 1987; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Reed 
& Reed, 1973; Roberts, 1992; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008).  In the eyes of 
the public, the image conjured up by the word ‘offender’ or ‘criminal’ is typically that of 
‘an outsider, a young, lower-class male, physically unattractive who has been convicted 
of a crime involving violence’ (Roberts, 1992, p. 138). This general stereotype 
underscores the belief that crime is perpetrated by low-status individuals, but also that 
these individuals have ill intent toward others (i.e., to cause harm). However some 
evidence suggests that criminals’ social status can be inferred on the basis of crime type 
or on the basis of the social or occupational status of the offender (e.g., white-collar 
crimes) (Benson & Moore, 1992; Christopher, Marek & May, 2003). More broadly, 
criminals represent a heterogeneous group that includes individuals found guilty of petty 
crimes (e.g., theft), violent crimes (e.g., assault) and white-collar crimes (e.g., fraud). 
Stereotypes about specific types of criminals may therefore vary and interact with other 
features of the offender (e.g., social status, age, ethnicity, gender) and of the offence 
(e.g., crime type). 
Where the criminal stereotype literature is limited, however, is in its 
consideration of the underlying dimensions of criminal stereotypes, and of the functional 
relation between various components of criminal stereotypes. Addressing this gap is a 
preliminary step in establishing the functional relation between criminal stereotypes and 
punitiveness toward crime.  
84 
 
 
H1. It is expected that criminals will be perceived as having a low social status 
and as being competitive toward society, which should engender perceptions of 
low competence and low warmth, respectively.  
 
Although some have argued that endorsing stereotypes about criminals is 
associated with feeling specific emotions toward crime (e.g., anger) (Johnson, 2009) the 
association between the endorsement of stereotypes and emotional responses has yet to 
be established empirically. In previous research, deviant groups such as the homeless, 
drug users and undocumented migrants were found to be perceived as being 
stereotypically hostile and untrustworthy (i.e., low on warmth) and as stupid and 
unmotivated (i.e., low on competence), eliciting emotions such as contempt and disgust 
(Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). More generally, groups perceived as violating normative 
or moral expectations, or outgroups, are perceived as lacking warmth and competence 
and tend to elicit dehumanizing prejudice (e.g., they are perceived as exhibiting less 
human-type emotions), less altruism and empathy, but more disgust and punishment 
(Harris & Fiske, 2006; Vaes, Paladino & Leyens, 2002; Wenzel et al., 2008). 
Criminological research suggests that crime elicits strong public responses such as anger 
and moral outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Darley & Pittman, 2003; de Haan & 
Loader, 2002; Freiberg, 2001; Johnson, 2009) but also fear and worry (Jackson, 2004). 
It is likely that these emotions are tied not only to acts of crime, but also to the 
individuals who commit crime.  
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H2. Stereotypes about criminals are expected to be associated with emotions of 
contempt. 
 
Perceiving groups as lacking warmth and competence and experiencing 
emotions such as contempt and disgust can motivate and justify harmful or punitive 
behaviour against these groups. For example, in the U.S., research on racial stereotypes 
about criminals suggests that the cognitive association between black people and apes 
can lead to justifying police brutality toward black people. Perceived threat and 
competition from black people also predicts punitiveness, while racism partly accounts 
for the divide in white and black people’s support for the death penalty in the USA 
(King & Wheelock, 2007; Unnever & Cullen, 2007).  More broadly, emotions of anger 
and moral outrage predict desires to punish specific crimes as well as support for harsh 
criminal justice policy (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Graham, Weiner & Zucker, 1997; 
Johnson, 2009). Stereotypes about criminals may therefore engender strong emotional 
and behavioural responses that can engender and support punitiveness toward crime.  
 
H3. Emotions of contempt are expected to be associated with behavioural 
intentions to exclude as well as attack criminals.  
 
H4. Emotions of contempt (e.g., anger, moral outrage) and attacking behavioural 
intentions are expected to be associated with harsher punitive decisions and 
attitudes.  
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To date, the punishment literature has established some of the cognitive 
pathways that link perceptions of crime to desires for punishment. These pathways 
include judgments pertaining to the offender’s intent to commit the crime and 
attributions for crime, and judgments of the wrongfulness, harmfulness and seriousness 
of a crime. However the punishment literature has yet to consider the effect of criminal 
stereotypes on these perceptions and judgments. The primacy of perceptions of others’ 
warmth and competence in influencing inferences about others’ behaviour suggests that 
stereotypes about criminals will affect individuals’ perceptions and judgments of crime. 
For instance, the tendency to consider a lack of warmth as being a stable and 
dispositional feature of a person suggests that stereotypes about criminals will increase 
perceptions of intent and internal attributions for crime, and in turn influence judgments 
of a crime (e.g., wrongfulness, harmfulness, seriousness). Stereotypes about criminals 
may be especially important in considering aggravating and mitigating factors where it 
is hypothesized that punitive intuitions are most at play (Roberts, 2008; Blasi & Jost, 
2006). For instance, the expression of remorse and more general indicators of empathy 
have been shown to be important mitigating factors in the eyes of the public and in 
sentencing, as underscored by Roberts (2008) in the following excerpt:  
The classic case is the offender who saves another person from drowning or 
performs some other act of exceptional bravery shortly before or after 
conviction. It is unclear why this kind of action should be considered to justify 
leniency, yet sentencers may well be tempted to mitigate the sentence on this 
basis. Indeed, there is a very strong intuitive appeal to a policy of mitigating 
sentences for offenders who have a history of very creditable behaviour […] 
Most jurisdictions permit courts to recognise a mitigating factor that is unrelated 
to the principal theoretical orientation of sentencing. 
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Perceptions of competence have also been shown to increase punitiveness 
toward high-status individuals who commit low-status crimes such as tax fraud 
(Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Fragale et al., 2009). This association may be 
explained in part by attributions of intent or causal responsibility, but also on the basis 
of violations of expectations of trust given to the perpetrator of the crime, particularly to 
those in positions of authority (Rebovich & Kane, 2004). 
Because others’ warmth is a diagnostic feature of social perception, stereotypes 
about criminals may also lead to inferences that criminals are likely to recidivate. The 
perceived malleability of the very nature of a person therefore has clear policy 
implications in the context of crime, for instance in expressing support for indeterminate 
sentencing (Maruna & King, 2004).  
 
H5. It is expected that perceptions of criminals’ low warmth is associated with 
increased perceived intent and attributions of dispositional causal responsibility, 
and lower perceptions of remorse. 
 
H6. It is expected that perceptions of criminals’ low warmth is associated with 
an increase in the judged wrongfulness, harmfulness and seriousness of an 
offence, and in turn with more punitiveness toward crime. 
Political Ideology, Stereotypes and Punitiveness: A Motivated Social Cognition 
Perspective  
To date, this review has centred on the predictors of punitiveness, but not on predictors 
of the endorsement of stereotypes. Political ideology, which has been linked to 
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punitiveness toward crime, has also been linked to racial, sexual and gender based 
prejudice (Allport, 1929; Bassett, 2010; Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Christopher & Mull, 
2006; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Feather et al., 2001; Herek; 2000; 
Hurwitz & Peffley, 1992; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994; King & Maruna, 2009; 
Kreindler, 2005; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007; 
Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). A principle theoretical framework used to explain the 
association between ideological positions and social and political preferences is Jost and 
colleagues’ (2003) Motivated Social Cognition Perspective (MSCP). This theoretical 
framework suggests that individuals’ endorsement of stereotypes, political ideology and 
punitiveness can be partly explained by the elective affinity between psychological 
needs and ideology (Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009). The MSCP aims 
at developing a model of relational, epistemic and existential needs and preferences that 
underlie ideological outcomes, and to link socio-cognitive motives to the contents of 
specific political attitudes. It also identifies some of the dispositional and situational 
factors that are associated with different belief systems, and underscores the 
functionality of belief systems and ideology.  
The MSCP is grounded in the premise that belief systems and ideologies are 
adhered to on the basis of dispositional and situational antecedents. Dispositional 
antecedents include psychological needs for order and closure, needs to manage 
uncertainty and minimize threat, openness to experience and change, cognitive and 
attributional complexity; while situational antecedents refer to specific threats (e.g., 
mortality salience or threats to the system, such as an economic crisis) (Jost, et al., 2003; 
Jost & Hunyady, 2005; van Hiel, Kossowska & Mervielde, 2000; van Hiel & Mervielde, 
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2004). The basic assumption is that everyone is motivated to resolve uncertainty but that 
people vary in the extent to which they are aversive of uncertainty and that this is 
reflected in belief systems.  
According to this framework, political orientation is related to two separate 
processes: (a) uncertainty avoidance (e.g., due to psychological needs for order, 
intolerance of ambiguity or lack of openness to experience) and (b) threat management 
(e.g., due to death anxiety, perceptions of a dangerous world or system threat) (Jost et 
al., 2007). Those who endorse right-wing ideologies therefore do so partly because ‘it 
serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, and 
ambiguity; and to explain, order, and justify inequality among groups and individuals’ 
(Jost et al., 2003, p. 340; Thorisdottir et al., 2007).  Conversely, ideology also reinforces 
psychological needs and orientations toward the world (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 
2003; Jost et al., 2007). 
More generally, people are motivated to perceive social arrangements as just, 
fair and legitimate.  Ideologies and belief systems that provide rationalizations and 
justifications for existing social, economic and political arrangements therefore result in 
more subjective comfort with the status quo (Blasi & Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Jost, Burgess & Mosso, 2001; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009; Jost, 
Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003; Wakslak et al., 2007). 
Using this framework, it is possible to build a comprehensive model linking 
stereotypes about criminals, ideology and punitiveness toward crime. The crux of this 
model is to consider punishment and stereotypes’ relational, epistemic and existential 
components. First, from a relational perspective, theories of interpersonal behaviour and 
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evidence suggest that people are deeply attuned to the intentions of others, specifically 
to whether they intend to compete or cooperate. Endorsing stereotypes about criminals 
would therefore fulfil relational needs to predict others’ behaviour and engender 
punitive responses through the cognitive and emotional processes outlined above. 
Second, from an epistemic perspective, endorsing stereotypes about criminals 
helps render the world a predictable and orderly place. Believing, for instance, that 
avoiding impoverished areas and unsavoury individuals could reduce the risk of 
victimization could increase subjective comfort (Jackson & Gray, 2010). Recall that 
people are also motivated to adopt stereotypes about warmth and competence, to the 
extent that such stereotypes justify inequality (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Oldmeadow & 
Fiske, 2007). Endorsing stereotypes and punishing crime can therefore help render the 
world an orderly and predictable place (Heider, 1944).  
Lastly, from an existential perspective, violations of expectations have been 
shown to heighten physiological responses associated with uncertainty and perceived 
threat, particularly for individuals with high needs for uncertainty avoidance (Mendes et 
al., 2007). Existential threats (e.g., concern about crime, fear of crime, economic 
insecurity) themselves have been found to contribute to punitiveness toward crime 
(Costelloe, Chiricos & Gertz 2009). Stereotypes that suggest that criminals are not 
trustworthy or empathetic may therefore communicate existential threat and increase 
punitiveness toward crime.  
In the context of punitiveness, political conservatism and two ideological 
systems have been found to robustly predict punishment of crime: right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). RWA is related to 
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political cultural conservatism and is defined as conventionalism (a preference for 
tradition and stability), authoritarian submission (a deference to authority) and 
authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer, 1981). RWA is strongly associated with 
punitiveness toward crime (Jost et al., 2003) and is positively correlated with feeling 
anger, which in itself can be associated with aggressive behaviours and support for 
aggressive policies (Skitka et al., 2006).  SDO is related to political economic 
conservatism and is defined by a preference for hierarchical as opposed to equal 
intergroup relations, as well as a tendency to want one’s ingroup to be on top of that 
hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). SDO is also defined by a lack of empathy (Pratto et al., 
1994; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2007) which itself is associated with increased 
punitiveness toward crime (Costelloe et a., 2002; Weiner, 1993).   
Punitiveness is also associated with the socio-cognitive motives that underlie 
these ideological positions such as psychological needs for order, predictability and 
control, a preference for authority and convention, and vindictiveness toward deviants 
(Jost et al., 2003). On the other hand, decreased punitiveness is associated with socio-
cognitive motives such as needs for cognition and attributional complexity (Sargent, 
2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008).  
Based on the MSCP and previous findings, it is possible to make specific 
predictions as to the association between certain socio-cognitive motivations, ideology, 
the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime. 
 
H7. It is expected that politically conservative individuals and/or individuals 
who are high on RWA, SDO or psychological needs for order will: 
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1.  Be more likely to endorse stereotypes about criminals; 
2. Perceive criminals as demonstrating more intent and causal    
responsibility; 
3. Judge an offence as being more wrongful, harmful and serious; 
4. Experience more moral outrage or anger toward crime and criminals; 
5. Express more punitive desires and attitudes. 
General Discussion 
The central aim of this thesis is to provide evidence that individuals’ punitiveness 
toward crime relates to fundamental dimensions of social perception captured by 
criminal stereotypes, their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes, and to 
political ideology. This review began by considering some of the key predictors of 
punitiveness toward crime such as individuals’ dispositions (e.g., cognitive styles), 
motivations and punishment goals. Many of these predictors interact with each other to 
help explain variance in punitive desires and attitudes. This section provided the 
criminological backbone upon which this thesis relies to test the importance of criminal 
stereotypes in shaping responses to crime.  
Next, this review broadened the scope of the study of punitiveness toward crime 
by situating punishment in the broader context of social life. In this section, punishment 
was discussed as a component of basic competitive and cooperative behaviour, themes 
picked up on by criminological theories of punishment (e.g., conflict perspective, 
utilitarian and moral theories of punishment). This section provided the basis upon 
which it was argued that punitiveness, in the context of criminal justice, is related to 
processes that operate in other spheres of everyday life, such as social perception and 
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affect. In situating punishment of crime in the broader context of social life, the hope is 
to firmly implant the criminological study of punishment in the social cognition, 
interpersonal perception and behaviour literature. As outlined in this review, the study of 
public punitiveness toward crime can benefit greatly from being repositioned and 
considered as a form of interpersonal behaviour, subject to systematic cognitive and 
affective processes.  
Finally, this review moved onto the key theoretical frameworks applied in this 
thesis; the Stereotype Content Model and the Motivated Social Cognition Perspective. 
Despite advancements in the study of social psychological processes that are associated 
with punitiveness toward crime, research on criminal stereotypes has largely been 
atheoretical and has failed to systematically measure the pathways that link social 
perception to punishment of crime. By borrowing from the intergroup perception and 
behaviour literature and applying the SCM and BIAS map, this thesis makes important 
contributions to the criminological study of punishment.  
The SCM and BIAS map frameworks are applied in the first and second papers 
to identify the content and social structural determinants of criminal stereotypes, and 
their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes. The third paper reconciles some of 
the extant criminological research on cognitive and affective predictors of punishment 
with the social stereotype and cognition literature. Specifically, the paper draws on 
criminological findings on the importance of attributions of intent and causal 
responsibility in generating judgments regarding the seriousness of crime, and strong 
affective responses such as moral outrage. Part of the motivation for considering the role 
of criminal stereotypes in shaping these perceptions and judgments emerge from 
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reviews of the neuroscientific and interpersonal perception and behaviour literature. 
Namely, these literatures draw attention to the cognitive importance of establishing 
order (e.g., by attributing intent and internal causal responsibility), and of moral 
emotions and concerns with fairness in punishment.  
The fourth and fifth papers continue to address some of these broader questions 
regarding the nature of punitiveness – specifically, whether it takes form in punitive 
intuitions. These papers draw on literatures that suggest that punitiveness is a basic 
feature of social life that should be associated with systematic cognitive and affective 
processes. To test these hypotheses, and address some of the gaps in the criminological 
literature, a methodology that allows for the measurement of individuals’ intuitive 
desires to punish stereotypical criminals is developed. The association between strong 
affective responses (e.g., anger) and punitive intuitions is also tested.  
The second and third papers also consider the role of political ideology in 
influencing the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and shaping punitiveness toward 
crime. This research contributes to the political psychology literature, by identifying 
some of the cognitive and affective pathways that link ideology to the endorsement of 
criminal stereotypes and punishment of crime.  
As a whole, this thesis makes an important contribution to the social perception 
literature, where there has been relatively little work on criminal stereotypes. While the 
interpersonal perception literature has identified some of the behavioural outcomes of 
social stereotypes, studying criminal stereotypes provides the unique opportunity to 
observe the effect of social perception on state-sanctioned and publicly endorsed 
aggressive responses to a social group. To date, much of the research applying the SCM 
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has fallen short of considering the social and political consequences of the affective and 
behavioural outcomes of stereotypes. This thesis therefore addresses an important gap in 
the interpersonal perception and behaviour literature by observing the effect of criminal 
stereotypes on policy preferences.  
One of the main contributions of this thesis is also to address some of the 
methodological limitations of measurements of punitiveness identified in the 
criminological literature. By measuring the association between criminal stereotypes and 
punitive decisions, attitudes and intuitions, this thesis aims to overcome some of the 
pitfalls of measuring punitive attitudes by asking individuals if ‘the courts are too 
lenient’. Previous research suggests that these overly simplistic measures can generate 
an inaccurate assessment of actual punitive desires (Doob & Roberts, 1984; Roberts, 
1992). This thesis argues, in part, that simple measures of punitiveness are likely to 
engender responses on the basis of criminal stereotypes and punitive intuitions, as 
opposed to careful consideration of current punitive practices and of the implications of 
harsh criminal justice policies.  
A key implication of this thesis is that punishment of crime results from 
systematic cognitive and affective processes that are influenced by criminal stereotypes. 
This research could help explain, for instance, punitive trends such as the tendency to 
punish low-status groups more-so than high-status groups, but also puzzling punitive 
trends such as the general tendency to punish small-scale property offences (i.e., theft) 
more often, and occasionally more harshly, than white-collar crime offences (i.e., crimes 
committed in the context of work for personal or institutional benefit) that have 
comparatively larger fiscal and social consequences (Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Helms, 
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2009; Tonry, 2007). From a policy perspective, this research suggests that criminal 
justice policies implemented on the basis of public opinion polls could be out of line 
with individuals’ actual punitive desires and concerns about fairness or equity. Such a 
misalignment between policies and preferences could threaten the perceived legitimacy 
of the criminal justice system (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tyler, 1990). More 
importantly, implementing increasingly harsh criminal justice policies will continue to 
have devastating effects on convicted criminals and have serious fiscal, social and 
political consequences for society more broadly.  
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Paper 1 
The evil, poor and disliked: Applying the Stereotype Content Model to study the 
content and social structural determinants of the criminal stereotype 
 
Ample research suggests that disadvantaged individuals are not treated equally 
under the law. Yet, little research considers the functional relation between 
criminals’ social status and perceptions and responses to crime. This paper 
applies the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) to study the content and social 
structural determinants of criminal stereotypes.  Study 1 examines the criminal 
cognitive associative network. The results suggest that when thinking about a 
criminal, individuals spontaneously think about a cold, violent but competent 
criminal and about society's responses to criminals (e.g., in terms of 
punishment). Study 2 investigates the content and social structural determinants 
of group-level criminal stereotypes. The results suggest that criminals' perceived 
low social status and competitiveness against society partly explain perceptions 
of criminals' lack of warmth (e.g., kind, trustworthy) and lack of competence 
(e.g., intelligent, efficient). Study 3 uses an experimental methodology, 
replicating some of the key findings from Study 2, while also disentangling 
street-criminal and white-collar criminal stereotypes. The results provide support 
for the application of the SCM to study criminal stereotypes and attitudes toward 
crime. Findings are discussed in terms of the importance of social status in 
generating perceptions of a cold and cruel criminal, and the potential effects of 
criminal stereotypes on attitudes toward crime. 
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What! Because we are poor, shall we be vicious? [...] Pray, what means have you 
to keep me from the galleys, or the gallows? – John Webster, The White Devil 
(1612) 
In his review of crime in 18
th
 to 20
th
 century English society, Emsley (1996) identified 
social class as the lens through which criminality was understood. Fast forward to 
present times and we find a number of theoretical approaches and empirical studies that 
link poverty and social inequality to crime in Western and developing societies (Choe, 
2008; Donohue, 2007; Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 
1997).
7
 The association between crime and poverty is not only the interest of academics, 
popular media and lay conceptions of criminality also draw links between poverty and 
crime (Davis, 1990; Roberts, 1992). Situating the crime problem among the poor has 
had important socio-political consequences, suggesting for instance that the poor use 
crime as a means to compete for power and resources. Principles of justice suggest that 
individuals should receive fair trials and be treated equally under the law. Yet the effects 
of harsh criminal justice policies are felt most strongly by those in the margins of 
society, such as the youth, the poor, the homeless, ethnic minorities and those with 
mental health problems (Bazemore, 2007; Bobo, 2004; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; 
Garland, 2001; Harcourt, 2007; Helms, 2009; James & Glaze, 2006; Pettit & Western, 
2004; Robinson & Darley, 2007; Teplin, 1990).  
                                                 
7
 But see Neumayer (2005) for a criticism of empirical evidence suggesting an income inequality-crime 
link. 
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This study explores whether there is an empirical link between thinking that 
crime is more prevalent among the poor, and believing that criminals are cold and cruel. 
This is an important question: if widely circulating representations present criminals as 
poor, disadvantaged and lacking in character; if people are quick to endorse these 
stereotypes; and if these stereotypes engender punitive sentiments and intuitions – then, 
the criminal justice system will feel pressure to be especially harsh in its punishment of 
law-breakers. The present research applies the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Fiske 
et al., 2006) – a theoretical framework designed to identify the social structural 
determinants and content of social stereotypes – to study criminal stereotypes and help 
explain attitudes toward crime and punishment. According to the SCM, the content of 
social stereotypes are important predictors of affective and behavioural responses to 
social groups and can help explain, for example, the dehumanization of social groups 
such as the homeless (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske, 2009). The SCM has a unique ability – 
when applied to attitudes towards crime, justice and punishment – to intervene in an 
important question for many modern societies: what drives popular punitive sentiment 
towards criminals?  
Drawing together the findings of three studies, the present paper suggests that 
thinking about the ‘criminal’ social category activates thoughts related to criminals’ low 
socio-economic status and lack of warmth. These thoughts reflect a dislike of criminals 
but also thoughts relating to society’s response to criminals. In line with predictions 
made by the SCM, criminal stereotypes indicate a shared perception of criminals’ low 
social status and competitiveness against society, two key social structural determinants 
of criminals’ low perceived warmth and competence. The effect of the criminal label is 
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especially detrimental for street-criminals as opposed to white-collar criminals, given 
that the former group are perceived as having a decidedly lower social status. These 
findings also provide further evidence that perceived social status can influence 
inferences of warmth (see Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). The evidence suggests that 
criminals’ perceived cruelty results not only from their involvement in criminal 
behaviour but also from their perceived low economic, educational and career 
achievements. This role of perceived social status in shaping stereotypes about 
criminals’ lack of warmth is particularly meaningful as previous research suggests that 
perceptions of warmth motivate negative affective and behavioural responses, for 
example excluding and attacking others (Cuddy et al., 2007; Wojciszke, Bazinska & 
Jaworski, 1998).  
Stereotypes About Criminals 
In the eyes of the public, the image conjured up by the word ‘offender’ or ‘criminal’ is 
typically that of ‘an outsider, a young, lower-class male, [who is] physically unattractive 
[and] who has been convicted of a crime involving violence’ (Roberts, 1992, p. 138). 
Criminals are stereotypically thought of as being uneducated, sloppy or dirty, a loner or 
a gang member, as being psychologically maladjusted and as being evil or mean (Reed 
& Reed, 1973). When picked apart, criminal stereotypes reflect three key components: 
(a) criminals’ low social status, (b) criminals’ cruel nature, and (c) the public’s dislike of 
criminals.  
The first component of the criminal stereotype – a low social status – has been a 
predominant feature of criminological research. Emsley (1996) identified class as being 
the lens through which the crime problem was perceived in British society from the 
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middle of the 18
th
 century up until the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Today, things have 
changed very little as criminal stereotypes continue to fall along class dimensions, 
reflecting a traditional concern with the poor’s ‘immoral’ or ‘disorderly’ behaviour. For 
the past 20 years, much of the research on criminal stereotypes has emerged from the 
United States where a central issue is the association between crime and (young) Black 
males (see for example, Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Plant et al., 
2005; Steen, Engen & Gainey, 2005). The racialization of criminal stereotypes in the 
United States is partly related to the association between crime and poverty or social 
inequality (see Pettit & Western, 2004).  
The second component of the criminal stereotype relates to criminals’ perceived 
dispositional evilness or predatory nature. According to Chapman (1968), criminals are 
stereotypically thought to be ‘socially pathological persons [who] are physically, 
psychologically, or racially inferior, or – a recent variation – members of a cultural 
subgroup’ (p. 25). Chapman argues that there has been a shift from searching for 
physiological distinctions (e.g., in terms of phrenology or anthropometry) between 
criminals and non-criminals to demonstrating the ‘socially inferior’ qualities of the 
criminal. Indeed, there is a tendency to think about violent, recidivating criminals when 
thinking about crime (Roberts & White, 1986). More generally, individuals (particularly 
those who are more punitive) tend to endorse stereotypes which suggest that individuals 
commit crime because they are essentially evil or callous (Carroll et al., 1987; Carlsmith 
& Darley, 2008; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 
2008). 
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Criminals’ perceived low social status and cruel nature appear to be associated 
with the third component of the criminal stereotype: dislike. Previous findings, which 
suggest that criminals are stereotypically thought of as being unattractive, dirty and 
sloppy, may reflect a general dislike of this social group. Individuals demonstrate 
implicit associations between unattractiveness and negative evaluations (i.e., dislike) 
(McConnell et al., 2008). However, criminals can also be subject to the ‘Robin Hood’ 
stereotype (i.e., that of the smart and friendly criminal, see MacLin & Herrera, 2006; 
Steckmesser, 1966), suggesting some variation in endorsed criminal stereotypes.  
However, despite the extant research on criminal stereotypes, the findings 
remain somewhat disparate, and have not yet been reconciled with current research and 
theory on interpersonal perception. The present research seeks to put content into 
otherwise seemingly amorphous criminal stereotypes, and draws upon social 
psychological theory on interpersonal and intergroup perception.   
The Stereotype Content Model  
Criminological research on criminal stereotypes remains for the most part atheoretical 
and has failed to draw meaningful links between components of criminal stereotypes. 
This is especially surprising since social psychological research on stereotypes has 
generated, over the past 30 years, a more comprehensive approach to study the 
cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes of social stereotypes. Widespread 
consensus amongst many social psychologists suggests that stereotypes reflect the ‘Big 
Two’ fundamental dimensions of social perception – that is, perceptions of warmth and 
competence (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, 
Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). The 
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Stereotype Content Model has emerged as a leading theoretical framework to study 
stereotypes about social groups in various social and cultural settings (Fiske et al., 2002; 
2006; Fiske, 2009). The SCM emphasizes the functionality of social stereotypes in 
interpersonal relations, suggesting that stereotypes are a predictable feature of any social 
system in which social groups must compete for resources and are varyingly successful 
in this task. Perceptions of warmth and competence answer questions that are 
fundamental for survival and social relationships: What are others’ intentions? How 
capable are others of carrying out their intentions?  
Correlational and experimental studies suggest that at an intergroup level – 
where individuals are aware of a common group membership, and members of that 
group experience ‘group identification’ (Tajfel, 1982) – perceptions of these two 
dimensions are partly explained by social structural factors of competition and social 
status (Caprariello, Cuddy & Fiske, 2009). Perceived competition generates stereotypes 
about an outgroup’s warmth, as perceivers make inferences about others’ intentions 
toward the ingroup and attribute these intentions to inherent traits (Russell & Fiske, 
2008; see also Esses et al., 2001, for the role of competition in generating prejudice). 
These attributions generate perceptions of low warmth and dislike. A group’s relative 
status and social standing is also attributed to dispositional as opposed to situational 
causes and generates corresponding perceptions of competence. Successful high-status 
groups are therefore perceived as being more competent than unsuccessful low-status 
groups (Conway et al., 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). But, according to Oldmeadow and 
Fiske (2007), to the extent that warmth stereotypes also justify social inequalities, status 
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may also predict warmth, particularly among those with system-justifying beliefs (see 
Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004, on system justification theory).  
In the context of crime and punishment, the SCM also has important socio-
political implications, notably that policies that strip criminals of their social status (e.g., 
by further isolating them from society through imprisonment) can have the effect of 
contributing to stereotypical perceptions of criminals (see Pettit & Western, 2004, on the 
detrimental effects of imprisonment). Previous research also suggests that stereotypes 
are functional in that they have been linked to basic approach and avoidance behaviour 
(Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998) as well as to specific affective and behavioural 
outcomes (Cuddy et al., 2007). These findings may help explain why endorsing criminal 
stereotypes has been identified as an important predictor of public support for harsh 
criminal justice policy (Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Correll et al., 2007; Gordon & 
Anderson, 1995; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Johnson, 2009; 
Roberts, 1992; Tam, Leung & Chiu, 2008). 
This paper argues that criminal stereotypes reflect fundamental dimensions of 
social perception – warmth and competence. By applying the SCM, this paper 
hypothesizes that criminal stereotypes are affected not only by direct experiences with 
crime or by indirect knowledge of crime (e.g., through news reports), but also by social 
structural determinants that are partly static (e.g., based on the perception that criminals 
compete against society, presumably a stable feature of engaging in criminal activity), 
and partly dynamic (e.g., based on the perception that criminals have a low social status, 
a feature of criminals that is variant). Given previous findings, one would expect 
criminals to be perceived as being particularly low on warmth but also low on 
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competence: criminals are often described and perceived as having bad intentions 
toward society (Carroll et al., 1987) and as having a low social status (Roberts, 1992).  
Overview of Three Studies 
Study 1 identifies the concepts that are relevant in individuals’ construal of the 
‘criminal’. Study 2 then applies the SCM, testing the hypothesis that criminal 
stereotypes reflect fundamental dimensions of social perception and are shaped by social 
structural factors. Finally, Study 3 gives consideration to variation in criminal 
stereotypes (on the basis of the type of crime a criminal has committed); some of the 
findings from Study 2 are replicated using an experimental methodology.  
Study 1: The ‘Criminal’ Associative Network 
Previous studies have identified some of the key constructs associated with the criminal 
stereotype, such as notions of poverty and cruelty. This study aims to replicate these 
findings using a methodology that steers away from imposing a theoretical framework 
or specific constructs (e.g., warmth, competence, age, ethnicity) on individuals’ 
stereotypes about criminals. Exploring individuals’ cognitive associations with the 
‘criminal’ social construct is helpful in addressing issues of accessibility (i.e., the most 
quickly recalled concepts), priming (i.e., the activation of constructs based on 
conceptual or semantic links) and salience (i.e., the prevalence of concepts in the 
associative network) (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
 The methods of analysis used in this study operate at two levels. A first analysis 
takes participants’ words at their ‘face value’, observing the occurrence of constructs 
and the associations between constructs in the ‘criminal’ associative network. A 
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problem with this method is that one fails to recognize concepts that are semantically or 
conceptually related, but that are used differentially across individuals. For instance, 
person A may think of ‘murderer’ and immediately think of ‘wrong’, while person B 
may think of ‘killer’ and immediately think of ‘bad’. Substantively, these conceptual 
links are virtually identical. But the constructs representing these links are different.  
The second method of analysis abstracts from the specific words used by 
participants to identify the broader conceptual constructs that these words represent. 
This is accomplished by using a coding scheme to systematically categorize 
participants’ responses and observe the association between these broader categories. 
Together, these methods overcome some of the pitfalls associated with analyzing open-
ended data – including the failure to identify context and underlying concepts (e.g., by 
using quantitative word-based analyses) and the imposition of meaning onto 
participants’ responses (e.g., by using researcher-generated coding schemes) (Jackson & 
Trochim, 2002).   
Participants 
Participants (N = 169)
8
 were university students in London who filled out a survey at a 
booth located on campus for the chance to win one of several cash prizes (ranging from 
£25 or $37.50USD, to £200 or $300USD) and/or a £2.50 ($3.75USD) voucher for 
university catering services. For the 165 participants who reported their age, mean age 
was 21.93 (SD = 4.72) (min = 18, max = 56). The sample consisted of 103 men, and 64 
women (two participants did not report their gender). Sixty percent of the sample 
reported spending most of their youth in the United Kingdom. White British students 
                                                 
8
 Four participants were excluded from the analyses as they failed to provide responses.  
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made up 32% of the sample, while 18% were White students from a non-British 
background. The remainder of the study was 27% Asian British (e.g., Indian, 
Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 4% British African or Caribbean and 19% were from other 
ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). The sample 
was equally distributed in terms of social class, with 30% reporting being from the 
working-class or lower-middle class, 39% from the middle-class and 31% from upper-
middle and upper class. 
Methodology and results 
Participants filled out a larger survey (containing measures that are not presented here) 
containing the following instructions on the first page: “write down as many words that 
come to mind when you think about a criminal, in the order that they come to mind, 
using the [20] spaces provided below” [emphasis in original text]. Participants generated 
approximately 700 different words or word-segments (i.e., 2-5 words describing a single 
idea). On average, participants wrote down approximately 12 words (M = 11.55, SD = 
4.63), with a minimum of 1 word and a maximum of 20 words. Words occurring most 
frequently included thief (n = 37), prison (n = 34), bad (n = 30), violen(t/ce) (n = 28), 
police (n = 27) and murder (n = 25) (see Table 1). 
Alceste analysis. A first analysis was conducted on the actual words participants 
wrote. This analysis was conducted using Alceste, which is a software program designed 
to analyze qualitative data using quantitative methods that combine correspondence 
analysis and descending hierarchical classification. Alceste substitutes meaning by 
treating each word stem (e.g., ‘ang+’ for anger, angry, angered) as an object and looking 
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for other objects which tend to occur nearby. It then observes whether identified co-
occurrences tend to be present across bodies or segments of text. The underlying idea is  
 
Table 1 
Words Occurring ≥10 Times in Total Word Sample (Study 1) 
Word Frequency Word Frequency 
Thief 37 Robbery 14 
Prison 34 Drugs 14 
Bad 30 Wrong 13 
Violen(t/ce) 28 Violence 13 
Police 27 Poor 13 
Murder 25 Murderer 13 
Desperate 20 Justice 13 
Crime 20 Dangerous 13 
Theft 16 Court 11 
Money 16 Burglar 11 
Law 16 Angry 11 
Jail 16 Thug 10 
Violent 15 Rapist 10 
Selfish 15 Knife 10 
Rape 15 Fraud 10 
Evil 15 - - 
129 
 
that speech co-occurrences reflect meaningful ways of thinking about a given topic. 
Alceste’s main weakness is its inability to find meaning between words that are 
semantically related but do not appear within close proximity of each other in a body of 
text. For instance, Alceste would not ‘know’ – so to speak – that the word ‘killer’ and 
‘murderer’ are two instances of the same construct (i.e., a person who commits 
homicide).  
To generate classes of words that reflect ways of thinking about a given topic, 
Alceste first generates larger classes of words that tend to co-occur together and then 
uses descending hierarchical classification to create final word classes that are most 
distinct from each other (i.e., representing separate themes), using a chi-square criterion. 
The total number of classes of words and their contents reflect the themes present in a 
body of text, and a hierarchy of these themes. In order to use Alceste, the body of text to 
be analyzed must show thematic coherence and be sufficiently large, so as to produce 
stable and meaningful analyses.   
Alceste was able to classify approximately 75% of participants’ responses into 
one of the three classes of words representing individuals’ thinking about criminals. The 
dendogram produced by Alceste (to be read from right to left) suggests that Alceste first 
distinguished between two classes of words, and later pulled apart two further classes 
within a broader class (see Figure 1). The largest class of words (44%), which will be 
referred to as the criminal features class, reflected three themes: (a) a lack of warmth 
(e.g., ‘evil’, ‘inconsiderate’, ‘selfish’, ‘cruel’), (b) a disturbed or violent nature (e.g., 
‘dangerous’, ‘dark’, ‘disturbed’, ‘violent’, ‘angry’), and (c) a certain level of cold-
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competence (e.g., ‘clever’, ‘sly’). This class signals not only the type of person that 
criminals are, but also the threat that they represent.  
The crime and justice class (19%) and crime features class (37%) dealt with 
issues related to crime and justice more broadly and to crime types and features of 
crime, respectively. Words most representative of the crime and justice class include 
‘justice’, ‘judge’, ‘crime’, and ‘victim’. Words most representative of the crime features 
class include ‘rape’, ‘murder’, ‘violence’, ‘robber’, ‘police’, ‘thief’ and ‘burglar’. Words 
linking the two classes represent the criminal justice systems’ responses to criminals 
such as ‘convict’ and ‘prison’.  
 
Figure 1 
Alceste Dendogram Representing Hierarchical Classification of Word Classes (Study 1) 
 
                    ----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| 
 Crime and justice 
 class             |--------------------------+                       
                                              |---------------------+ 
 Crime features                               |                     | 
 class             |--------------------------+                     |                                           
                                                                    |            
 Criminal features                                                  + 
 class             |------------------------------------------------+ 
 
These results suggest that when the ‘criminal’ social category was activated, 
much of individuals’ spontaneous thoughts related to criminals’ lack of warmth, cold-
competence, and about the threat that criminals represent. Individuals also 
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spontaneously thought of notions related to justice, to society’s legal response to 
criminals in terms of the social institutions that deal with criminals (e.g., judges, police), 
and to different types of criminal behaviour (e.g., robbery, theft, rape).  
Latent class analysis. A second analysis was conducted using a coding scheme 
to categorize participants’ responses into broader concepts.9 By using a coding scheme it 
is possible to move away from the specificity of words (e.g., ‘murderer’, ‘rapist’) and 
observe patterns in the broader concepts (e.g., violent crime) reflected in individuals’ 
thoughts about criminals. In total 63 codes were developed to capture the word 
categories reflected in participants’ responses (see Table 2). The results suggest that the 
top ten word categories accounted for nearly half (48%) of participants’ responses and 
included words relating to criminals’ lack of warmth and poverty, crime type (e.g., 
violent crime, property crime), law and legal responses (e.g., criminal designations, 
prison) and the wrongfulness of crime (see Table 3). 
Using information about the order in which words appeared in participants’ 
responses, it is possible to observe how ‘early’ (on average) concepts enter individuals’ 
stream of consciousness when they think of the word ‘criminal’. In this respect, the 
open-ended method is well suited for establishing order or priming patterns in cognitive 
associations. The mean order of the top ten word categories reveals that when thinking 
about criminals, individuals were most quickly drawn to notions of property crime and 
wrongfulness (see Table 4).  
 
 
                                                 
9
 This coding scheme was developed based on a subsample of participants’ responses with the help of the 
same research assistant who coded all participants’ responses.  
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Table 2 
63 Word Categories (Study 1) 
 
1 Crime type - Violent (e.g., murder, robber) 
2 Crime type - Property (e.g., thief, steal) 
3 Crime type - White-collar (e.g., fraud, hacker) 
4 Crime type - Drugs (e.g., drugs, high) 
5 Crime type - Alcohol (e.g., drunk, alcoholic) 
6 Crime type - Vandalism (e.g., vandalism, graffiti) 
7 Crime type-  Nuisance (e.g., nuisance, loitering) 
8 Crime type - Organized (e.g., gang, thug) 
9 Crime type - Terrorism (e.g., terrorist, terrorism) 
10 Crime type - Sex crimes (e.g., pedophile, pimp) 
11 Violence (e.g., violent, rough) 
12 Emotions Positive (e.g., happy, joyful) 
13 Emotions Negative (e.g., angry, sad) 
14 Harm (e.g., harm, pain) 
15 Justice (e.g., justice, unfair) 
16 Authority (e.g., respect, authority) 
17 Loyalty (e.g., betray, tradition) 
18 Purity (e.g., disgusting, dirty) 
19 Wrong (e.g., wrong, not right) 
20 Legal response – Police (e.g., police, arrest) 
21 Legal response - Law/Legal (e.g., law, criminal) 
22 Legal response – Courts (e.g., court, guilty) 
23 Punishment – Punishment (e.g., punish, 
punishment) 
24 Punishment – Prison (e.g., prison, jail) 
25 Punishment – Other (e.g., rehabilitation, sentence) 
26 Society (e.g., society, community) 
27 Disorder - Positive (e.g., controlled, composed) 
28 Disorder – Negative (e.g., disorder, reckless) 
29 Warmth – Positive (e.g., warm, kind) 
30 Warmth – Negative (e.g., cold, cruel) 
31 Competence -  Positive (e.g., competent, clever) 
32 Competence – Negative (e.g., stupid, unaware) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
33 Agency – Positive (e.g., determined, forceful) 
34 Agency – Negative (e.g., lazy) 
35 Competent-cold (e.g., sly, manipulative) 
36 Social category/occupation (e.g., anarchist, vagabond) 
37 Media (e.g., film, Bobby Sands) 
38 Threat (e.g., danger, fear) 
39 Weapon (e.g., weapon, knife) 
40 Victim (e.g., victim, victimization) 
41 Dark/night (e.g., darkness, night) 
42 Motivation (e.g., power, rush) 
43 Money (e.g., money, rich) 
44 Poor/disadvantage (e.g., poor, lack of education) 
45 Hopeless (e.g., hopeless, loss) 
46 Outcast (e.g., outcast, isolated) 
47 Mental health (e.g., insane, psycho) 
48 Area/location (e.g., streets, East End) 
49 Government (e.g., ministers, politicians) 
50 Necessity  (e.g., forced, need) 
51 Circumstance (e.g., unfortunate, inequalities) 
52 Family (e.g., background, childhood) 
53 Idleness (e.g., bored, aimless) 
54 Moral judgment (e.g., immoral, ethics) 
55 Antisocial (e.g., antisocial) 
56 Physical Descriptor -  Positive (e.g., handsome) 
57 Physical Descriptor – Negative (e.g., ugly, smelly) 
58 Physical Descriptor – Neutral (e.g., fat, young) 
59 General Descriptor - Positive (e.g., cool, romantic) 
60 General Descriptor – Negative (e.g., weak, disgraceful) 
61 General Descriptor – Neutral (e.g., secretive, enigmatic) 
62 Other (e.g., why, psychology) 
63 Education (e.g., uneducated, education) 
- - 
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Table 3 
Top Ten Word Categories in Participant Responses (Study 1) 
Word category 
 
Word 
occurrences 
% of total 
words 
Lack of warmth (e.g., cold, cruel, dishonest) 127 8% 
Violent crime (e.g., murder, assault, rapist) 121 8% 
Property crime (e.g., theft, stealing, burglary) 86 6% 
Law and legal responses (e.g., law, unlawful, crime) 81 5% 
Prison (e.g.,  jail, guard, locked up) 78 5% 
Neutral physical characteristics (e.g., fat, young, adult) 57 4% 
Wrong (e.g., wrongful, not right, bad) 54 3% 
Poor/disadvantaged (e.g., homeless, deprived area, lack 
of education) 
53 3% 
Courts (e.g., lawyer, conviction, guilty) 50 3% 
Violence (e.g., violent, aggressive, brutal) 46 3% 
 
Total 
 
753 
 
48% 
Note. The category ‘Other’ (which includes words such as ‘why’, ‘psychology,’ ‘surprise’) and 
represented 4.9% of words in the total sample was excluded from the above table.  
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Table 4 
Top Ten Word Types in Order of Average Occurrence (Study 1) 
Word type Mean order 
Property crime 3.77 
Wrong 3.83 
Poor/disadvantaged 5.15 
Law and legal responses 5.23 
Violent crime 5.42 
Lack of warmth 5.48 
Violence 5.50 
Neutral physical characteristics 5.86 
Prison 6.70 
Courts 6.98 
 
Following thoughts about wrongfulness were thoughts about the types of crimes 
criminals commit, society’s response to criminals and who the criminal is as a person 
(e.g., evil, poor). Although previous findings suggest individuals stereotypically think of 
violent criminals when thinking about crime (see Roberts, 1992), thoughts related to 
property crimes tended to occur sooner than those about violent crimes or violence in 
general. Thoughts relating to criminals’ lack of warmth, poverty and legal responses to 
crime tended to occur closely together, as did thoughts about violent crime and violence. 
In line with previous findings, these results suggest that stereotypes about 
criminals’ poverty and lack of warmth featured prominently in the criminal cognitive 
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associative network. However, even before thinking about what type of person a 
criminal is, individuals thought about the crimes they commit and make normative 
judgments about the wrongfulness of crime. Other concepts activated by the criminal 
associative network included legal and punitive responses to crime. Although the SCM 
suggests that fundamental dimensions of social perception form the content of 
stereotypes, it is clear that stereotypes about criminals were associated with broader 
concepts relating to the wrongfulness of crime and to society’s response to crime.  
The next step in the analysis is to identify latent or unobserved variables that 
help explain the relationships among observed word categories using Latent Class 
Analysis (LCA) (Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002). In this case, the unobserved 
variables reflect different ‘classes’ of individuals or ways in which individuals think 
about criminals. Because the current interest is in the content of criminal stereotypes, the 
LCA was performed on the 24 word categories related to the type of person a criminal 
is, the criminal features class identified by Alceste, and excluded categories unrelated to 
the type of person a criminal is (e.g., crime type, weapons, media depictions) as well as 
broad and less substantively meaningful categories (e.g., physical descriptors). The LCA 
was conducted using binary variables where participants were given a value of ‘1’ if at 
least one of their responses represented this category, and a value of ‘0’ if none of their 
responses represented the category.  
A three cluster solution provided the most meaningful results and best fit (AIC = 
581.18), compared to a two (AIC = 587.19) or four (AIC = 591.71) cluster solution. 
According to this cluster solution, the majority of respondents, who fall in the 
threatening criminal cluster (63%), think about criminals in terms of being individuals 
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who are poor, outcasts, who lack warmth and are immoral. What sets this cluster apart 
from the remaining two is thinking about criminals as being threatening, violent and 
antisocial. Individuals in this cluster tend to also link criminals’ behaviour to family 
factors (e.g., a broken home) and to a lack of education.  
While individuals in the second biggest cluster, the bad criminal cluster (24%) 
also thought about criminals in terms of their lack of warmth, they additionally think 
about criminals’ incompetence, mental or psychological instability (e.g., ‘insane’, 
‘psycho’) and to a lesser extent about their outcast status (e.g., ‘isolated’, ‘loner’) and 
poor background. Individuals in this cluster were most distinct from those in the first 
cluster in two respects. First, they tended to have more thoughts relating to moral 
judgments about criminals (e.g., ‘immoral’, ‘morality’), and less about the threat that 
criminals represent. Second, they link criminals’ behaviour to a broad spectrum of 
factors including internal motivation (e.g., ‘power’, ‘rush’), necessity (e.g., ‘forced’, 
‘need’) or circumstance (e.g., ‘unfortunate’, ‘mistake’), family factors and idleness (e.g., 
‘aimless’, ‘bored’). Individuals in the final complex criminal cluster (13%) thought 
about criminals in a somewhat more multifaceted way. For instance, while like other 
individuals they think about criminals’ lack of warmth, incompetence, poverty and 
outcast status
10, they also thought about criminals’ positive features (e.g., ‘charming’, 
‘suave’), competence (e.g., ‘intelligent’, ‘resourceful’) and cold-competence (e.g., ‘sly’, 
‘manipulative’). For these individuals, criminals evoked thoughts of hopelessness (e.g., 
‘loss’, ‘failure’, ‘pitiful’) and disorder (e.g., ‘reckless’, ‘out of control’), in addition to 
less central thoughts relating to criminals’ violent and antisocial features. 
                                                 
10
 Although they do think about these features, they do so to a lesser extent than individuals in the 
threatening criminal cluster and bad criminal cluster.  
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Discussion of Study 1 
This study investigated individuals’ associative network with the criminal construct. The 
results suggest that there is a great deal of consistency in how individuals think about 
criminals as a social group, with the top ten word categories reflected in participants’ 
spontaneous thoughts about criminals accounting for nearly 50% of all responses. 
However, there are also some important differences in thinking about criminals. The 
results of latent class analysis suggest that most individuals perceive criminals as 
lacking warmth, with a large subsample of this group additionally perceiving criminals 
as being particularly threatening. On the other hand, a smaller proportion of individuals 
perceive criminals as not being all bad, but instead as being complex and multifaceted 
individuals. More broadly, the results suggest that when thinking about criminals, 
individuals’ thoughts are not limited to the question of what type of person a criminal is 
or what type of crime they committed. Rather, individuals also make normative 
judgments about the wrongfulness of crime, and think about how society responds to 
criminals. In other words, tangled into thoughts about ‘who is a criminal’ are thoughts 
about ‘what do we and what should we do to criminals’.  
In line with previous findings, the present findings suggest that stereotypical 
beliefs about criminals’ lack of warmth and low socio-economic status are a prevalent 
feature of individuals’ criminal associative network. Hypotheses specified by the SCM, 
specifically regarding the associations between social structural determinants and 
fundamental dimensions of social perception, will be addressed in the following study. 
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Study 2: The Content of the Criminal Stereotype and its Social Structural Determinants 
According to the Stereotype Content Model, stereotypes about social groups reflect 
fundamental dimensions of social perception – warmth and competence – and are 
shaped by social structural determinants such as social status and competitiveness (Fiske 
et al., 2002). The SCM hypothesizes that perceptions of a high social status lead to 
inferences of competence (in line with meritocratic beliefs), while a group’s perceived 
competitiveness against (or lack of cooperation with) society is hypothesized to be a key 
predictor of how warm a group is inferred to be. The first study suggested that 
criminals’ lack of warmth and low social status were key features of the criminal 
stereotype. Study 2 study tests the association between perceptions of criminals’ lack of 
warmth and social status by using structural-equation modeling to simultaneously 
estimate the measurement and structural paths specified by the SCM.  
 
Participants 
Participants (N= 271)
11
 were university students in the city of London who completed 
an online survey for the chance to win one of 8 cash prizes (ranging from £20 or 
$30USD, to £150 or $225USD). Participants were recruited by posting advertisements 
on campus billboards and online social groups, distributing advertisements directly to 
students on campus and through departmental e-mails. Participants’ mean age was 23.37 
(min = 18, max = 63). The sample consisted of 95 men and 176 women. Of the 258 
participants who reported their ethnicity, White British students made up 31% of the 
sample, while 30% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder 
                                                 
11
 The study had a 49% completion rate, with 28% of the sample dropping out within a minute or two of 
beginning the survey. This means that amongst the 72% of participants who made it past the first minute 
or so, 68% completed the survey.  
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of the study was 11% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 5% British 
African or Caribbean and 23% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British 
and non-British, Mixed or Other). The sample was equally distributed in terms of social 
class, with 32% reporting being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 38% 
from the middle-class and 30% from upper-middle and upper class.   
Methodology 
Participants were asked to rate criminals as a social group on dimensions of 
competitiveness, social status, warmth and competence. 
12
 In an effort to reduce social 
desirability effects and tap into cultural stereotypes about criminals, participants were 
asked to rate criminals on the basis of how society views criminals as a social group.  
Measures 
Competitiveness and social status. Criminals’ perceived competitiveness (e.g., 
for power, resources and privileges) and social status (e.g., economic, educational and 
employment achievements) were measured by 3 items each on a scale that ranged from 
1 to 7 (taken from Fiske et al., 2002).  A confirmatory factor analysis suggested an 
adequate fit for dimensions of competitiveness and social status (2 (8, N = 271) = 
32.38, p ≤ .001, 2/df = 4.05, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .11),13,14 with each item loading 
                                                 
12
 In the first part of the survey, participants were randomly assigned into an experimental condition. The 
results presented here are comparable to results that control for the experimental factor, and so the 
presented results exclude this factor from the analyses. 
13
 If the item measuring criminals’ perceived economic success is removed from the model, the fit indices 
improve substantially (Chi-square p ≥ .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05). This item’s lower factor loading 
may be due to individuals’ differential understanding of the question, that is, if answers should be based 
on gainful employment or on actual economic success. Still, this item was kept in the analyses in order to 
take into account criminal’s perceived financial success.  
14
 These fit statistics are more reflective of the measurement models as none of the structural paths are 
constrained.  A CFI close to .95 and RMSEA close to .06 suggest a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A CFI 
141 
 
highly and statistically significantly on its respective factor (p’s ≤ .001). Items did not 
cross load. Competitiveness and status correlated negatively and significantly (r = -.36, 
p ≤ .001).  
Competence and warmth. Criminals as a group were rated on 3 competence (i.e., 
competent, efficient, intelligent) and 4 warmth (i.e., warm, trustworthy, good-natured, 
sincere) traits on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). Criminals are perceived as 
being low, in absolute terms, on both competence (M = 3.24, SD = 1.20) and warmth (M 
= 1.98, SD = 0.81). Perceptions of criminals fall into the ‘successful competitor’ 
category as they are perceived as being significantly higher on competence than on 
warmth (t = 16.91, df = 270, p ≤ .001). Confirmatory factor analysis suggested an 
adequate fit for dimensions of competence and warmth (2 (13, N = 271) = 39.89, p ≤ 
.001, 2 /df = 3.07, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .09) with each item loading highly and 
statistically significantly on its respective factor (p’s ≤ .001). Items did not cross load. 
Competence and warmth correlated significantly and positively (r = .41, p ≤ .001).  
Results 
Structural equation modeling (using MPLUS 5.21) was used in order to estimate the 
measurement and structural paths specified by the SCM. Paths were estimated from 
competition and social status to perceived warmth and competence (see Figure 2). The 
model suggests a marginally good or adequate fit (2 (59, N = 271) = 165.16, p ≤ .001, 
                                                                                                                                               
> .90 suggests a reasonable model-data fit (see Marsh et al., 2004), while a RMSEA between .05 and .08 
suggests a fair fit, with a value greater than .1 indicating a poor fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Other 
measures of fit such as chi-square are sensitive to sample size and violations of distributional assumptions 
(Bentler, 1990), which have lead some to suggest using a Chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio to 
compensate for sample size. A ratio of less than 5 is typically considered to demonstrate an acceptable fit 
(Wheaton et al., 1977). 
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2/df = 2.80, CFI = .88, RMSEA = .08).15 Results for the measurement parts of the 
model are similar to those found in the separate confirmatory factor analyses.  
 
Figure 2 
 Structural Equation Model for Stereotype Content Model (Study 2) 
 
Note. Regression coefficients are standardized. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles represent 
manifest variables. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
 
As expected, the results suggest that criminals’ perceived warmth is associated with 
their perceived competitiveness (β = -.42, p ≤ .001), but also with their perceived social 
status (β = .53, p ≤ .001). On the other hand, criminals’ perceived competence is 
                                                 
15
 Participants’ gender, age and socio-economic status were not predictive of perceived warmth and 
competence, except for gender which marginally predicted perceived warmth. The presented results 
therefore exclude participant socio-demographics from the analyses.  
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strongly associated with their perceived social status (β = .78, p ≤ .001), and to a lesser 
extent with their perceived competitiveness (β = .18, p ≤ .05). In other words, perceiving 
criminals as having a low social status engenders low perceptions of warmth and 
competence, while criminals’ perceived competitiveness is especially important in 
predicting low perceptions of warmth. 
Discussion of Study 2 
The present findings largely support the Stereotype Content Model. Although criminals 
were perceived as being low on both competence and warmth, they were perceived as 
being significantly more competent, efficient and intelligent than warm, trustworthy and 
good-natured. Perceptions of criminals’ warmth and competence were positively 
correlated such that endorsing stereotypes about criminals as being cold and 
untrustworthy was associated with also believing that they are incompetent and 
unintelligent.  
As predicted by the SCM, criminal stereotypes are partly explained by social 
structural factors of competition and social status. The results suggest that, controlling 
for criminals’ perceived social status, to the extent that criminals are perceived as 
competing against society (for power and resources), they will also be perceived as 
being lower on warmth and higher on perceived competence. Therefore, if two 
individuals (let us call them individuals A and B) share the same stereotype about 
criminals’ low social status, but individual A also believes that criminals are particularly 
competitive against society, individual A is more likely to also perceive criminals as 
being especially cold and untrustworthy, but more competent, and perhaps therefore as 
more threatening. On the other hand, controlling for criminals’ perceived 
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competitiveness, perceiving criminals as having a low social status was associated with 
perceptions of low competence and low warmth. In other words, if two individuals share 
the same stereotype about criminals’ competitiveness against society, but individual B 
believes that criminals have a particularly low social status, individual B is also more 
likely to perceive criminals as being especially incompetent and untrustworthy.   
Stereotypes that suggest that criminals are evil or cruel, but also generally stupid 
and useless, are therefore intimately tied to perceptions of criminals’ social rank. This 
finding is novel. It is tempting to believe that individuals harbor stereotypes about 
criminals’ evilness or cruelty on the basis of their criminal actions. Yet, the present 
findings suggest that stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth are partly explained by 
criminals’ perceived low social status.  
A weakness of the present study is that it is correlational in nature. The design 
precludes establishing causal associations between social structural determinants and 
stereotypes about criminals. However, previous research by Caprariello, Cuddy and 
Fiske (2009) has experimentally established the link between social structural factors 
and stereotypes about immigrants. There is thus evidence that social structural factors 
can have causal effects on social stereotypes. Still, future research may seek to 
experimentally manipulate criminals’ perceived competitiveness and social status in 
order to observe the effects on criminal stereotypes.  
The present study also asked individuals to think abstractly about how society 
perceives criminals as a social group – a method that some may argue is adequate to 
capture cultural level stereotypes but perhaps less suited for capturing individuals’ 
personal stereotypes about criminals. Furthermore, the present study treats criminals as a 
145 
 
homogeneous group, when in fact the criminal social category encompasses individuals 
who have committed crimes ranging from tax evasion to burglary and murder. The 
following study seeks to experimentally instantiate individuals’ personal stereotypes 
about criminals and to distinguish between stereotypes about street criminals from those 
about white-collar criminals.  
Study 3: Replication and ‘Fine Tuning’ of the Criminal Stereotype 
This final study experimentally tests the effect of the criminal label on perceptions of 
warmth and competence at the individual as opposed to group level. This study uses a 
methodology that differs from the usual paper-and-pencil questionnaire: participants 
were presented pictures of suspected or wanted criminals taken from police websites; 
and the criminal status of pictured individuals was experimentally manipulated.
16
 
Previous findings suggest that, when provided with the ‘criminal’ label, people encode 
facial attributes differently than when provided the same face under a different label 
(e.g., ‘lifeboat captain’) (Shepherd et al., 1978; as cited in Hills, 2008). This study first 
considers the impact of the broader criminal label, and then moves toward disentangling 
stereotypes associated with street criminals from those associated with white-collar 
criminals.  
Participants 
Participants (N= 271) were the same as those used for Study 2. They completed this task 
before moving onto the second part of the study (described in Study 2). Participants 
                                                 
16
 Pictures were found on police, prison and probation websites based primarily in the USA and UK. 
Pictures were selected on the basis of their visual quality and size. Each picture was color corrected and 
modified so that the background color was grey. A disclosure indicating that it was unknown whether any 
of the pictured individuals were actually found guilty of any crime was accessible by clicking on a link 
present at the very bottom of the welcome page that participants first visited. 
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completed the study online and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in 
which they were asked to rate pictures of others and to answer questions about 
themselves. In the street-crime condition, participants (N = 145) were told that the 
pictures were of men who were found guilty of committing a street-crime (e.g., theft, 
minor assault). In the white-collar crime condition, participants (N = 65) were told that 
the pictures were of men who were found guilty of committing a white-collar crime 
(e.g., fraud, embezzlement).
17
 The remaining participants (N = 61) were in a control 
condition and were given no crime-related information.   
Methodology and measures 
Participants first rated each picture on socio-demographics (i.e., age, ethnicity, socio-
economic status), attractiveness, babyfacedness and on how much the person looked like 
the stereotypical criminal (see Table 5).
18
 Previous findings suggest that babyfaced 
individuals elicit more approach and helping behaviour (Keating et al., 2003) while 
attractive individuals elicit more positive evaluations (Rudman et al., 2002). Next, each 
picture was rated on 10 personality traits that reflected dimensions of competence 
(competent, intelligent, capable, confident) and warmth (warm, trustworthy, friendly, 
good-natured), and included two filler items. Factor scores for dimensions of warmth 
and competence were used in all analyses. Warmth and competence were positively and 
significantly correlated (r = .48, p ≤ .001). 
 
 
                                                 
17
 More participants were randomly assigned to the street-crime condition as measures obtained under this 
condition have been used for additional analyses that are not discussed here.  
18
 In the control condition, participants were also asked how much the person looked like the stereotypical 
‘businessman’ and ‘working-class man’ so as to mask the true interest in criminal stereotypicality.  
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations of Perceptions of Pictures by Experimental Condition 
(Study 3) 
 Street-crime 
condition 
White-collar 
crime condition 
Control 
condition 
 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Range 
Resemblance to 
stereotypical 
criminal 
3.96 1.75 4.13 1.68 3.82 1.89 1 - 7 
Social status 1.91 .91 1.96 .95 2.05 .92 1 - 5 
Warmth  3.21 1.22 3.01 1.23 3.40 1.29 1 - 7 
Competence  3.93 1.44 3.81 1.16 3.81 1.17 1 - 7 
Attractiveness 2.43 1.43 2.34 1.41 2.23 1.28 1 - 7 
Babyfacedness 3.20 1.73 3.06 1.64 3.17 1.69 1 - 7 
 
Note. Warmth is measured by taking the mean of participants’ ratings for warm, trustworthy, friendly and 
good-natured. Competence is measured by taking the mean of participants’ ratings for competent, 
intelligent, capable and confident. 
 
Each participant rated a subset of 10 pictures (selected from a pool of 80 
pictures). To avoid systematic bias, the 10 rated pictures were randomly selected from 
subsets of pictures so as to provide an equal number of pictures that were rated (in a 
pilot study) as higher than average on perceived warmth (HW) (n = 5) and as lower than 
average (LW) (n = 5). Perceived warmth is a key feature of the criminal stereotype and 
so it was important to provide an equal number of HW and LW pictures to participants. 
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Pictures were presented in a structured randomized order such that each block of 5 
pictures contained either 2 HW and 3 LW pictures or 3 HW and 2 LW pictures. For each 
experimental condition, two versions of blocks of 10 pictures were created, resulting in 
16 versions of the survey for each of the 3 conditions (see Figure 3). Each participant 
was randomly sent to one of the 48 versions, using a random-url link generator. 
 
Figure 3 
Experimental Design of Study 3 
                         
Note. Each participant was randomly sent to one of 48 versions. Each experimental condition contains 2 
sets of versions, each of which contained 10 pictures of criminals selected from a pool of 80 pictures. 
Results 
The analyses consist of estimating a set of multilevel regression models (using Stata 10) 
in order to observe the effects of a criminal label on social perception. All of the 
following multilevel models control for the variance (unaccounted for by explanatory 
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variables) that is induced by the fact that each participant rated more than one picture 
(thus creating a ‘participant factor’) and because each picture was rated more than once 
(thus creating a ‘picture factor’). Using multilevel regression to control for the clustered 
nature of the data and residual variance is also important because it provides better 
estimates of the standard errors for the explanatory variables.  
The results suggest that the experimental manipulation was successful. 
Controlling for individual level variables (i.e., participants’ age, gender, socio-economic 
status and ethnicity) and picture level variables (i.e., perceptions of pictured individuals’ 
age, attractiveness, babyfacedness, ethnicity and social status) (Model 1, see Table 6), 
when presented in a crime condition (β = .22, p ≤ .05), pictures of the same individuals 
are rated as looking more like the stereotypical criminal than when presented in the 
control condition. The extent to which individuals are perceived as being similar to ‘the 
stereotypical criminal’ is also negatively predicted by attractiveness (β = -.25, p ≤ .001), 
social status (β = -.58, p ≤ .001), babyfacedness (β = -.08, p ≤ .05), though weakly, and 
by ethnicity. Compared to White individuals, individuals are perceived as being more 
similar to the stereotypical criminal if they are Latin (β = .20, p ≤ .05) or of a different 
non-White ethnic background (β = .32, p ≤ .01), but only marginally more stereotypical 
if they are Black (β = .24, p = .08) (although this effect becomes significant in Model 2) 
and not more stereotypical if they are Asian (β = -.07, p ≥ .05). 
Adding perceived warmth and competence to the model (Model 2, see Table 6) 
reveals that the warmer (β = -.59, p ≤ .001) an individual is perceived as being the less 
he is seen as being similar to the stereotypical criminal, while competence is not  
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Table 6 
Multilevel Regression Models Predicting Perceived Stereotypicality (Study 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed effects 
 B    SE      B    SE 
Crime condition .22* .10 .10 .11 
Perceived  age -.06 .04 -.04 .04 
Perceived attractiveness -.25*** .02 -.16*** .02 
Perceived babyfacedness -.08*** .02 -.05* .02 
Perceived status -.58*** .04 -.49*** .03 
Perceived ethnicity - Black .241 .14 .28* .12 
Perceived ethnicity – Asian -.07 .14 -.04 .13 
Perceived ethnicity – Latin .20* .10 .21* .09 
Perceived ethnicity - Other .32* .13 .32** .12 
     
Perceived warmth    -  -.59*** .04 
Perceived competence    -  .00 .04 
Random effects 
σ2 Picture .61 .06  .48 .05 
σ2 Participant .55 .04 .61 .04 
σ2e
 
Residual 1.30 .02 1.23 .02 
Note. These models controlled for the clustering of picture ratings by individual and by picture. These 
models also controlled for participants’ gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status. * p ≤ .05. ** p 
≤.01. *** p ≤.001. 1 p = .08. 
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significantly associated with stereotypicality.
19
 
On the other hand, controlling for perceived warmth and competence renders the 
effect of the experimental manipulation on perceived stereotypicality non-significant (β 
= -.07, p ≥ .05), partly because of its shared variance with perceived warmth and social 
status, which have comparatively stronger effects. 
The second set of analyses estimate the direct effect of the experimental 
manipulation on perceptions of individuals’ warmth and competence. Controlling for 
perceived age, social status, attractiveness and babyfacedness, and participants’ socio-
demographics, when presented in the crime condition, pictures of the same individuals 
are rated as being significantly less warm than when presented in the control condition 
(β = -.20, p ≤ .01) (see Table 7). Perceptions of warmth are also associated with 
perceived attractiveness (β = .17, p ≤ .001), social status (β = .18, p ≤ .001), and though 
more weakly, with babyfacedness (β = .06, p ≤ .001) and only marginally with age (β = 
.04, p = .06). 
A second model – replacing the dependent variable of warmth with competence 
– reveals that the experimental manipulation did not have a significant effect on 
perceptions of competence (β = -.02, p ≥ .05). Perceptions of competence are, however, 
associated with perceived attractiveness (β = .18, p ≤ .001), social status (β = .26, p ≤ 
.001) and with ethnicity. Individuals perceived as being Black (β = .12, p ≤ .05), Asian 
(β = .22, p ≤ .001) or as being another non-White ethnicity (β = .18, p ≤ .01) are 
perceived as being more competent than White individuals. This finding raises the 
                                                 
19
 The non-significant effect of perceived competence on perceived stereotypicality is partly due to shared 
variance with perceived social status. Removing social status from the model reveals that perceived 
competence has a small negative effect  (β = -.08, p ≤ .05) on perceived stereotypicality, while the effect 
of warmth is slightly strengthened  (β = .63, p ≤ .001).  
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Table 7 
Multilevel Regression Models Predicting Perceived Warmth and Competence (Study 3) 
 Warmth Competence 
Fixed effects 
 B   SE B  SE 
Crime condition -.20** .07 .02 .07 
Perceived  age .04 .02 .04* .02 
Perceived attractiveness .17*** .01 .18*** .01 
Perceived babyfacedness .06*** .01 -.03** .01 
Perceived status .18*** .02 .26*** .02 
Perceived ethnicity - Black .07 .07 .12* .05 
Perceived ethnicity – Asian .03 .07 .22*** .06 
Perceived ethnicity – Latin -.01 .05 .04 .05 
Perceived ethnicity - Other .00 .07 .18** .07 
Random effects 
σ2 Picture  .31        .03 .13 .02 
σ2 Participant .38         .02 .39 .02 
σ2e
 
Residual .68       .01  .69 .01 
 
Note. These models controlled for the clustering of picture ratings by individual and by picture. These 
models also controlled for participants’ gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤.01. ***p ≤ .001. 
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question of whether these types of criminals are also perceived as being more 
threatening given that perceived competence may suggest an increased ability to carry 
out bad intentions. Perceptions of competence are only weakly associated with age (β = 
.04, p ≤ .001) and babyfacedness (β = -.03, p ≤ .001).  
The results support the hypothesis that the criminal stereotype engenders lower 
perceptions of warmth, although the effect of the experimental manipulation on 
perceived warmth is relatively small. Because pictured individuals reflected a particular 
subsample of the criminal population, they may have already reflected (in some sense) 
the ‘stereotypical’ criminal. Therefore, the effect of the experimental manipulation may 
have had a smaller effect than if participants had been presented pictures of a random 
sample of the general population. Still, it is a weakness of this study that the effect sizes 
of the experimental manipulation were not greater. The next step is to further investigate 
stereotypes about criminals by distinguishing between stereotypes about street-criminals 
from those about white-collar criminals. 
 Street criminal vs. white-collar criminal stereotypes. The following analyses 
distinguish between criminal stereotypes by entering separate dummy variables for the 
street-crime and white-collar crime conditions. The results suggest that controlling for 
pictured individuals’ perceived social status, age, attractiveness, babyfacedness, 
ethnicity and participants’ socio-demographics, compared to the control condition, 
individuals are perceived as being more like the stereotypical criminal when presented 
in the white-collar crime condition  (β = .34, p ≤ .01), but not when presented in the 
street-crime condition  (β = .17, p = .11). Further analyses suggest that the non-
significant effect of the street-crime condition on perceived stereotypicality is due to 
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shared variance with perceived social status. Once social status is removed from the 
model, individuals presented in the street-crime condition are perceived as being 
significantly more like the stereotypical criminal (β = .27, p ≤ .05) than in the control 
condition. In other words, controlling for the same factors as above, the results suggest 
that compared to the control condition, individuals are perceived as having a lower 
social status when presented in the street-crime condition (β = -.16, p ≤ .05) but not 
when presented in the white-collar crime condition (β = -.07, p ≥ .05).  
Replacing perceived stereotypicality with perceived warmth – and controlling 
for the same factors as above – suggests that compared to the control condition 
individuals are perceived as being less warm when presented in the street-crime 
condition  (β = -.16, p ≤ .05) and when presented in the white-collar crime condition  (β 
= -.30, p ≤ .001). Moreover, individuals in the white-collar crime condition are 
perceived as being less warm than those in the street-crime condition. Replacing 
perceived warmth with perceived competence reveals that, compared to the control 
condition, individuals were not perceived as being less competent in the street-crime 
condition (β = .01, p ≥ .05) nor in the white-collar crime condition (β = -.10, p ≥ .05). 
Discussion of Study 3 
This study experimentally instantiated the criminal stereotype in order to observe its 
causal effect on individuals’ perceptions of others and to replicate some findings 
emerging from Study 2. The results suggest that being labeled a criminal increases the 
extent to which individuals’ are perceived as resembling the stereotypical criminal, but 
lowers perceptions of warmth and social status, even when controlling for physical 
features of an individual’s appearance (e.g., age, ethnicity, attractiveness, 
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babyfacedness). As in Study 2, perceived social status was most strongly associated with 
perceived competence, although it was also associated with perceived warmth, 
particularly for street-criminals. The fact that a key difference between the street-
criminal stereotype and the white-collar criminal stereotype is perceived social status is 
nontrivial. Perceived social status was key in predicting how much participants believed 
pictured individuals resembled the stereotypical criminal: when controlling for social 
status, the effect of the street-criminal label on perceived stereotypicality was nearly 
halved. Perceived social status was also found to be an important predictor of perceived 
warmth and competence.  
This study provides further evidence that criminal stereotypes engender low 
perceived warmth and social status.  The criminal label did not, however, have a 
significant effect on perceived competence but, rather, it had the effect of lowering 
street-criminals’ perceived social status. These findings suggest that the criminal 
stereotype may have indirect effects on perceived competence through social status. And 
while white-collar criminals were not perceived as having a low social status, they were 
perceived as being more similar to the stereotypical criminal and to be less warm than 
street-criminals. These findings may suggest that different processes are at play in 
perceptions of white-collar criminals.  
The findings do face some limitations, notably in terms of the relatively small 
effect sizes. It may be that the use of pictures of suspected and wanted criminals 
inadvertently reduced the effect of the criminal stereotype on social perception. 
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General Discussion and Conclusion 
Studies of criminal stereotypes often construct a ‘laundry list’ of features and traits that 
are part of individuals’ representations of who a criminal is. A review of the literature 
suggests that there are three overarching themes in criminal stereotypes: poverty, cruelty 
and dislike. This paper moves beyond studying amorphous criminal stereotypes (e.g., in 
terms of physical descriptors or crime type) by applying the Stereotype Content Model 
to investigate the content and social structural determinants of these stereotypes. 
According to the intergroup and interpersonal perception literature, perceptions of others 
and of social groups fall along two fundamental dimensions: warmth and competence 
(Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & 
Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). Perceptions 
of these dimensions have been linked to basic approach and avoidance behaviour, as 
well as to specific affective and behavioural outcomes (Cuddy et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 
Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). 
The present findings demonstrate that criminal stereotypes reflect fundamental 
dimensions of social perception that are key in shaping interpersonal relations. Although 
criminals are stereotypically believed to be low on both competence and warmth, they 
appear to fit the ‘successful competitor’ stereotype as they are perceived as being 
significantly lower on warmth than on competence. Criminals are thought of partly in 
terms of their cold-competence, as sly and cunning individuals. Instantiating the 
criminal stereotype did not, however, have a direct causal effect on perceptions of 
competence. Stereotypes about criminals’ incompetence may therefore be closely tied to 
perceptions of their low social status. As a result, street-criminals may be perceived as 
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being especially incompetent and unintelligent, due to their lower perceived social 
status. 
In line with predictions made by the SCM, the results suggest that criminals’ 
perceived competitiveness negatively predicts criminals’ perceived warmth, while 
criminals’ perceived social status was found to positively predict criminals’ perceived 
competence and warmth. The results therefore contribute to a growing body of research 
that suggests that perceptions of a group’s social status can influence inferences 
regarding a group’s warmth (see Brambilla et al., 2010, on the malleability of the 
relationship between status and stereotype content). From a theoretical perspective, the 
SCM framework and the present studies are limited, however, in that they do not 
address criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society’s norms and values. 
Criminals may represent a particularly competitive group for individuals who value 
social order or hierarchy (e.g., see Pratto et al., 1994, on Social Dominance Orientation) 
or who value respect for authority and tradition (e.g., see Altemeyer, 1981, on Right-
Wing Authoritarianism). The present findings suggest that notions of morality and moral 
judgment feature in individuals’ criminal cognitive associative network. Future studies 
should therefore incorporate criminals’ perceived competitiveness against norms and 
values into criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society. 
Looking more closely at distinctions between criminal stereotypes, some of the 
findings suggest that the processes that generate stereotypes about street-criminals are 
different from those that generate stereotypes about white-collar criminals. For instance, 
although white-collar criminals were not perceived as having a lower social status, they 
were perceived as being less warm than street-criminals. It is therefore unclear whether 
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the white-collar criminal stereotype is as detrimental as the street-criminal stereotype. 
Future research could investigate the relative harmfulness of street criminal and white-
collar criminal stereotypes by considering their effects on affective and behavioural 
responses to each group.  
Although this research largely supports the application of the SCM to study 
criminal stereotypes and attitudes toward crime and punishment, the findings are limited 
in some ways. For instance, some of the studies revealed relatively small effect sizes. 
Moreover, the present findings would have benefited from experimentally replicating 
the observed negative association between perceived competitiveness and perceptions of 
warmth. Still, previous research provides some empirical evidence of the causal effect of 
perceived competitiveness on perceived warmth (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007), while the 
present research provides correlational evidence in the context of criminal stereotypes.  
One of the main aims of this research was to develop a better understanding of 
the association between components of the criminal stereotype. A secondary aim was to 
explain some of the consequences of situating the crime problem among the poor. These 
studies demonstrate that stereotypes about criminals’ evilness or cruelty are not arrived 
at strictly on the basis of criminals’ behaviour or competitiveness against society. The 
belief that criminals are uneducated, economically unsuccessful and do not hold 
prestigious jobs is associated with the belief that criminals are cold and untrustworthy. 
According to Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007), perceptions of warmth may be positively 
associated with perceptions of social status to the extent that these perceptions justify a 
group’s low social status. In the context of crime, social class is seen as the key lens 
through which criminality is understood, evidenced in part by society’s longstanding 
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concern with the ‘immorality’ of the lower classes (Emsley, 1996). The association 
between social status and a perceived lack of warmth suggests that criminals are not 
merely perceived as being the ‘needy’ poor, rather they are perceived as being the 
untrustworthy poor. Situating the crime problem among the poor could engender an 
implicit justification of their harsh treatment under the law, to the extent that criminals’ 
perceived low social status contributes to their perceived lack of warmth.  
This research also brings to the fore broader questions regarding the role of 
social policy and cultural narratives in shaping stereotypes about criminals. If 
stereotypes are affected by social structural factors such as competition and social status, 
what happens when the crime problem is framed in ways which lower criminals’ 
perceived social status or increase their perceived competitiveness? Will situating the 
crime problem amongst immigrants, youth or organized crime have the same impact on 
criminal stereotypes? Do policies such as increased policing in impoverished areas 
strengthen the apparent link between social status and crime (see Davis, 1990)? These 
questions should be addressed in future research about the unequal treatment of the 
disadvantaged under the law and in research about the effects of criminal stereotypes on 
individuals’ attitudes toward crime.  
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From Stereotype Content to Affective, Behavioural and Attitudinal Outcomes  
 
The first paper presented in this thesis accomplished two goals. First, it systematically 
measured the criminal stereotype. By using three different methodologies and measuring 
criminal stereotypes both at the group and individual level, this paper provided strong 
evidence of consistency in criminal stereotypes. By beginning inductively, and not 
imposing a theoretical framework on participants, this paper used a non-constrictive 
method of measuring individuals’ stereotypes about criminals. The results suggested 
that embedded in stereotypes about the type of crime criminals commit are thoughts 
related to criminals’ lack of warmth and to legal and punitive responses to crime. These 
findings provided empirical support for applying the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), 
a theoretical framework that identifies the underlying dimensions of stereotypes 
(warmth and competence), their social structural determinants, and affective and 
behavioural outcomes. 
Next, this first paper identified the content of criminal stereotypes and their 
social structural determinants. Social status was found to predict not only stereotypes 
about criminals’ lack of competence, but also about their lack of warmth. Criminals’ 
perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for resources) was also found to partly 
explain their low perceived warmth. The results suggested that the criminal stereotype is 
particularly damaging for street criminals, as opposed to white-collar criminals, who are 
perceived as being particularly low on social status.  
This paper addressed some of the key issues discussed in the literature review, 
namely by identifying the content of otherwise seemingly amorphous criminal 
stereotypes.  This was an important first step as it suggests that the processes that 
engender criminal stereotypes are associated with basic social psychological processes 
that engender social stereotypes more generally, such as making inferences of intent and 
causal attributions for behaviour. Moreover, this paper implants the study of criminal 
stereotypes firmly in the domain of interpersonal perception and relations.  
The following paper takes findings from the first paper as a point of departure in 
order to investigate the affective and behavioural outcomes of criminal stereotypes, and 
their effects on punitive attitudes. This second paper applies both the Stereotype Content 
Model and the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes Map in order to 
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predict individuals’ support for harsh criminal justice policies. Moreover, individuals’ 
ideological positions are used to predict perceptions and responses to criminals. The 
second paper therefore makes headway in identifying the effects of stereotypes on affect 
and behaviour; it seeks to develop a full model of the key social psychological 
predictors linking social perception to punitiveness toward crime.  
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Paper 2 
The ‘Big Two’ and public attitudes toward criminal punishment: Applying the 
Stereotype Content Model and Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes 
Map 
 
The seemingly insatiable public desire for punishment of crime has led some to 
compare support for harsh criminal justice policies to a practice of excess, much 
like craving ice cream (Loader, 2009). But what drives the public appetite for 
punishment? This study considers associations between the ‘Big Two’ 
dimensions of social perception and affective, behavioural and attitudinal 
responses to criminals. Results suggest, first, that perceiving criminals as lacking 
warmth is associated with feeling more anger and less compassion toward 
criminals. Second, these emotions are in turn associated with expressing support 
for harsh criminal justice policies. Third, political ideology is also key in 
understanding variation in perceptions and responses to the ‘Big Two’. Attitudes 
and policy preferences are therefore intimately tied to stereotyping, affect and 
ideology.  
Keywords: Big Two, criminal stereotypes, punitiveness, political ideology 
 
While punishment of crime is for all intents and purposes qualitatively milder than it 
was only a few hundred years ago (Foucault, 1975), the latter half of the 20
th
 century has 
seen increasingly harsh criminal justice policies in countries such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, evidenced most visibly in growing prison populations 
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(Walmsley, 2009). In the United States alone, the prison population has risen six-fold in 
a quarter of a century, with estimates of the prison population in the early 2000s ranging 
from 1.2 million to 2 million (Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; Donohue, 2007). In the 
United Kingdom, the prison population had reached its capacity of 80,000 by 2006 
(King, 2008). 
The devastating effect of these policies has been felt most strongly by those in 
the margins of society – for example the youth, the poor, the homeless, ethnic minorities 
and those with mental health problems – whom tend to be overrepresented in the 
criminal justice system (Bazemore, 2007; Bobo, 2004; Curry & Klumpp, 2009; Garland, 
2001; Harcourt, 2007; Helms, 2009; James & Glaze, 2006; Pettit & Western, 2004; 
Robinson & Darley, 2007; Teplin, 1990). Such policies are often justified on the basis of 
public opinion polls indicating a widespread belief that court sentences are too lenient 
and that harsher sentences are needed (Bottoms, 1995; Casey & Mohr, 2005; Garland, 
2001; Loader, 2009; Useem et al., 2003).   
This paper explores variation in public attitudes toward the punishment of law-
breakers. Prior research has shown that public support for punishment of serious 
offenders does vary – despite being high on average – and that this variation depends on 
individuals’ perceptions of the criminal justice system (e.g., perceptions of sentencing 
and prison trends) (Doob & Roberts, 1984; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & Hough, 2005) and 
a range of individuating factors such as political ideology, sentencing goals, beliefs 
about the function of punishment and perceptions of the offence and offender 
(Bazemore, 2007; Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, 2000; King, 2008; Maruna & King, 
2004; Roberts, 1992).  
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The purpose of the current article is to consider whether variation in the 
endorsement of criminal stereotypes helps explain variation in affective, behavioural 
and attitudinal responses to crime. Importantly, this is the first time that the Stereotype 
Content Model (SCM) (Fiske et al., 2002) has been applied to public attitudes toward 
the punishment of criminals. Two studies test an integrative theoretical account of 
stereotyping on an important socio-political phenomenon of our time. Public discourse 
about crime and punishment is fraught with language that suggests that criminals are 
‘evil’ ‘cruel’ ‘monsters’ and ‘bad’, that we should adopt ‘harsher’ or ‘stiffer’ laws and 
sentences, and that society and its institutions should engage in a ‘war’ or ‘get tough’ on 
crime. Two studies link perceptions and responses to the ‘Big Two’ dimensions of social 
perception – warmth and competence – to punitive attitudes. The studies apply Fiske 
and colleagues’ (2002) SCM as well as Cuddy and colleagues’ (2007) Behavior from 
Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) map. The studies depart from the ways in 
which the SCM and BIAS map are typically employed by looking at heterogeneous 
perceptions of a single social group (i.e., criminals) and differences in attitudinal 
responses to these perceptions.  
Findings suggest that controlling for political ideology, endorsing stereotypes 
about criminals’ lack of warmth (i.e., as not being nice, good-natured or trustworthy) is 
associated with experiencing fewer emotions of compassion, which in turn is associated 
with greater punitiveness. In line with the SCM, the findings suggest that criminal 
stereotypes are explained by shared perceptions of social structural factors which 
suggest that criminals have a low social status and compete against society. At a socio-
political level, the findings suggest that harsh criminal justice policies and political 
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discourses, which have the effect of lowering criminals’ social status or implying that 
criminals are worthless or cruel, may contribute to feeling a lack of compassion toward 
criminals, and in turn to widespread punitiveness toward crime.  
Criminal Stereotypes and Punitiveness Toward Crime 
The criminal stereotype literature suggests that (a) criminals are perceived as being evil 
and poor, and (b) that criminals are generally disliked (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; 
Carroll et al., 1987; Chapman, 1968; Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Emsley, 1996; Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1997; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Plant et al., 2005; Reed & Reed, 1973; 
Roberts, 1992; Roberts & White, 1986; Sargent, 2004; Steen, Engen & Gainey, 2005; 
Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; Van Knippenberg et al., 1999). These beliefs often co-occur, 
leading Roberts (1992) to conclude that the image of the ‘criminal’ is typically that of 
‘an outsider, a young, lower-class male, [who is] physically unattractive [and] who has 
been convicted of a crime involving violence’ (p. 138).  
Endorsing criminal stereotypes seems to be associated with making more 
punitive decisions and expressing more punitive attitudes (Correll et al., 2007; Dixon & 
Maddox, 2005; Gordon & Anderson, 1995; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1997; Johnson, 2009; Roberts, 1992). For example, believing that ‘most 
criminals commit crimes because they are basically selfish people, unconcerned about 
the feelings of other people’ is associated with endorsing statements such as ‘criminals 
should be punished to make the criminals suffer, as the victims of the crimes suffered’ 
(Tam et al., 2008). Perceptions of offenders’ intent and causal responsibility can also 
motivate punishment of specific crimes and engender support for harsh criminal justice 
policies. Perceived causes of crime include individuals’ dispositions (e.g., laziness, 
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evilness or callousness), social (e.g., drug use, criminal associates) and economic factors 
(e.g., poverty, inequality). Indeed, individuals tend to be especially punitive when they 
perceive intent and attribute the causes of crime to individuals’ dispositions (Carlsmith 
& Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992; 
Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar 
findings in moral judgment). Punitiveness is also associated with features of the 
offender such as criminal record, afrocentric features, social status and social motives 
(i.e., self-concerned vs. other-concerned) (Blair et al., 2004; Christopher, Marek & May, 
2003; Kliemann et al., 2008). Moreover, individuals’ political ideology can come to 
shape perceptions of criminals and therefore have direct as well as indirect effects on 
punitiveness (Jost et al., 2003; see Tam et al., 2008, on the role of authoritarianism in 
shaping attributions for crime and punitiveness). The associations between political 
ideology, stereotyping and punitiveness will be more fully discussed later (see Study 2).  
In short, beliefs about who and what a criminal is are intimately tied to beliefs 
about how society should respond to criminals – that is, with punishment. Yet, no study 
has explored in any detail the structure of criminal stereotypes and the links between 
endorsing particular stereotypes and the affective and attitudinal responses that these 
engender. Recent research suggests that criminal stereotypes are in fact reflective of the 
‘Big Two’ fundamental dimensions of social perception (warmth and competence), with 
criminals stereotypically perceived as being incompetent and unintelligent, but also as 
being cold and untrustworthy (Côté-Lussier, 2012). Social psychological research on 
intergroup perception and relations suggests that these dimensions influence individuals’ 
affective and behavioural responses to social groups (Cuddy et al., 2007). The present 
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research aims to build on existing criminological research by identifying the paths that 
link criminal stereotypes to punitiveness toward crime.  
The ‘Big Two’: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS map 
For the past 30 years the interpersonal perception literature has demonstrated that 
perceptions of others and of social groups fall along two fundamental dimensions: 
warmth (i.e., kind, trustworthy, understanding) and competence (i.e., intelligent, 
efficient,  skilful) (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; 
Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 
2008). Correlational and experimental studies show – at an intergroup level – that 
perceptions of warmth and competence can be partly explained by social structural 
factors of competition and social status, respectively (Caprariello, Cuddy & Fiske, 
2009). But, according to Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007), status can also function to 
inform perceptions of warmth, to the extent that warmth stereotypes justify social 
inequalities, and that individuals adopt system-justifying beliefs. 
According to the SCM (Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske et al., 2002) and BIAS map 
(Cuddy et al., 2007), social perceptions of others generate appraisals and interpersonal 
comparisons that engender specific affective and behavioural responses (see Figure 1).  
For example, upward assimilative comparisons engender admiration and pride – a 
univalent positive emotion – whereas downward contrastive comparisons elicit 
contempt (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). Emotions related to contempt are disgust and 
resentment, which have moral overtones and contribute to the formation of moral 
judgment (Haidt, 2001). Emotions of anger may especially be elicited in response to 
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indignation and behaviour thought to be illegitimate and competitive in a zero-sum 
sense (Fiske et al., 2002).  
 
Figure 1. Quadrants of social perception, affective and behavioural responses according 
to the SCM and BIAS map. 
 
Note. Adapted from Cuddy, Fiske & Glick (2007).  
Groups perceived as being more competent than warm should elicit emotions of 
envy, which is an ambivalent emotion engendered by the perception that a group is 
doing well for itself but is concerned only with furthering its own goals (i.e., lacking 
positive intent toward the ingroup). Envy can result not only in admiration but also in 
resentment and exclusion (Fiske et al., 2002). Indeed, envy can also engender feelings of 
injustice (in outcomes) and anger, especially toward groups perceived as being parasitic 
(Fiske et al., 2002). Groups perceived as being more warm than competent are expected 
to elicit pity, an ambivalent emotion that is related in part to a group’s perceived 
uncontrollable negative outcomes (i.e., due to a lack of competence). Pity can also elicit 
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paternalism and the justification of subordination, especially toward outgroups (Fiske et 
al., 2002). According to Fiske et al. (2002) envy and pity are functional emotions. They 
maintain the status quo and defend the position of ingroups by acknowledging the 
positive aspect of a social group (i.e., warmth for pity, and competence for envy) and 
simultaneously denigrating the group (i.e., as lacking competence for pity, and as 
lacking warmth for envy).  
Emotions, in turn, are key in activating behaviour and can function to inform 
attitudes at an intuitive level (Adolphs, 2009; Frijda, 2010; Haidt, 2001; Roseman, 
Wiest & Swartz, 1994). Affective responses to social perception are thus functionally 
relevant in that they motivate interpersonal behaviour and engender action tendencies 
(Cuddy et al., 2007). Broadly speaking, social behaviour can aim toward facilitation or 
harm, and can be active or passive. According to the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007), 
helping behaviour (active facilitation) is predicted by admiration but also pity, while 
associating behaviour (passive facilitation) is predicted by admiration and envy. 
Attacking behaviour (active harm) is predicted by envy and contempt, while excluding 
behaviour (passive harm) is predicted by pity and contempt. 
Previous findings suggest that punitiveness toward criminals is associated with 
affective responses to crime. Evidence links punitiveness to negative emotions such as 
anger, while reduced punitiveness is linked to positive emotions such as sympathy 
(Gault & Sabini, 2000; Johnson, 2009; Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005). Yet little research 
has linked criminal stereotypes to affective responses that are predictive of punitiveness 
toward crime. It is hypothesized that criminal stereotypes engender negative affective 
and harmful behavioural responses, thus motivating specific attitudinal responses, such 
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as support for harsh criminal justice policy. Previous findings provide some support for 
this hypothesis; endorsing stereotypes about Black criminals has been associated with 
experiencing emotional discomfort (Dixon & Maddox, 2005), aggressive behaviour 
(Correll et al., 2007) and more punitive responses (Graham & Lowery, 2004).  
The following studies apply two theoretical frameworks from the interpersonal 
and intergroup relations literature – the SCM and BIAS map – to identify the pathways 
that link social perception to punitive responses to crime. Study 1 tests the main 
hypotheses of the SCM and BIAS map with punitive attitudes added as a final outcome. 
Study 2 builds on the first study by additionally considering the role of political 
ideology in shaping perceptions and responses to law-breakers. Considering the 
associations between political ideology and criminal stereotypes proves to be an 
important step in understanding the functional relation between affect and punitive 
attitudes.  
Study 1: Applying the SCM and BIAS Map to Predict Punitive Attitudes 
This study addresses the question of what drives the public appetite for harsh 
punishment of law-breakers. Structural equation modeling is used to simultaneously 
estimate the associations between components of the SCM, BIAS map and support for 
tough criminal justice policy. One hypothesis is that criminal stereotypes engender 
negative affective and behavioural responses to criminals. A second hypothesis is that 
these responses are associated with expressing more punitive attitudes toward crime.                        
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Participants 
Participants (N = 172) were London (UK) students who filled out a survey at a booth 
located on campus for the chance to win one of several cash prizes (ranging from £25 or 
$37.50USD, to £200 or $300USD) and/or a £2.50 ($3.75USD) voucher for university 
catering services.  Participants’ mean age was 21.93 (min = 18, max = 56). The sample 
consisted of 106 men, and 66 women. Sixty per cent of the sample reported spending 
most of their youth in the United Kingdom. White British students made up 32% of the 
sample, while 19% were White students from a non-British background. The remainder 
of the study was 26% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 6% British 
African or Caribbean and 16% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British 
and non-British, Mixed or Other). The sample was equally distributed in terms of social 
class, with 30% reporting being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 40% 
from the middle-class and 30% from upper-middle and upper class.  
Measures 
Competitiveness and social status. Criminals’ perceived competitiveness (M = 
4.95, SD = 1.27) and social status (M = 2.64, SD = 1.02) were measured by 3 items each 
on a scale that ranged from 1 to 7 (taken from Fiske et al., 2002). A confirmatory factor 
analysis suggested a good fit for dimensions of competitiveness and social status (2 (8, 
N = 172) = 7.8, p > .05, 2/df = .97, CFI = 1, RMSEA ≤ .001). Each item loaded highly 
and statistically significantly on its respective factor (p’s ≤ .001). Items did not cross 
load. Competitiveness and status did not correlate significantly.  
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Competence and warmth. Criminals were rated on 5 competence (i.e., 
competent, skilful, efficient, intelligent, goal-oriented) and 5 warmth (i.e., warm, nice, 
well-intentioned, trustworthy, good-natured) traits on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 
(Extremely). Although criminals are perceived as being low on both competence and 
warmth, perceptions of criminals fall into the ‘successful competitor’ category as they 
are perceived as being higher on competence (M = 3.46, SD = 1.18) than on warmth (M 
= 1.79, SD = 0.81) (t (171) = 19.11, p ≤ .001). Confirmatory factor analysis suggested a 
good fit for the two dimensions of competence and warmth (2 (21, N = 172) = 45.31, p 
≤ .01, 2/df = 2.16, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .08) with each item loading highly and 
statistically significantly on its respective factor (p’s ≤ .001). Items did not cross load. 
Competence and warmth correlated positively (r = .57, p  ≤ .001).  
Emotional responses to criminals as a social group. Participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which society feels 24 emotional responses toward criminals as a 
social group on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely) (taken from Fiske et al., 2002). 
On average, emotions most likely to be felt toward criminals as a group were, in order, 
angry (M = 5.87, SD = 1.30), fearful (M = 5.69, SD = 1.45), uneasy (M = 5.60, SD = 
1.42), disgusted (M = 5.53, SD = 1.47), hateful (M = 5.40, SD = 1.31), frustrated (M = 
5.38, SD = 1.49) and tense (M = 5.23, SD = 1.40). Emotions least likely to be felt toward 
criminals were secure (M = 1.68, SD = 1.01), fond (M = 1.70, SD = 1.10), proud (M = 
1.71, SD = 1.20), respectful (M = 1.73, SD = 1.14), comfortable (M = 1.75, SD = 1.16) 
and admiring (M = 1.92, SD = 1.30). Reliability analyses suggested that emotional 
responses specified by the SCM, that is, envy (envious, jealous, a = .75), admiration 
(e.g., respectful, proud, admiring, inspired, fond, a = .74) and contempt (e.g., frustrated, 
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hateful, disgusted, angry, uneasy, resentful, contemptuous, ashamed, a = .72) were 
adequate, except for pity (e.g., pitying, sympathetic, compassionate, a = .45).  
Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of emotional responses suggested a 
somewhat different 4 factor solution (2 (53, N = 172) = 111.69, p ≤ .001, 2 /df = 2.11, 
CFI = .93, RMSEA = .08) than that suggested by Fiske et al. (2002).
20
 The first two 
factors split contempt into negative emotions suggesting Anger (e.g., angry, disgusted, 
hateful) and a weaker and more diffuse negative emotion suggesting Uneasiness (e.g., 
uneasy, tense, anxious, fearful). The third factor of Envy was a mixture of envy and 
admiration (e.g., envious, jealous, admiring, inspired), and the last factor Compassion 
was a mixture of pity and admiration (e.g., compassionate, fond, secure). All items 
loaded on their respective factors statistically significantly (p’s ≤ 0.01). Certain 
emotions loaded significantly on more than one factor: fearful loaded significantly on 
Uneasy and Angry; uneasy loaded significantly and positively on Uneasy, but negatively 
on Envy; admiring and inspired loaded significantly on Compassion but also on Envy. 
These cross-loadings suggest that Envy was associated with positive evaluations and 
partly explains the correlation between Envy and Compassion (see Table 1 for bivariate 
correlations between emotions). 
 Behavioural responses to criminals as a social group. Participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which society is likely to demonstrate 8 behavioural types toward 
criminals as a social group on a scale of 1 (Not at all likely) to 7 (Very likely). 
Behaviours most likely to occur toward criminals as a group were, in order, to exclude 
(M = 4.28, SD = 1.34), demean (M = 3.92, SD = 1.43), fight (M = 3.32, SD = 1.39) and  
                                                 
20
 Emotions ‘disappointed’, ‘proud’ and ‘resentful’ loaded poorly on factors and were dropped from the 
analysis.  
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Table 1 
Bivariate Correlations Between Emotional Responses to Criminals 
  
Uneasiness 
 
Envy 
 
Compassion 
 
Anger 
 
.30*** 
 
-.11 
 
 -.46*** 
Uneasiness    .03           -.24** 
Envy   .53*** 
               
 Note. Correlations are between latent variables and were obtained using confirmatory factor  analysis in 
MPLUS. *p  ≤ .05. **p  ≤  .01. ***p  ≤  .001. 
 
attack (M = 3.06, SD = 1.49). Behaviours least likely to occur were to protect (M = 1.90, 
SD = 1.05) and associate with (M = 2.04, SD = 1.01). Correlational analyses suggest 
moderate correlations between items for Help behaviour (help and protect, r = .48), 
Associate behaviour (cooperate and associate, r = .45), Attack behaviour (fight and 
attack, r = .35) and Exclude behaviour (exclude and demean, r = .49). In each case, 
correlations were highest between items meant to reflect each behavioural type, except 
for attack which correlated slightly more highly with exclude (r = .37).  Means of 
behaviour responses were used in all analyses (see Table 2 for bivariate correlations 
between behavioural responses).  
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Table 2 
Bivariate Correlations Between Behavioural Responses to Criminals 
  
Exclude 
 
Associate 
 
Help 
 
Attack 
 
.32*** 
 
     .07 
 
.05 
Exclude     -.25***          -.24*** 
Associate        .48*** 
 
Note. Correlations are between means of behavioural items and were obtained in MPLUS.  
* p  ≤ .05. **p  ≤  .01. ***p  ≤  .001. 
  
Punitiveness. Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 
(Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly) with statements: ‘People who break the law 
should be given stiffer sentences’, ‘Offences against laws and norms in our society 
should be punished as severely as possible’, and ‘The use of harsh punishment should be 
avoided whenever possible’. A latent variable was estimated to represent punitiveness 
toward crime.   
Results  
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the measurement and structural 
parts of the SCM and BIAS map with punitiveness added as an attitudinal outcome. 
Latent variables were estimated for perceived competence and warmth, affective 
responses and punitiveness, while means were used for perceived competitiveness and 
social status, and for behavioural responses.
21
 The estimated SEM can be thought of as 
being composed of 4 steps or components. The first step links social structure to social 
perception. The second step links social perception to affect. The third step links affect 
to behaviour. The final step links social perception, affect and behaviour to punitiveness. 
                                                 
21
 Means were used to limit the number of estimated parameters due to the small sample size.  
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Components of each step (e.g., affective responses) were allowed to correlate with each 
other.  
The results suggest an adequate fit for the full SEM (see Figure 3) (2 (86, N = 
172) = 177.94, p ≤ .001, 2/df = 2.07, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .08). 22  While 
competitiveness only significantly predicts warmth (β = -.32),23 social status positively 
predicts warmth (β = .50) and competence (β = .46) (p’s ≤ .01). The results partly 
support the hypothesized SCM pathways, however the positive association between 
social status and warmth was unexpected given that one would expect warmth to be 
functionally related to social status (i.e., more successful criminals are less warm). 
These findings may suggest a ‘halo effect’ such that more successful criminals are seen 
as being more competent and more warm (Conway et al., 1996), but also that criminals’ 
low warmth justifies criminals’ social inequality (i.e., criminals’ low social status is due 
to their low warmth) (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). 
Paths were estimated from perceived competence and warmth to each affective 
response, and from affective responses to behavioural responses. Warmth was found to 
significantly and negatively predict Uneasiness (β = -.53) and Anger (β = -.42), and 
positively predict Compassion (β = .50) (p’s ≤ .001). Competence was found to strongly 
positively predicted Envy (β = .64, p  ≤ .001), positively, but more weakly, predict  
                                                 
22
 The fit statistics suggest a marginally good or fair fit. According to Hu and Bentler (1999) a CFI close 
to .95 and RMSEA close to .06 suggest a good fit. However, Marsh et al. (2004) warn against 
overgeneralizing Hu and Bentler’s recommendations which do not apply to all models. Previous 
researchers have suggested that a CFI > .90 suggests a reasonable model-data fit (c.f. Marsh et al., 2004), 
and that a RMSEA between .05 and .08 suggests a fair fit, while a value greater than .1 indicates a poor fit 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Chi-square measures on the other hand are sensitive to sample size and 
violations of distributional assumptions (Bentler, 1990). Wheaton et al. (1977) therefore suggest using a 
Chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio to compensate for sample size, a ratio of less than 5 is typically 
considered to demonstrate an acceptable fit.  
23
 All regression coefficients are standardized.  
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Uneasiness (β = .33, p ≤ .05) and marginally positively predict Anger (β = .20, p = .06). 
The results suggest that although competence is crucial in predicting envy, it is less 
important than warmth in predicting anger, uneasiness and compassion. Stereotypes 
about criminals’ warmth are therefore particularly important in predicting strong 
negative affective responses to criminals. 
Because confirmatory factor analyses distinguished between feelings of Anger 
and Uneasiness (rather than the umbrella emotion of contempt) paths linking Anger to 
behavioural outcomes were also estimated for Uneasiness. Attack behaviour is 
positively predicted by Anger  (β = .20, p ≤ .05), but not by Uneasiness or Envy. 
Exclude behaviour is positively predicted by Uneasiness (β = .27, p ≤ .001) and 
marginally predicted by Anger (β = .24, p = .052), but not by Compassion. Recall that in 
this case Compassion was a mixture of emotions of pity and admiration, the latter of 
which is unlikely to elicit exclusion. Help behaviour is positively predicted by 
Compassion (β = .38, p ≤ .001) but not by Envy. Associate behaviour is positively 
predicted by Compassion (β = .41, p ≤ .001) but not by Envy.  
As expected, anger predicts harmful behavioural responses such as attacking and 
excluding, while uneasiness only predicts excluding behaviour. These findings suggest 
that in considering affective responses to criminals, there is a distinction between feeling 
uneasy and angry. Though both emotions are predicted by stereotypes about criminals’ 
lack of warmth, uneasiness predicts a desire to exclude and demean criminals, while 
anger predicts a desire to exclude and demean, as well as fight and attack criminals. On 
the other hand, helping and associating behaviour is expectedly predicted by compassion 
which combined emotions of pity and admiration, specified by the SCM. 
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This model also regresses punitiveness on three components of the SCM and 
BIAS map: social perception, affective and behavioural responses. Punitiveness was 
negatively predicted by Exclusion behaviour (β = -.22, p ≤ .01) and positively predicted 
by Anger (β = .39, p ≤ .001). All other paths were non-significant and had considerably 
smaller effect sizes. Social perceptions and responses to these perceptions accounted for 
28% of the variance in punitiveness.  
Summary of Study 1 
These results build on previous findings that link anger to punitiveness. They suggest 
that endorsing stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth and untrustworthiness is 
associated with feeling angry, disgusted and hateful toward criminals. The finding that 
exclusion negatively predicts punitiveness is unexpected, in part because exclusion 
behaviour is positively predicted by negative emotions of uneasiness. But, moreover, 
this finding would suggest that individuals draw a clear distinction between punishing 
and excluding criminals.  
In other words, the findings suggest that while individuals who feel uneasy (and 
to some extent, angry) toward criminals may want to exclude criminals, they do not 
want to punish them harshly. This seems unlikely given that exclusion is a key 
component of punishment in the context of criminal justice, whether punishment is 
thought of in terms of a concrete sentence (e.g., prison) or in terms of its social 
implications (e.g., being labeled as a convicted criminal). This finding suggests that 
there may have been methodological problems in the measurement of individuals’ social 
perceptions and responses to criminals and that a more careful analysis and 
interpretation of individuals’ responses is warranted. On the other hand, this finding may 
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also suggest that an omitted variable may explain the negative association between 
exclusion and punitiveness. One potential missing variable in this model is individuals’ 
political orientation and ideology, which previous research suggest can influence social 
perception and punitive responses (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007; Jost et al., 2003). The 
following study therefore additionally takes into account the role of political orientation 
and ideology in shaping perceptions and responses to criminals.  
Study 2: The Role of Political Ideology in Shaping Perceptions and Responses to 
Criminals 
Much of the research applying the SCM and BIAS map has tended to consider cultural 
or group-level perceptions and responses to various social groups (e.g., feminists, rich 
people, the homeless). But theoretical approaches and empirical evidence in the area of 
political psychology point to the importance of ideology in predicting prejudice (e.g., 
racial, sexual and gender based) and political attitudes such as punitiveness toward 
crime (Allport, 1929; Bassett, 2010; Christopher & Mull, 2006; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; 
Duriez et al., 2005; Herek; 2000; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1992; Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
Kreindler, 2005; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). Political ideology predicts punitiveness at 
both the individual (e.g., in terms of expressed attitudes) and societal level (e.g., in terms 
of actual sentencing practices) (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et 
al., 2003; King & Maruna, 2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & 
Boeckmann, 1997).  
Political conservatism – a key predictor of punitiveness – is defined by two 
dimensions: cultural and economic conservatism. Cultural conservatism is traditionalism 
(or resistance to change) while economic conservatism is the acceptance (or preference) 
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of inequality (Jost et al., 2003; Thorisdottir et al., 2007; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004).  
Political conservatism itself is predicted by two main ideological positions: Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Right-wing 
authoritarianism is related to cultural conservatism and is defined as conventionalism (a 
preference for tradition and stability), authoritarian submission (deference to authority) 
and authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer, 1981).  RWA is particularly associated with 
punitiveness toward crime (Jost et al., 2003), with authoritarian aggression being 
measured by individuals’ endorsement of the need to ‘crack down harder on deviant 
groups’ and the belief that ‘physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make 
people behave properly’ (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Evidence suggests that RWA 
is positively correlated with anger, which in itself can be associated with aggressive 
behaviours and support for aggressive policies (Skitka et al., 2006).  
Social dominance orientation is related to economic conservatism and is defined 
by a preference for hierarchical as opposed to equal intergroup relations, and a tendency 
to want one’s ingroup to be on top of that hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). People high on 
SDO are more likely to endorse meritocratic beliefs and hierarchy-legitimizing 
stereotypes (Caricati, 2007; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007) and to favour hierarchy-
enhancing policies (Pratto et al., 1994). More generally, SDO is defined by a lack of 
empathy (Pratto et al., 1994; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2007) which itself is a key 
cause of sympathy and motivates individuals to help others (Adolphs, 2009).  
Previous research has established some links between political ideology and the 
inferences individuals draw from social structure to traits (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). 
In Study 2, individuals’ political orientation and ideology are incorporated into the SCM 
190 
 
and BIAS map model to consider their effect on punitiveness toward crime. In addition, 
separate SEMs are estimated to observe the effect of political ideology on each 
component of the SCM and BIAS map. It is hypothesized, for instance, that people high 
on SDO should perceive criminals as being more competitive because of, first, a belief 
that the social world is unequal and that groups must compete for power and, second, a 
desire for unequal outcomes (Esses et al., 2001). Perceiving criminals as being more 
competitive should be associated with lower perceptions of warmth, and in turn with 
expressing more anger and less compassion toward criminals. On the other hand, RWA 
should be associated with expressing more anger toward criminals and with expressing 
more punitiveness toward crime.  
Participants 
Participants were the same as in Study 1. 
Measures 
Measures for the SCM, BIAS map and punitiveness were the same as in Study 1.  
Right-wing authoritarianism. RWA was measured by 4 items. Participants rated 
the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly) 
with statements: ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values 
children should learn’, ‘Strong force is necessary against threatening groups’, 
‘Traditions are the foundation of a healthy society and should be respected’ and ‘It is 
necessary to use force against people who are a threat to authority’.  Confirmatory factor 
analysis suggested a good fit (2 (2, N = 172) = 2.46, p > .05, 2 /df = 1.23, CFI = 1, 
RMSEA = .04). RWA factor scores were used in all analyses.  
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Social dominance orientation. SDO was measured by 5 items adopted from 
Pratto et al.’s (1994) scale. Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 
1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly) with statements: ‘It’s probably a good thing 
that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom’, ‘Group equality 
should be our ideal’, ‘Increased social equality’, ‘If certain groups of people stayed in 
their place we would have fewer problems’ and ‘We should do what we can to equalize 
conditions for different groups’. Confirmatory factor analysis suggested a good fit (2(5, 
N = 172) = 8.73, p > .05, 2 /df = 1.75, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .07). SDO factor scores 
were used in all analyses.  
Left-right political placement. Participants were asked to rate their political 
views or affiliation on a scale of 1 (Very liberal) to 7 (Very conservative).  
Results 
Structural equation modeling was used to estimate the same SCM and BIAS map paths 
as in Study 1, while additionally regressing punitiveness on ideology and political 
orientation (i.e., RWA, SDO and left-right placement) (2 (94, N = 172) = 192.44, p ≤ 
.001, 2 /df = 2.05, CFI = .88, RMSEA = .08) (see Figure 3). The paths between social 
structural variables, social perception, affect and behaviour are consistent with Study 1 
and remain statistically significant. However, ideology and political orientation weaken 
the association between punitiveness and Exclude behaviour (β = -.08, ns), and Anger (β 
= .11, ns). When controlling for ideology and political orientation, however, 
Compassion significantly negatively predicts punitiveness (β = -.28, p ≤ .05). RWA is 
the strongest predictor of punitiveness (β = .60, p ≤ .001) with political orientation  
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having a smaller but significant effect (β = .15, p ≤ .05). SDO on the other hand does not 
have a significant direct effect on punitiveness, rather its effect is mediated by left-right 
placement. Left-right placement itself is significantly positively predicted by RWA (β = 
.35) and SDO (β = .33) (p’s ≤ .001). Together with social perception, affective and 
behavioural responses, ideology and political orientation accounted for 61% of the 
variance in punitiveness.  
The results are in line with previous findings and give some indication that 
political ideology is associated with responses to criminals. Separate SEMs were 
therefore estimated for each of the components of the SCM and BIAS map to test for the 
associations between social structure and social perception, social perception and affect, 
and affect and behaviour while simultaneously regressing dependent variables on 
ideology and political orientation, and controlling for participants’ socio-demographic 
variables (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). 
 A first SEM estimated only the measurement and structural paths between social 
structural variables and social perception, regressing perceived competitiveness, social 
status, warmth and competence on ideology and left-right placement while controlling 
for socio-demographic variables (2 (74, N = 172) = 121.23, p ≤ .001, 2 /df = 1.64, 
CFI = .90, RMSEA = .06). SDO significantly positively predicts perceived warmth (β = 
.12, p ≤ .05). Ideology and political orientation do not predict perceptions of 
competence, nor do they predict perceptions of competition and social status.  
Otherwise, paths remain consistent with Study 1. 
A second SEM estimated only the measurement and structural paths between 
social perception and affect, regressing affect on ideology and left-right placement while 
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controlling for socio-demographic variables  (2 (104, N = 172) = 182.41, p  ≤ .001, 2 
/df =  1.75, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .07). RWA significantly positively predicts Anger (β = 
.23, p ≤ .05) while SDO significantly negatively predicts Anger (β = -.21, p ≤ .05). 
Compassion on the other hand is significantly positively predicted by SDO (β = .20, p ≤ 
.05) and significantly negatively predicted by political orientation (β = -.22, p ≤ .05). 
Otherwise, paths remain consistent with Study 1. 
A third SEM estimated only the measurement and structural paths between affect 
and behavioural responses, regressing behaviour on ideology and political orientation 
while controlling for socio-demographic variables (2 (88, N = 172) = 156.89, p ≤ .001, 
2 /df = 1.78, CFI = .87, RMSEA = .07). Findings suggest that controlling for the effect 
of ideology and political orientation weakened the effect of Anger on Attack behaviour 
(β = .16, p = .07) and rendered the effect of Envy on Attack behaviour statistically 
significant (β = .16, p ≤ .05).24 Help behaviour is significantly and positively predicted 
by left-right placement (β = .25, p ≤ .001), while Exclude behaviour is marginally 
negatively predicted by RWA (β = -.17, p = .08). Otherwise, paths remain consistent 
with Study 1. 
These results are at times as expected and at times counterintuitive. While RWA 
expectedly positively predicts anger, it unexpectedly marginally negatively predicts 
exclusion behaviour. Also, unexpectedly, SDO positively predicts compassion and 
negatively predicts anger. Political conservatism on the other hand surprisingly 
positively predicts helping behaviour. One interpretation of the results is to consider the 
                                                 
24
 A separate analysis estimating the measurement model for emotional responses and regressing Anger 
on Compassion and Envy revealed that when controlling for Compassion, Envy positively predicts Anger. 
This partial association helps explain the positive effect of Envy on Attack behavior, which is consistent 
with the SCM.  
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measurement problems inherent in using projective measures, and in this case, asking 
respondents to answer based on how they believe society is likely to respond to 
criminals. The findings suggest that respondents partly reported their own perceptions, 
affective and behavioural responses, but also at times positioned their answers in 
relation to how they believe society perceives and responds to criminals.  This 
positioning appears to have been influenced by ideology and political orientation. That 
is, people high on RWA seemed to think that society does not exclude criminals enough 
and tended to say that it was unlikely that society would exclude criminals. Political 
positioning one’s answers explains the negative association between RWA and 
exclusion, and the finding that controlling for RWA weakens the negative association 
between exclusion behaviour and punitiveness. On the other hand, people high on SDO 
seemed to think that society perceives criminals as being too warm, feels too much 
compassion and not enough anger toward criminals. Lastly, politically conservative 
people seemed to think society helps criminals too much.  
Anger, however, was expectedly positively associated with RWA and with 
punitiveness, although controlling for RWA weakened the association between anger 
and punitiveness. This finding could suggest that the association between anger and 
punitiveness is completely mediated by ideology, and that once RWA is taken into 
account there is no longer a statistically significant association between anger and 
punitiveness. However, ample evidence suggests that anger is a robust predictor of 
punitiveness (Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005; Seip et al., 2009; Johnson, 2009). It is 
therefore possible that the small sample size could have affected the statistical 
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significance of the association between anger and punitiveness, when controlling for the 
ideological component of anger.  
Summary of Study 2 
The results of Study 1 revealed that feeling uneasy and angry was associated with 
wanting to exclude criminals but not punish them harshly. This finding suggested that 
this study faced measurement issues or that important explanatory variables were 
omitted from the model.  In Study 2, separate structural equation models testing each 
step of the SCM and BIAS map revealed that controlling for political ideology 
explained the unexpected findings reported in Study 1. Moreover, Study 2 demonstrates 
that even after controlling for political orientation and ideology, the pathways specified 
by the SCM and BIAS map between social structure, perception, affect and behaviour 
remained significant. Still, future research applying the SCM and BIAS map to the study 
of criminal stereotypes should control for political ideology and use projective questions 
that do not allow for politically positioning one’s answers.  
In summary, the findings largely support the SCM and BIAS map and identify 
some of the pathways that link criminal stereotypes to punitiveness toward crime. 
Though anger expectedly predicted punitiveness, controlling for ideology and political 
orientation weakened this association and revealed that endorsing stereotypes about 
criminals’ lack of warmth is associated with feeling less compassion toward criminals 
and with expressing more support for harsh criminal justice policies. This finding is in 
line with other studies which find that sympathy is an important negative predictor of 
punishment (Graham et al., 1997; Feather et al., 2001). However, the strongest predictor 
of punitiveness was political ideology, specifically RWA. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This research aimed in part to explain the public’s seemingly insatiable desire for the 
harsh punishment of law-breakers (Loader, 2009). Despite growing prison populations 
and having little knowledge of actual crime and sentencing trends, individuals in the 
UK, USA and Canada tend to support harsh criminal justice policies (Cullen, Fisher & 
Applegate, 2000; Doob & Roberts, 1984; King, 2008; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & Hough, 
2005). A review of the criminological evidence suggests that the endorsement of 
criminal stereotypes may help explain individuals’ punitive attitudes, although it is 
unclear why believing that criminals are, for example, poor and cruel would engender 
strong desires to punish crime.  
This paper applied the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002) and BIAS 
map (Cuddy et al., 2007), and argued that stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth 
and competence are likely to engender negative affective and behavioural responses, 
including desires to attack and exclude criminals. It was also hypothesized that criminal 
stereotypes and their outcomes may help explain public punitiveness toward crime. The 
findings largely supported the SCM and BIAS map. The results suggested that 
stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth are particularly powerful as they engender 
strong affective responses such as anger and disgust, but also fear and uneasiness. While 
previous research suggests that anger is a strong predictor of support for harsh criminal 
justice policies, the present findings suggested that the effect of anger on punitiveness is 
weakened when controlling for Right-Wing Authoritarianism. However, controlling for 
political ideology also revealed that individuals who endorse stereotypes about 
criminals’ cruelty or callousness were less likely to feel compassion toward criminals 
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and more likely to support harsh criminal justice policy. These findings may partly 
explain why people are likely to say that offenders should get stiffer sentences, despite 
knowing little about actual sentencing practices. That is, answers to this question are 
partly based on social stereotypes about criminals, strong affective responses and 
ideological positions. 
This study contributes to research on the ‘Big Two’ by demonstrating that 
perceptions of warmth and competence can come to shape socio-political attitudes, 
through affective responses. The findings also suggested that in order to better 
understand individuals’ perceptions and responses to the ‘Big Two’, it is sometimes 
necessary to take into account individuals’ political ideology. Though it has been 
established that political ideology is associated with the endorsement of stereotypes and 
punitiveness, the present study is novel in that it revealed that affective responses to the 
‘Big Two’ have an ideological component. In the context of crime and punishment, 
controlling for the ideological component of anger revealed that criminal stereotypes 
can have an indirect effect on punitiveness through compassion.  
One of the limitations of this study is the inability to make strong causal claims 
about the directionality of the observed effects. To the extent that affect influences 
cognition, the directionality of the social perception and affect association could be 
reversed, such that affective responses also influence social perception (and, potentially, 
perceived competitiveness and social status). Indeed, some evidence suggests that 
perceptions of injustice can engender anger, which in turn leads to aggressive behaviour 
and blaming cognitions (Jones & Fitness, 2008). The directionality of the social 
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perception and affect association should therefore be tested experimentally in future 
research.  
By taking into account the content of criminal stereotypes and the effects of the 
‘Big Two’ on affective and behavioural responses, this research provides a strong 
theoretical framework linking criminal stereotypes to punitiveness toward crime. The 
findings have important policy implications. They suggest that reducing stereotypical 
perceptions of criminals and increasing compassion toward criminals could have the 
effect of making society less punitive. For instance, even if individuals are politically 
conservative and feel angry toward crime, increasing perspective taking (i.e., 
considering how the other would perceive or respond to a given situation) could reduce 
punitiveness toward crime (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). On the other hand, political 
platforms which insist that criminals are worthless and cruel may contribute to a 
growing punitive public by decreasing compassion toward this social group.  
The findings also suggest that criminal justice policies which have the effect of 
lowering criminals’ social status could contribute to negative stereotypes about 
criminals’ warmth and competence. These effects may especially be harmful for social 
groups already in the margins of society, and justify their exclusion and punishment.  
The main contribution of this research is, then, to demonstrate the functionality of the 
‘Big Two’ in engendering specific socio-political attitudes. Policy makers should take 
into account the role of social stereotypes in generating support for social policies, and 
the role of policies in generating social stereotypes.  
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Pathways Linking Social Perception to Cognitive,  
Affective and Punitive Responses 
 
The second paper focused on group-level criminal stereotypes and built a full model 
linking these stereotypes to support for harsh criminal justice policy. The results also 
replicated some of the findings from the first paper, where criminal stereotypes were 
found to be predicted by social structural determinants. This paper moved beyond the 
first paper by applying the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) 
Map in order to identify the affective and behavioural outcomes of criminal stereotypes. 
The results largely supported both the SCM and BIAS map.  
Although the SCM suggests that criminal stereotypes should engender contempt, 
the results suggested that negative emotional responses to criminals were more nuanced. 
Stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth engendered angry and disgusted responses, 
but also distinct uneasy and fearful responses. However, it was individuals’ angry 
responses that were more strongly associated with desires to attack and punish 
criminals. Endorsing criminal stereotypes was also found to be associated with 
expressing a lack of empathy toward criminals. Further analyses revealed that 
controlling for individuals’ political ideology weakened the association between anger 
and supporting harsh criminal justice policy, while feeling a lack of empathy toward 
criminals emerged as an important predictor of punitive attitudes.  It therefore appears as 
though there is an ideological component to feeling angry toward criminals.  Indeed, the 
results suggested that individuals’ political ideology influenced how they perceived 
society’s perceptions and responses to criminals.  
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The results speak more broadly to the role of emotion in motivating behavioural 
intentions and policy preferences. Anger itself is a strong negative emotional response 
that motivates approach and harmful behaviour toward others. On the other hand, a lack 
of empathy would attenuate desires to approach and help others.  Support for harsh 
criminal justice policy therefore emerges in part from individuals’ belief that criminals 
are stereotypically cold and untrustworthy, and from a failure to feel empathy toward 
these stereotypical criminals.  
More generally, this paper addressed some of the issues raised in the literature 
review regarding the processes associated with punishment in the broader context of 
social life. Namely the results support the argument that perceived warmth is key in 
social cognition, and that emotions of anger and a lack of empathy play an important 
role in motivating social behaviour, including punitiveness toward crime. Although this 
paper did not address whether these cognitive and affective processes occured 
intuitively or through slower controlled reasoning processes, some of these issues will 
be addressed in the fourth and fifth papers.  
In moving forward, the third paper aims to identify some of the pathways that 
link stereotypes about criminals to strong cognitive, affective and punitive responses. 
Individuals routinely come to form judgments about crime, for example about its 
harmfulness and wrongfulness, when expressing moral outrage or punitiveness toward 
crime. This paper moves the level of analysis from group-level to individual-level 
criminal stereotypes in order to observe the direct effect of stereotypes on cognitive, 
affective and punitive responses to specific crimes.  
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Paper 3 
A crime is only as bad as the person who commits it: 
The role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and 
punishment of crime 
 
The way in which individuals think society should respond to criminals, 
for example by adopting harsher criminal justice policies, is intimately 
tied to how individuals think and feel about criminals. While previous 
research demonstrates that perceiving criminals in stereotypical ways is 
associated with feeling specific negative emotions toward crime (e.g., 
anger) (Côté-Lussier, 2012a), it is unclear whether stereotypes shape the 
way in which individuals perceive crime. This research considers the 
effect of criminal stereotypes on perceptions and punishment of specific 
crimes. The results suggest that crimes committed by stereotypical 
criminals are perceived as being more wrongful, harmful, and serious, 
and engender more moral outrage. Cognitive and emotional responses to 
crime are also partly explained by ideological positions and political 
orientation. The findings contribute to social psychological research on 
interpersonal and intergroup relations by demonstrating the cognitive 
links between stereotypes and moral outrage, in the context of crime. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the complex links between 
ideology, stereotyping and public attitudes towards crime and 
punishment. 
Keywords: social stereotypes, criminals, punitiveness, political ideology 
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Why does crime engender an angry and punitive response? Theorists, such as Durkheim, 
have argued that crimes are moral outrages that shock ‘healthy consciences’ and 
motivate social responses such as punishment (Garland, 1990). According to Batson and 
colleagues (2007) ‘[m]oral outrage can be defined as anger provoked by the perception 
that a moral standard—usually a standard of fairness or justice—has been violated’ 
(p.1272). Similarly, cognitive linguist George Lakoff has argued that anger is most 
clearly conceptualized as constituting a response to some form of injustice, most 
strongly reflected in the common saying: ‘don’t get mad, get even’ (emphasis in original 
text, Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987). In the criminological literature, moral outrage toward a 
specific crime is found to be partly explained by a crime’s perceived wrongfulness and 
harmfulness (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002). Feeling angry toward crime and 
criminals more generally is also partly explained by the endorsement of stereotypes 
about criminals’ lack of warmth (Côté-Lussier, 2012a) and by other factors such as 
political ideology (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2003; 
King & Maruna, 2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 
1997). According to the interpersonal and intergroup relations literature, anger is a 
functional emotion that is elicited in response to a group’s perceived lack of competence 
and warmth (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) and can become part of an affective attitude 
toward specific social groups (Tapias et al., 2007). But what cognitive processes link 
stereotypes about criminals to anger or moral outrage and to a strong desire to punish 
crime? 
The aim of this research is to show that stereotypes about criminals affect not 
only the way individuals feel about crime, but also how individuals perceive and judge 
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specific crimes. The following study bridges research on stereotypes and emotion to 
research on the cognitive pathways that engender moral outrage in the context of crime. 
This research addresses key questions including whether crimes committed by an evil 
and cruel individual are perceived as being as wrongful as those committed by a kind 
and remorseful individual, and whether these crimes should be punished to the same 
degree. The results suggest that crimes perpetrated by stereotypical criminals are 
perceived as more wrongful, harmful and serious, which in turn is associated with 
experiencing more moral outrage and making more punitive decisions. Politically 
conservative individuals are also more likely to perceive crime as being serious and to 
experience moral outrage. These results suggest that thinking about criminals in 
stereotypical ways and being politically conservative may generate an inflated sense of 
the seriousness of crime and strong emotional responses that support a punitive stance 
toward crime, such as anger and moral outrage.  
Cognitive and Emotional Predictors of Punitiveness Toward Crime 
Punitiveness toward crime is typically operationalized as public support for harsh 
criminal justice policy (Carroll et al., 1987; Costelloe et al., 2002; Gault & Sabini, 2000; 
King & Maruna, 2009; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 
1997) or as the decision to punish specific (hypothetical) crimes in a harsh manner 
(Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley, Robinson, 2002; Christopher et 
al., 2003; Miller et al., 1986; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009). While support for harsh 
criminal justice policy has clear social and political implications, most individuals will 
rarely be asked to punish crime in everyday life. Studying the determinants of decisions 
to punish a specific crime does, however, provide insight into the cognitive pathways 
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that link social perceptions and judgments of crime to strong desires to punish crime. In 
particular, by manipulating stereotypes about criminals at the individual level, we can 
observe their effect on basic social perception and responses to crime.  
Decisions to Punish Crime 
Decisions to punish specific crimes are associated with a range of emotional and 
cognitive factors, and are most strongly related to principles of retribution. Carlsmith 
and Darley (2008) argue that retributive justice addresses the question of ‘how people 
who have intentionally committed known, morally wrong actions that either directly or 
indirectly harm others, should be punished for their misdeeds’ (p. 194). This definition 
of retributive justice is supported by evidence that suggests that a key motivating factor 
in punitiveness is the perceived seriousness, or moral severity, of a crime (Darley & 
Pittman, 2003).  
According to Warr (1989) judging a crime to be serious involves making a 
normative statement about the perceived wrongfulness and/or harmfulness of a crime. 
Discrepancies in how much punishment offences typically receive reflect cultural 
consensus that, for example, violent crimes are more serious than white-collar crimes 
(e.g., embezzlement) (but see Cullen, Hartman & Jonson, 2009, for social and cultural 
features that may change perceptions of crime, and Roberts, 1992, for differences in 
ordinal and cardinal seriousness, and in consensus over seriousness). The determinants 
of seriousness are difficult to disentangle. However, some evidence suggests that the 
wrongfulness of crime, demarked by intent or blameworthiness (e.g., offenders’ remorse 
or social motives), outweighs its harmfulness as a determinant of seriousness and 
punitiveness (Alter, Kernochan & Darley, 2007; Fragale et al., 2009). Other research 
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suggests that the type of offence can shift the focus for assessments of seriousness, with 
wrongfulness being key in property offences and harmfulness in personal offences 
(Warr, 1989). Cushman (2008) further teases apart the harmfulness of an offence in 
terms of (a) the consequences of the offence and (b) the offender’s causal 
responsibility
25, and the wrongfulness of an offence in terms of (c) the offender’s intent 
to harm and (d) the belief that they would cause harm.  He found that in assigning 
punishment, individuals pay comparable attention to whether the offender caused and 
intended to cause the harm, specifically in terms of the offender’s belief that they would 
cause harm.  
These findings point to the importance of social perceptions of the offence and 
offender in decisions to punish crime.  For instance, individuals typically punish more 
harshly when they perceive intent and attribute the causes of crime to individuals’ 
dispositions (e.g., laziness, evilness or callousness) as opposed to external social (e.g., 
drug use, criminal associates) or economic factors (e.g., poverty, inequality) (Carlsmith 
& Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Roberts, 1992; 
Vidmar & Miller, 1980; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar findings in moral 
judgment). According to Alter and colleagues (2007), intent is especially important in 
perceptions of the wrongfulness of a criminal act, particularly in Anglo-American 
criminal legal doctrine. Vidmar and Miller (1980) argue that attribution of causal 
responsibility is a two-way process. On one hand, individuals tend to feel more anger 
and to be more punitive when they perceive others as purposefully inflicting harm onto 
their victims. On the other hand, individuals also need to justify feelings of punitiveness 
                                                 
25
 In Cushman’s (2008) operationalization, causal responsibility refers to whether the individual caused 
the harm, and not to whether their causal responsibility is attributed to internal dispositions.  
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– to establish order and stability – and to predict severe harm or injustice, by attributing 
causal responsibility (see also Heider, 1944, on the desire to view others as absolute 
causal origins). Punitiveness is also associated with features that would stereotypically 
suggest an underlying disposition or tendency to commit crime, such as criminal record, 
afrocentric features, social status and social motives (i.e., self-concerned vs. other-
concerned) (Blair et al., 2004; Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; Kliemann et al., 2008).  
The link between perceptions of crime, criminals and punitiveness is moral 
outrage. Controlling for the seriousness of a crime, features of the offence and offender 
tend to lead to increased moral outrage, which in turn tends to increase punitiveness 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 
2003). According to Carlsmith and Darley (2008), moral outrage is a feeling that 
represents the ‘conscious registration of the intuitive reaction to instances of moral 
wrong-doing’ (p. 212). A substantial body of evidence suggests that moral outrage is 
most strongly associated with the emotion of anger (sometimes referred to as ‘empathic 
anger’) (Batson et al., 2007; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Hoffman, 1989; 
Montada & Schneider, 1989).  
In summary, it appears as though there are three cognitive layers that link 
perceptions of crime to a desire to punish crime. First, there are perceptions of the 
offender (e.g., perceived intent, remorse, attributions for crime). Second there are higher 
order judgments (e.g., wrongfulness and harmfulness) which are influenced by 
perceptions of the offender and of the crime. Finally, these judgments generate 
perceptions of seriousness and affective responses such as moral outrage, which 
motivate individuals to punish a crime. These cognitive and affective processes, 
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however, are unlikely to be uni-directional and are likely to involve two-way processes 
(Vidmar and Miller, 1980). Moreover, motivations to punish are related to personality 
and ideological differences and so people may pay more attention to certain features of 
the offence in order to justify their punitiveness or punishment goals (Carroll et al., 
1987).  
Political Ideology and Punitiveness Toward Crime 
Although little research considers the role of political orientation in shaping punitive 
decisions, previous research suggests it is a robust predictor of individual and societal 
level punitiveness toward criminals (e.g., politically conservative states in the USA tend 
to be more punitive) (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2003; 
King & Maruna, 2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 
1997). Two ideological systems are consistently found to be associated with 
punitiveness toward crime: Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO). RWA consists of three interrelated features: conventionalism (i.e., 
preferring tradition and stability), authoritarian submission (i.e., showing deference to 
authority) and authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer, 1981). RWA is particularly 
associated with cultural conservatism, tends to be strongly predictive of punitiveness 
toward crime (Jost et al., 2003); and is positively correlated with feeling anger, which 
can contribute to support for aggressive policies (Skitka et al., 2006).  SDO is associated 
with preferring hierarchical as opposed to equal intergroup relations and with wanting 
one’s ingroup to be on top of that hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). SDO is most closely 
associated with economic conservatism and is often associated with expressing a lack of 
empathy toward outgroups (Pratto et al., 1994; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2007) which 
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itself is associated with punitiveness toward crime (Costelloe et a., 2002; Côté-Lussier, 
2012a; Weiner, 1993).  Although punitiveness toward crime is often associated with 
political ideology, it is considered to be a peripheral ideological issue (Jost et al., 2003). 
The present research addresses the remaining question of whether criminal 
stereotypes and political ideology can alter perceptions and judgments of crime. Judging 
a crime to be ‘wrongful’ or ‘harmful’ is in itself associated with a range of cognitive 
beliefs and emotional responses, such as increased perceived seriousness and moral 
outrage. The following section discusses the role of social stereotypes in engendering 
cognitive, emotional and attitudinal responses and specifies the hypotheses of the 
current research.  
The Content of the Criminal Stereotype and its Emotional, Cognitive and Attitudinal 
Counterparts 
Stereotypes about criminals suggest that criminals are evil, poor and disliked (Carlsmith 
& Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Côté-Lussier, 2012; Langworthy & Whitehead, 
1986; Roberts, 1992; Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au & Leung, 2008). Recent research suggests 
that these stereotypes reflect two fundamental dimensions of social perception: warmth 
and competence (Côté-Lussier, 2012). The interpersonal and intergroup perception 
literature suggests that these dimensions underlie stereotypes about various social 
groups and inform emotional responses as well as basic approach and avoidance 
behaviour (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, 
Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; 
Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). Crucially, perceptions of warmth and 
competence are functional in that they answer two fundamental questions that facilitate 
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interpersonal relationships: What are others’ intentions? How capable are others of 
carrying out their intentions? 
 According to the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; 2006), 
perceptions of warmth and competence are partly explained, at an intergroup level, by 
social structural factors of competition and social status. Stereotypes link a group’s 
perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for power and resources) and social 
status (e.g., in terms of educational and economic attainment) to internal traits such as 
warmth and competence, respectively. In line with predictions made by the SCM, Côté-
Lussier (2012, 2012a) found that perceiving criminals as competing against society 
partly explained criminals’ low perceived warmth, while criminals’ low perceived social 
status partly explained criminals’ low perceived competence and warmth.  
 Specific combinations of perceived warmth and competence in turn elicit 
functionally relevant, distinct emotions and behaviours (see Figure 1) (Cuddy, Fiske & 
Glick, 2007). Stereotypes about criminals’ low warmth, and to a lesser degree about 
their low competence, are associated with feeling emotions of anger, disgust and hate 
which in turn are associated with behavioural intentions that suggest a desire to fight and 
attack as well as exclude and demean criminals (Côté-Lussier, 2012a). Feeling angry 
and a lack of compassion toward criminals is also associated with expressing more 
support for harsh criminal justice policy (Côté-Lussier, 2012a).   
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Figure 1. Quadrants of social perception, emotional and behavioural responses 
according to the Stereotype Content Model and Behavior from Intergroup Affect and 
Stereotypes map 
 
 
 
 
  
The present study considers whether stereotypes about criminals influence the 
very way in which individuals perceive crime. Previous research on interpersonal 
perception suggests that stereotypes about others’ warmth are diagnostic, such that 
corresponding behaviour is interpreted as being attributable to people’s dispositions as 
opposed to external factors (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). One would therefore expect a 
strong association between stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth and attributing 
crime to internal as opposed to external factors (H1), as well as perceiving more intent 
and less remorse when a crime is committed by a stereotypical criminal (H2). Because 
of the role of attributions and perceived intent in generating judgments of the 
harmfulness and wrongfulness of a crime, it is also expected that crimes perpetrated by 
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stereotypical criminals would be judged as being more harmful and wrongful (H3). In 
turn, crimes committed by stereotypical criminals should be perceived as being more 
serious (H4), should generate more moral outrage (H5) and should be punished more 
harshly (H6). Lastly, political ideology is expected to be associated with perceptions of 
criminals and with making more stern judgments about crime (e.g., about its 
seriousness) in part because of the threat that crime represents to politically conservative 
ideologies (H7). The following study incrementally tests these hypotheses in order to 
build a final full but parsimonious model that links stereotypes about criminals to 
perceptions and judgments of crime, moral outrage and punitiveness.  
Overview of Study 
In order to test the hypotheses that criminal stereotypes influence perceptions, higher 
order judgments and responses to crime (see Figure 2), participants are provided with 
information about a crime and about the criminal, and are asked to decide how severely 
the crime should be punished. The criminal stereotype is instantiated by describing a 
criminal as being stereotypically cold and unkind and as having a low social status, as 
opposed to being warm and kind and as having a high social status. In the analyses, 
crime type and features of the offender are treated as lower order variables that influence 
higher order perceptions of intent, remorse and attributions for crime. Normative 
judgments about the harmfulness and wrongfulness of crimes are treated as higher order 
judgments which in turn influence the key determinants of punitiveness: perceived 
seriousness and expressed moral outrage. A series of structural equation models are used 
to test the hypotheses (H1 – H7). 
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Figure 2. Basic model of the effect of social perceptions of warmth and competence on 
punitiveness. 
 
                                 →                       →                   →                        →                 →   
         →                       →                   →                        →                 →       
  
Participants 
Participants (N = 223) were students recruited on campus from City University, 
Goldsmiths University and Queen Mary University in London (UK). Participants filled 
out a survey at a booth located on campus for the chance to win one of several cash 
prizes (ranging from 25GBP to 200GBP) and/or a 2.50GBP voucher for university 
catering services.  For the 221 participants who reported their age and gender, mean age 
was 22.42 (min = 18, max = 58) and the sample consisted of 87 men, and 134 women. 
White British students made up 35% of the sample, while 17% were White students 
from a non-British background. The remainder of the sample was 23% Asian British 
(e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 5% British African or Caribbean and 20% were 
from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). In 
terms of social class, 41% reported being from the working or lower-middle class, 41% 
from the middle-class and 18% from upper-middle and upper-class. 
Methodology and measures 
Vignette. Participants were first asked to read a vignette describing a crime and 
to decide how severely the crime should be punished. Each vignette manipulated social 
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status (high vs. low), warmth (high vs. low) and crime type (assault vs. theft vs. fraud), 
in a 2 X 2 X 3 counterbalanced between-subject design (see Appendix I). For example, a 
participant would have read: 
David is a customer service representative at a phone company but occasionally has a hard 
time making ends meet. He is kind and is willing to take the time to be there for friends. He 
enjoys being able to help people and often sympathizes with their problems. He is generally a 
warm person. Last month, David was found guilty of fraud. He was found to have made 
personal gain by using inside information he learned about before the information was made 
public. He bought stocks in a company for his personal account knowing that the stock price 
would go up when the information was made public. The profits amounted to £50,000.  
 
Severity of punishment. Next participants were asked to rate how severe a 
punishment the crime should receive on a scale of 1 (Not severe at all) to 7 (Extremely 
severe).  
Seriousness and moral outrage. Participants rated how serious the crime was on 
a scale of 1 (Not at all serious) to 5 (Very serious) and reported the degree to which they 
were morally outraged by the crime on a scale of 1 (Not at all outraged) to 5 (Very 
outraged).  
Wrongfulness and harmfulness. Participants rated how wrong the offender’s 
behaviour was on a scale of 1 (Not at all wrong) to 5 (Very wrong) and how harmful the 
offender’s behaviour was on a scale of 1 (Not at all harmful) to 5 (Very harmful).  
Intent and remorse. Participants rated how likely it is that the offender had the 
intention to commit the crime and how likely it is that the offender was sorry for having 
committed the crime on a scale of 1 (Not at all likely) to 5 (Very likely).  
Attributions for crime. Participants rated the extent to which stress and the 
offender’s personality were responsible for his crime on a scale of 1 (Not at all 
responsible) to 5 (Very responsible).  
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Social status. Offenders’ social status was instantiated by occupation and income 
(see Appendix I). Participants’ perception of offenders’ social status was measured by 
asking participants to rate offenders on a scale from 1 (Working class) to 5 (Upper 
class). A manipulation check suggests that the experimental manipulation was 
successful.  
Warmth and competence. Warmth was instantiated by describing the offender as 
either being kind, sympathetic and warm, or as being unkind, unsympathetic and cold. 
Participants rated the extent to which personality traits reflecting dimensions of warmth 
and competence, and filler items, described the offender on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 
(Extremely). Warmth was measured by warm, nice, friendly and good-natured. 
Competence was measured by intelligent, capable, skilful, goal-oriented and assertive. 
A confirmatory factor analysis suggests a good fit (2 = 15.36, df = 10, p ≥ .05, 2 /df = 
1.54, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .05) for dimensions of warmth and competence.  
Left-right placement. Participants were asked to rate their political views or 
affiliation on a scale of 1 (Very liberal) to 7 (Very conservative).  
Social dominance orientation. SDO was operationalized as preference for 
inequality and measured by 4 items. Participants rated the extent of their agreement on a 
scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly) with statements: ‘Group equality 
should be our ideal’, ‘All groups should be given an equal chance in life’, ‘We should 
do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups’ and ‘Increased social 
equality’.  A latent variable representing SDO was used in all analyses (2 = 4.42, df = 
2, p > .05, 2 /df = 2.21, CFI = 1, RMSEA = .07). 
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Right-wing authoritarianism. RWA was measured by 10 items. Participants 
rated the extent of their agreement on a scale of 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree 
strongly) with statements reflecting dimensions of authoritarian submission (e.g., ‘We 
should believe what our leaders tell us’), conventionalism (e.g., ‘Traditions are the 
foundation of a healthy society and should be respected’) and aggression (e.g., ‘Strong 
force is necessary against threatening groups’). Hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis 
was used to measure the three subscales of RWA and the overarching second order 
factor of RWA, the latter of which was used in all analyses (2 = 65.53, df = 32, p ≤ 
.001, 2 /df = 2.05, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .07). 
Results 
A series of structural equation models were estimated in order to observe the effects of 
social perception on punitiveness and on the determinants of punitiveness. These models 
were also used to select a final parsimonious model that will simultaneously estimate the 
direct and indirect effects of the most robust predictors on punitiveness.   
A first step is to ensure that the experimental manipulation was successful in 
influencing perceptions of warmth, competence and social status. Controlling for social 
status and crime type, and participants’ socio-demographics (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, 
socio-economic status), criminals described as being warm were more likely to be 
perceived as being warm (β = 1.73, p ≤ .001) and slightly more competent (β = .52, p ≤ 
.001) (see Figure 3). Criminals who committed crimes of theft (β = -.47, p ≤ .01) and 
assault (β = -.36, p ≤ .05) were seen as being significantly less competent than criminals 
who committed fraud. Crime type had no effect on perceptions of warmth. Perceptions 
of warmth and competence correlated positively (r = .37, p ≤ .001). The status 
228 
 
manipulation was successful in increasing perceptions of social status (β = .86, p ≤ 
.001), which in turn increased perceptions of competence (β = .37, p ≤ .001), but not 
perceptions of warmth. The influence of social status on perceptions of competence is in 
line with predictions made by the SCM and suggests that social perception flows from 
social structural determinants such as competition and social status.  The warmth and 
crime type manipulations did not statistically significantly influence perceptions of 
social status.  
 
Figure 3. Effects of the experimental manipulations on perceptions of warmth and 
competence. 
 
 
Note. Regression coefficients are standardized. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles represent 
manifest variables. The model also controlled for crime type and participants’ socio-demographics. *p  ≤ 
.05. ** p  ≤ .01. ***p  ≤ .001. 
 
In the following analyses, criminals’ perceived social status, warmth and 
competence will be used to predict social perception and judgment as opposed to 
dummy variables reflecting the experimental manipulations. Taking into account 
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individuals’ perceptions of criminals is beneficial in large part because it allows for the 
measurement of variance in social perception and to explain this variance using other 
variables, such as individuals’ political ideology.  
Step 1. The first step consists in observing whether social perceptions of 
criminals’ warmth and competence have direct effects on punitiveness. Based on 
previous findings and theory (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007; Johnson, 2009; Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008), it is expected that perceptions of warmth will be especially important in 
predicting punitiveness. A structural equation model regressing punishment on 
perceptions of warmth and competence, controlling for crime type, perceived social 
status and participants’ socio- demographic variables (2 = 73.67, df = 37, p ≤ .001, 2 
/df = 1.99, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .07), suggests that perceptions of offenders’ warmth 
have a statistically significant negative effect on punishment (β = -.20, p ≤ .01). That is, 
criminals who are perceived as being warm are also perceived as deserving less severe 
punishment. On the other hand, perceptions of competence have no effect on severity of 
punishment (β = .02, p > .05). However, this model explains only 11% of the variance in 
punitiveness, suggesting that a relatively large proportion of the variance remains 
unexplained and that other factors also explain individuals’ punitiveness. The next steps 
will be to (a) establish the pathways that link social perceptions and judgments to 
punitiveness and (b) develop a model that explains more of the variance in punitiveness.       
 Step 2 (H1 and H2). Previous findings suggest that attributions for crime and 
perceptions of offenders’ intent and remorse are important in predicting punitive 
responses (Cushman, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 
1980; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carroll et al., 1987; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; 
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Roberts, 1992; see also Hauser et al., 2007, for similar findings in moral judgment). The 
next step is to link these determinants of punitiveness to perceptions of warmth and 
competence. In Model 1, perceived intent and remorse are regressed on attributions for 
crime, controlling for crime type, social status and participants’ socio-demographic 
variables. This first model is nested within Model 2, which additionally regresses 
perceptions of intent, remorse and attributions for crime on perceptions of warmth and 
competence (see Figure 4). In Model 1, attributing crime to internal causes (i.e.,  
 
Figure 4. The effects of perceived warmth and competence on attributions for crime, 
perceived intent and remorse (Model 2). 
 
 
Note. Coefficients are standardized. Coefficients in parentheses are from Model 1. Variables controlled 
for but not shown are crime type, social status and participants’ socio-demographics. Criminals described 
as having a high social status were perceived as demonstrating marginally more intent (β = .28, p = .08) 
and less remorse (β = -.40, p ≤ .01), and as committing crime less due to external causes (β = -.45, p ≤ 
.01), though no difference was observed for internal attributions (β = .18, p = .24) . Those who committed 
crimes of fraud were seen as demonstrating more intent than those who committed theft (β = -1.13, p ≤ 
.001) or assault (β = -1.57, p ≤ .001), but as showing comparable remorse (Theft: β = .22, p = .20, Assault: 
β = .26, p = .18). Crime type did not influence attributions for crimes, as those who committed fraud 
elicited comparable attributions to internal and external dispositions than those who committed theft 
(Internal: β = -.28, p = .13, External: β = -.06, p = .76) or assault (Internal: β = -.29, p = .11, External: β = 
.11, p = .59). * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
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personality) positively predicts perceptions of intent (β = .19, p ≤ .001) and negatively 
predicts perceptions of remorse (β = -.25, p ≤ .001), while attributing crime to external 
causes (i.e., stress) positively predicts perceptions of remorse (β = .21, p ≤ .001). 
In Model 2 (2 = 73.41, df = 43, p ≤ .05, 2 /df = 1.70, CFI = .99, RMSEA = 
.06), the effects of attribution on perceived intent and remorse are nearly halved when 
controlling for perceptions of warmth and competence. As expected, describing 
criminals in stereotypical ways influenced individuals’ perceptions of the causes of 
crime, as well as perceptions of individuals’ intent to commit crime and remorse for 
having committed a crime. 
Controlling for the type of crime an offender has committed and his social status, 
the results suggest that a criminal’s perceived warmth generates more attributions of 
crime to external causes (i.e., to stress) (β = .28, p ≤ .001) and less to internal causes 
(i.e., to personality)  (β = -.44, p ≤ .001), and more perceptions of remorse (β = .52, p ≤ 
.001). Criminals’ perceived warmth also has a direct negative effect on perceived intent 
(β -.14, p = .053), and a smaller indirect effect through internal attributions for crime.  
That is, an offender who is perceived as lacking warmth is perceived as committing 
crime due to his personality, and in turn as demonstrating the intent to commit a crime. 
Perceived intent is also partly explained by the type of crime an offender has committed; 
offenders who commit crimes such as fraud are perceived as demonstrating 
comparatively more intent than those who commit crimes such as theft (β = -1.13, p ≤ 
.001) and assault (β = -1.57, p ≤ .001). Although one may have expected more 
aggressive crimes (e.g., assault) to generate lower perceptions of warmth, the results do 
not support this hypothesis. This finding may be due to the fact that in this study, crimes 
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of assault and theft were described in ways that could suggest that the crime had 
occurred due to chance or opportunity (see Appendix I). On the other hand, the fraud 
scenario suggested that the criminal had taken purposeful steps to complete their crime 
(i.e., by buying stocks before the price was raised).  
Perceptions of criminals’ competence did not have significant effects on 
perceptions of intent or remorse, nor on attributions for crime. However, criminals who 
have a high social status are perceived as demonstrating less remorse (β = -.40, p ≤ .01),  
marginally more intent (β = .28, p = .08), and are perceived as committing crime less 
due to external causes (β = -.45, p ≤ .01). The results therefore seem to suggest that a 
criminal’s social status was more important than his perceived competence in explaining 
causes of crime, intent and remorse.  Individuals may therefore believe that high status 
others should ‘know better’ and in turn allocate more internal causality.  
Step 3 (H3). The third step consists of estimating the effect of perceptions of the 
offender on judgments of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime. In previous 
studies, crime type and intent have been found to influence the judged wrongfulness and 
harmfulness of a crime. The following models test whether stereotypes about criminals 
influence judgments of wrongfulness and harmfulness and mediate the effect of 
attributions, intent and remorse on these judgments. This step consisted of estimating 
two structural equation models. The first model (Model 3) excludes perceptions of 
warmth and competence (there are no fit statistics because the model is saturated), and is 
nested in the second full model (Model 4) which additionally simultaneously regresses 
attributions, perceived intent, remorse, judged wrongfulness and harmfulness on 
perceptions of warmth and competence (2 = 72.32, df = 44, p ≤ .05, 2 /df = 1.64, CFI  
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Table 1 
 Judged Wrongfulness and Harmfulness (Model 3 & Model 4). 
 Internal 
attribution 
External 
attribution 
 
Intent 
 
Remorse 
Wrong- 
fulness 
Harm- 
fulness 
Model 3       
Crime type       
Fraud - - - - - - 
Theft -.28 -.04   -1.15*** .19     .61** .53** 
Assault -.29  .10  -1.58*** .18 .37c   1.53*** 
       
Attributions       
Internal - -    .20***   -.26***  .14*  .10 
External - -  -.11*    .28***      -.09 - .01 
       
Perceptions 
of offender 
      
Intent - - - - .05   .22** 
Remorse - - - - -.12 b -.01 
       
R
2 .07 .07 .39 .19 .18 .29 
       
Model 4       
Crime type       
Fraud - - - - - - 
Theft -.30 -.03 -1.19*** .29     .56**  .45* 
Assault -.29 .08 -1.65*** .25  .32   1.63*** 
       
Attributions       
Internal - - .12 -.04 .10 .00 
External - - -.07  .14* -.07 .04 
       
Perceptions 
of offender 
      
Intent - - - - .06  .24** 
Remorse - - - - -.03      .16* 
Warmth    -.46***         
.31*** 
-.18*      .52***   -.22*    -.33*** 
Competence .01 -.05 .04  -.12* .09      .08 
Status .07 -.13a .02 -.11 -.01      .12 
       
R
2 .29 .18 .41 .38 .21 .38 
 
Note. Regression coefficients are standardized. The models also controlled for participants’ socio-demographics. 
For Model 1, residual correlations between are intent and remorse are r = -.22***, between internal and external 
attributions are r = -.15**, between wrongfulness and harmfulness are r = .49***.  For Model 2, residual 
correlations between perceived warmth and competence are r = .34***, between intent and remorse are r = -
.19**, between internal and external attributions are r = .00, between wrongfulness and harmfulness r = .46***. 
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤.01. ***p ≤.001. a p = .06. b p = .09. c p = .10. 
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= .99, RMSEA = .05), (see Table 1). In Model 3, the results suggest that the judged 
wrongfulness of a crime is marginally negatively predicted by perceiving a criminal as 
feeling remorse (β = -.12, p = .10) and positively predicted by attributing crime to 
internal causes (β = .14, p ≤ .05) (see Figure 5). The judged harmfulness of a crime is 
positively predicted by perceived intent (β = .22, p ≤ .01). 
Model 4 suggests that criminals’ perceived warmth influences normative 
judgments about the harmfulness and wrongfulness of a crime. Specifically, crimes 
committed by stereotypical criminals were judged as being more wrongful (β = -.28, p ≤ 
.01) and particularly more harmful (β = -.42, p ≤ .001). The effects of perceived remorse 
(β = -.03, ns) and internal attributions (β = .10, ns) on wrongfulness were weakened 
when controlling for perceptions of warmth, however, the effect of intent on the 
perceived harmfulness of a crime is only slightly weakened (β = .20, p ≤ .01) by 
perceptions of warmth. Previous research suggested that perceptions of intent would be 
key in influencing judgments of wrongfulness, however the present findings suggest that 
perceptions of criminals’ intent to commit a crime and their perceived lack of warmth 
were most strongly associated with judgments of harmfulness. The effect of perceived 
intent and of stereotypes on judgments of harmfulness may be partly due to the 
importance that individuals place on others’ empathy (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). In 
other words, perceived intent and a lack of perceived warmth are seen as being 
especially harmful in social behaviour such as crime. Crime type also influenced 
normative judgments, with crimes of theft and assault being perceived as being more 
harmful (Theft: β = .55, p ≤ .01, Assault: β = 1.54, p ≤ .001) and wrongful (Theft: β = 
.65, p ≤ .01, Assault: β = .37, p ≤ .10) than fraud.  
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Figure 5. Judged wrongfulness and harmfulness (Model 3). 
 
Note. There are no fit statistics because the model is saturated. Regression coefficients are standardized. 
Rectangles represent manifest variables. The model also controlled for crime type and participants’ socio-
demographics. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤.01. ***p ≤.001 
 
Step 4 (H4 and H5).  The fourth step is to observe the direct effects of 
perceptions of offenders on the perceived seriousness and moral outrage felt toward a 
crime, key determinants of punishment. A structural equation model (Model 5) 
estimating the effects of perceived warmth and competence on seriousness and moral 
outrage suggests that, controlling for crime type, perceived social status and 
participants’ socio-demographic variables, perceiving criminals as being warm leads to 
lower perceptions of seriousness (β = -.16, p ≤ .05) and to less moral outrage (β = -.38, p 
≤ .001) (2 = 75.04, df = 54, p≤ .05, 2 /df = 1.39 , CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04). 
Perceptions of competence on the other hand have a positive effect on moral outrage (β 
= .13, p ≤ .05) and a smaller but marginally significant negative effect on perceived 
seriousness (β = -.11, p = .09). Crimes of assault and theft lead to comparable levels of 
moral outrage while fraud engendered less moral outrage than theft (β = -.40, p ≤ .05). 
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Theft, in turn, was seen as being less serious than assault (β = .41, p ≤ .05) or fraud (β = 
.59, p ≤ .01).  
Together, the results from steps 1 – 4 suggest that perceptions of offenders’ 
warmth have direct effects on punitiveness, but also influence causal attributions, 
perceptions of offenders’ intent and remorse, judgments about a crime’s wrongfulness 
and harmfulness, as well as the perceived seriousness and moral outrage elicited by a 
crime. The results also suggest that perceptions of warmth and competence weaken the 
effects of attributions for crime on perceived intent and remorse, and the effects of 
remorse and intent on the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime. Still, intent 
continues to have a separate and significant effect on the judged harmfulness of a crime. 
The final model will therefore retain perceptions of warmth, competence, and intent, and 
simultaneously estimate their effects on judgments of wrongfulness and harmfulness, on 
the key determinants of punitiveness (i.e., seriousness and moral outrage) and on 
punitiveness itself. 
Step 5. The final full model (Model 6) distinguishes between lower and higher 
order variables expected to influence punitiveness, but allows perceptions of offenders’ 
warmth, competence and intent to have effects on lower- and higher-order variables (2 
= 48.91, df = 42, p> .05, 2 /df = 1.16 , CFI = 1, RMSEA = .03) (see Figure 6). Paths 
were also estimated from wrongfulness and harmfulness to seriousness and moral 
outrage, which in turn were used to predict punitiveness. Lastly, all dependent variables 
were regressed on crime type and participants’ socio-demographic variables.  
Controlling for higher-order variables, perceptions of criminals’ warmth (β = -
.06, ns) and competence (β = .05, ns) do not have significant direct effects on  
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punitiveness. Rather, the perceived seriousness of a crime is the key determinant of how 
much it is punished (β = .54, p ≤ .001). Controlling for perceived seriousness, 
individuals’ expressed moral outrage (β = .11, ns) and crime type fail to have significant 
effects on punishment.  
The perceived seriousness of a crime is associated with its perceived 
harmfulness (β = .58, p ≤ .001), wrongfulness (β = .31, p ≤ .001) and with crime type.  
Fraud was perceived as being significantly more serious than theft (β = -.95, p ≤ .001) 
and assault (β = -.97, p ≤ .01), but did not elicit more moral outrage (theft: β = .26, p ≥ 
.05, assault: β = .15, p ≥ .05). This result is not entirely surprising in part because in 
earlier models, those who committed fraud were perceived as being more competent and 
as demonstrating more intent than those who committed theft or assault. Previous 
research suggests that the perceived seriousness of white-collar crime is partly 
associated with the social status and trust given to the perpetrator of the crime, 
particularly to those in positions of authority (Rebovich & Kane, 2002). Perceptions of 
competence, on the other hand, can increase punitiveness for high-status individuals 
who commit low-status crimes such as tax fraud (Christopher, Marek & May, 2003; 
Fragale et al., 2009). In this study, the results of the final full model suggest that the 
effect of fraud on perceived seriousness is not mediated by other factors such as 
perceived intent, competence or social status. The results may suggest that while white-
collar crimes such as fraud do not elicit the same cognitive judgments and emotional 
responses as street crimes, individuals believe that these crimes are serious and should 
be punished.   
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When controlling for the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of a crime, 
perceived warmth was unexpectedly found to have a significant positive effect on the 
perceived seriousness of a crime (β = .14, p ≤ .05), while perceived competence has a 
significant negative effect on perceived seriousness (β = -.18, p ≤ .001). The residual 
positive effect of perceived warmth on seriousness is surprising, as it would suggest that 
the warmer a criminal is perceived as being, the more serious the crime. However, 
separate analyses reveal that this residual effect arises solely when controlling for crime 
type, wrongfulness and harmfulness. When either crime type or wrongfulness and 
harmfulness are removed from the regression model, perceived warmth has no effect or 
a negative effect on seriousness, respectively, which is in line with analyses in Step 4. 
Otherwise, findings were similar to previous analyses in that perceptions of warmth had 
significant negative effects on judged wrongfulness (β = -.31, p ≤ .001), harmfulness (β 
= -.29, p ≤ .001) and on perceived intent (β = -.23, p ≤ .001), while perceived intent was 
positively associated with the judged harmfulness of a crime (β = .17, p ≤ .05). 
The final full model demonstrates that when other cognitive and emotional 
factors are taken into account, perceptions of warmth and competence do not have a 
direct effect on decisions to punish a crime. Punitiveness was found to be most strongly 
associated with a crime’s perceived seriousness, while moral outrage failed to have a 
significant separate effect. Both perceived seriousness and moral outrage were predicted 
by higher-order variables of judged wrongfulness and harmfulness.  
The fact that the effect of perceived seriousness outweighed the effect of moral 
outrage on punitiveness is worth a brief discussion. Based on previous findings, one 
would expect there to be a strong association between emotions of moral outrage, or 
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anger, and punitiveness (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Johnson, 2009). Perceived 
seriousness, however, is a key factor in retributiveness as it serves as a cognitive marker 
of how much a crime should be punished. To say that a crime is serious is in a sense a 
cognitive assessment of how morally outraged an individual feels and a normative 
judgment about the nature of a crime. In these analyses, it would have been feasible to 
not allow perceived seriousness to have a direct effect on punishment, but rather to 
indirectly affect punishment through moral outrage, as Carlsmith and Darley (2008) 
have done. However, the present results suggest that individuals’ beliefs about the 
nature of a crime can be equally if not more important than how they feel toward crime.  
Step 6 (H7). Additional analyses were conducted to observe the effects of 
political orientation and ideology on punitiveness and the determinants of punitiveness. 
The final full model was re-estimated while additionally regressing dependent variables 
on political orientation, which in turn was regressed on RWA and SDO (Model 7) (2 = 
187.11, df = 118, p ≤ .001, 2 /df = 1.58,  CFI = .92, RMSEA = .05). Political orientation 
was positively predicted by RWA (β = .68, p ≤ .001), however SDO failed to have a 
significant separate effect (β = .05, p ≥.05), which may be due to its operationalization 
as preference for inequality. The results suggest that those who self-identify as being 
politically conservative are more likely to perceive a crime as being serious (β = .17, p ≤ 
.05) and to express more moral outrage (β = .12, p ≤ .05).26 Taking into account political 
ideology increased the amount of variance explained in perceived seriousness by 3% 
(from 61% to 64%) and in moral outrage by 4% (from 53% to 57%). However, political 
orientation did not have direct effects on punitiveness, social perceptions of warmth, 
                                                 
26
 A set of two additional analyses estimating the full final model and regressing dependent variables 
solely on RWA (Model 8) and solely on SDO (Model 9) reveal similar findings.  
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competence and intent, nor on judgments of wrongfulness and harmfulness (all p’s 
≥.05). Otherwise, paths remained consistent with the full model.  
General Discussion and Conclusion 
The present research addressed the question of whether criminal stereotypes affect not 
only the way individuals feel about criminals, but also how individuals perceive and 
judge crime. The interpersonal and intergroup perception literature suggests that the 
underlying dimensions of stereotypes, warmth and competence, inform emotional 
responses, basic approach and avoidance behaviour and the inferences individuals make 
about the causes of others’ behaviour (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; 
Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; 
Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998). Previous research 
on criminal stereotypes suggests that criminals are stereotypically perceived as being 
low on competence (e.g., unintelligent, inefficient) and warmth (e.g., unkind, 
untrustworthy) (Côté-Lussier, 2012), and that perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth 
are key in predicting emotions of anger and compassion, and in turn support for harsh 
criminal justice policy (Côté-Lussier, 2012a).  
The present study expanded on previous findings by considering the role of 
stereotypes in shaping perceptions of crime. Participants were presented a crime 
scenario in which criminal stereotypes were experimentally manipulated. For some 
participants, the criminal was described as having a low social status and as being 
stereotypically cold, unkind and unsympathetic. For others, the criminal was described 
as having a high social status and as being warm, kind and sympathetic. In this study, 
stereotypes about criminals’ lack of warmth were found to have indirect effects on 
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punishment by influencing the judged harmfulness, wrongfulness and seriousness of 
crime. The perceived seriousness of crime was in turn a key predictor of how much 
individuals believed a crime should be punished. 
The findings of this research have two key implications. First, the present 
findings suggest that predictors of punitiveness – such as criminals’ perceived intent, 
lack of remorse and causal responsibility – are partly explained by stereotypical 
perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth. These findings support previous research 
which suggests that perceptions of others’ warmth are diagnostic when making 
attributions for others’ behaviour (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). However, criminal 
stereotypes have the added effect of contributing to judgments about the wrongfulness 
and harmfulness of a crime, key predictors of a crime’s perceived seriousness.   
The results also suggest that endorsing stereotypes about criminals’ lack of 
warmth could generate an inflated sense of the seriousness of crime, and in turn more 
support for harsh criminal justice policy. In this and other research, the perceived 
seriousness of crime is a key predictor of how much individuals want a specific crime to 
be punished (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Crime’s perceived seriousness also predicts 
how morally outraged or angry individuals are about crime, a key predictor of support 
for harsh criminal justice policy (Côté-Lussier, 2012a; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Graham, 
Weiner & Zucker, 1997; Johnson, 2009). Future research should therefore test the effect 
of criminal stereotypes on broader beliefs about the seriousness of crime.  
Still, criminal stereotypes only partly explained normative judgments about the 
seriousness of crime and expressed moral outrage. Previous findings suggest that 
ideological positions are also strongly associated with adopting a punitive stance toward 
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crime (Bowers & Waltman, 1993; Feather et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2003; King & Maruna, 
2009; McCann, 2008; McKee & Feather, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997), with right-
wing authoritarianism often being a key predictor of support for aggressive policies 
(Skitka et al., 2006). The present findings suggested that although politically 
conservative individuals perceived crime as being more serious and expressed more 
moral outrage toward crime, the processes which engendered these responses did not 
differ between politically liberal and conservative individuals. Politically conservative 
individuals may therefore consider additional factors when judging the seriousness of 
crime and expressing moral outrage. Haidt, Graham and Joseph (2009) have found that 
in addition to considering the perceived wrongfulness (or injustice) and harmfulness of 
an event, politically conservative individuals also consider whether an event violates 
moral dimensions related to authority, loyalty and purity. Future research looking at the 
cognitive pathways between political ideology, social perception and punitiveness may 
therefore seek to consider these additional dimensions.  
 Although the present findings make headway in linking fundamental dimensions 
of social perception to perceptions of crime and punitiveness, they are limited in several 
ways. First, previous research suggests that politically conservative individuals are more 
likely to endorse stereotypes about threatening groups such as criminals (Bassett, 2010; 
Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kreindler, 2005; 
Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). However, in this research, politically liberal and 
conservative individuals did not differ in their perceptions of stereotypical criminals. 
The failure to observe an effect on social perception may be related to a reduced reliance 
on stereotypes due to the individuating nature of the task (Gawronski et al., 2003) or to 
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the described crime type’s failure to elicit politically charged responses. Second, the 
residual positive effect of criminals’ perceived warmth on perceptions of the seriousness 
of a crime did not support the hypothesis that crimes committed by stereotypical 
criminals are perceived as being more serious.  However, this residual effect was found 
to only emerge when controlling for normative judgments about the harmfulness and 
wrongfulness of a crime, which were themselves predicted by perceptions of a lack of 
warmth, making this finding substantively difficult to interpret.  
Still, this research has important theoretical and policy implications. First, the 
present findings suggest a cognitive pathway that links stereotypes to anger. According 
to Batson and colleagues (2007) anger or moral outrage is elicited when a moral 
standard related to justice is violated. The present findings demonstrate that when a 
criminal act is committed by a stereotypical criminal (i.e., a low warmth individual), this 
act is judged as being more wrongful or unjust. Anger toward low warmth and low 
competence groups may therefore be elicited partly on the basis of inferences about the 
types of wrongful or unjust acts that these groups are likely to commit. Indeed, in the 
USA, other low warmth and low competence groups who may be judged as engaging in 
wrongful or unjust behaviour include welfare recipients, the homeless and feminists 
(Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006).  
Second, from a policy perspective, the results support the view that public 
punitiveness toward crime is partly explained by subjective perceptions of crime. The 
role of stereotypes and political ideology in shaping cognitive, emotional and attitudinal 
responses to crime runs counter to theories and evidence which suggest that individuals 
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rationally seek to punish crime in order to deter future crime or in response to the courts’ 
perceived leniency.  
The present and other findings suggest that increasing the harshness of criminal 
justice policies may be ineffective in quelling public desires for harsh punishment, to the 
extent that these desires result from cognitive and affective responses to criminal 
stereotypes. Policy makers should therefore take seriously the role of criminal 
stereotypes and political ideology in shaping perceptions and judgments of crime.  
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Appendix I 
Crime vignettes 
 
Status 
High:  Paul (or David, or Mark) earns good money as an analyst-programmer 
at a major phone company.    
OR 
 
Low:  Paul (or David, or Mark) is a customer service representative at a 
phone company but occasionally has a hard time making ends meet. 
 
Warmth 
High:  He is kind and is willing to take the time to be there for friends. He 
enjoys being able to help people and often sympathizes with their 
problems. He is generally a warm person. 
OR 
 
    Low:   He is unkind and rarely there for friends. He does not enjoy having to  
help people and is unsympathetic to their problems. He is generally a 
cold person.   
 
Crime type 
Assault:  Last month, on his way home from work, he got into an altercation with a 
stranger. He punched the other person in the face several times and threw 
them to the ground. The victim sustained some cuts and bruises to their 
face, shoulder and hands. The police were called and [name] was 
arrested. He was later found guilty of assault. 
OR 
 
Theft:  Last month, on his way home from work, he walked into an open office 
door where a laptop had been left on a desk. He took the laptop and hid it 
under his jacket. He looked around the office to see if there was anything 
else he could take before walking away with the laptop. The police were 
called and [name] was arrested. He was later found guilty of theft.  
OR 
 
Fraud:  Last month, [name] was found guilty of fraud. He was found to have 
made personal gain by using inside information he learned about before 
the information was made public. He bought stocks in a company for his 
personal account knowing that the stock price would go up when the 
information was made public. The profits amounted to £50,000.  
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On the Role of Criminal Stereotypes and Intuition in 
Generating Punitiveness Toward Crime 
 
The first three papers of this thesis worked toward establishing the content, cognitive, 
affective, behavioural and attitudinal outcomes of criminal stereotypes. Some of the 
theoretical frameworks applied in these papers, and discussed in the literature review, 
suggest that punitiveness is likely the result of intuitive as opposed to reasoned 
processes. A renewed interest in the role of intuition has gained momentum in research 
on social judgments, particularly in the area of moral judgment. Research on the role of 
intuition in social judgment is in line with neuro-psychological research which suggests 
that neural substrates underpin and link processes related to social cognition and 
behaviour, such as punishment. A general consensus in the literature suggests that social 
judgment results from a dual-process model that involves slower controlled (or 
reasoning) processes, and rapid automatic (or intuitive) processes.  
 Although research on punitiveness has identified intuition as an important 
determinant of public attitudes toward crime, little of this research has used a 
methodology that allows for the measurement of individuals’ rapid or intuitive 
responses to crime. This paper therefore makes an important methodological 
contribution to this stream of research by developing and using a methodology that 
allows for the measurement of individuals’ punitive intuitions. 
In this thesis, punitive intuitions are defined as the sudden appearance in 
consciousness of a desire to punish crime harshly without any conscious awareness of 
having gone through the steps of searching, weighing evidence and inferring that a 
specific crime should be punished. This definition suggests that individuals’ punitive 
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desires are likely to occur even before individuals have taken the time to consider the 
origin and nature of their responses toward crime. In order to measure these punitive 
intuitions, the next study uses a response-time measure and multilevel quantile 
regression modelling to observe the processes that – very early on – come to shape 
punitive decisions. This method of analysis has yet to be used in social psychological 
research on rapid social judgments, and proves to be a useful approach to studying 
intuitive responses.  
In summary, the previous papers considered the effects of the content of criminal 
stereotypes – warmth and competence – on explicitly expressed punitive attitudes and 
decisions to punish specific crimes. In these studies, participants had ample time to 
reflect on their attitudes and decisions, and still criminal stereotypes were found to affect 
responses to crime. A remaining question, addressed in the following paper, is whether 
criminal stereotypes can shape punitive intuitions – that is, the decision to punish crime 
before individuals are even aware of having gone through the steps of establishing why a 
criminal should be punished.  This study will address questions with important political 
implications; whether public punitiveness partly reflects a deep-seated intuitive desire to 
see to the punishment of crime, and whether this desire is shaped by criminal 
stereotypes.  
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Paper 4 
Kicking them while they’re down: The effects of perceived warmth and social 
status on punitive intuitions 
 
Carolyn Côté-Lussier 
Methodology Institute and Mannheim Centre for Criminology 
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK 
 
Affect has been shown to be a good predictor of individuals’ intuitive social 
judgments. The current research tests the hypothesis that perception of others’ 
warmth and competence, fundamental dimensions of social perception, can also 
come to shape intuition. The results suggest that participants were more likely to 
rapidly harshly punish pictured criminals who were low on perceived warmth. 
However, the results of multilevel quantile regression modelling reveals that 
perceived social status can be equally important in shaping punitive intuitions. 
The findings shed light on the role of fundamental dimensions of social 
perception in engendering intuitive responses to others.  
Keywords: intuition, cognition, affect, fundamental dimensions of social 
perception 
 
Current social psychological and cognitive neuroscience research has spawned renewed 
interest in the role of intuition in forming social judgments. Social judgment, for the 
most part, is discussed in terms of a dual-process model that involves two interrelated 
processes. The first process consists of slower controlled (or reasoning) processes, while 
the second rapid automatic (or intuitive) processes are argued to be more in line with 
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emotional responses (Adolphs, 2009; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Pretz & Totz, 2007; but 
see Greene et al., 2004, on conflicting cognitive and emotional processes). In the context 
of moral judgment, for instance, intuition is argued to originate from strong emotional 
responses to deep seated moral principles that are the result of evolutionary, social and 
cultural influences (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; but see Huebner, Dwyer & 
Hauser, 2008, on causal-intentional appraisals and moral intuition).  
An area receiving less attention is the association between social perception and 
intuitive responses to others. From an interpersonal relations perspective, intuitive 
responses to others should be related to the two fundamental dimensions of social 
perception: warmth (e.g., kind, trustworthy) and competence (e.g., intelligent, skilful) 
(Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Conway et al., 1996; Fiske, Cuddy & 
Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979). These dimensions answer questions that 
are fundamental for human survival: What are others’ intentions? What are others’ 
abilities to carry out those intentions (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006)? Inferences 
regarding others’ warmth and competence flow in part from social structural 
determinants: perceived competition for resources and power leads to inferences of low 
warmth, while perceived high social status leads to inferences of high competence 
(Fiske et al., 2002). Individuals are capable of very quickly forming impressions of 
others’ warmth and competence, and perceptions of these dimensions are functionally 
related to affective and behavioural responses (Cuddy et al., 2007). For instance, 
Todorov et al. (2005) found that individuals’ impressions of politicians’ competence 
based on a 1-second exposure to a picture of their face was sufficient to predict 
subsequent voting behaviour.  
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The present study considers whether criminals’ perceived warmth, competence 
and social status affect punitive intuitions. Punitive intuitions are the sudden appearance 
in consciousness of a desire to punish crime harshly without any conscious awareness of 
having gone through the steps of searching, weighing evidence and inferring that a 
specific crime should be punished.
27
 Individuals’ seeming intuitive punitive desires have 
received growing attention in social psychological and criminological research on 
punitiveness toward crime (Ham et al., 2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Robinson & 
Darley, 2007; Salerno & Bottoms, 2009). The interest in punitive intuitions stems in part 
from evidence that suggests a discrepancy between individuals’ expressed and implicitly 
endorsed punitive goals (Carlsmith, 2008). The association between anger and decreased 
reasoning processes also suggests that intuition is likely to shape responses to incidents 
that elicit anger, such as crime or moral violations (Goldberg, Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
However, extant research on punitive intuitions has fallen short of using methodologies 
that allow for the measurement of intuitive or rapid decisions to punish crime. It is 
therefore unclear what factors come to shape or instigate punitive intuitions.  
In previous research, perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth were found to be 
important in predicting functionally relevant affective responses to criminals such as 
anger, uneasiness and a lack of compassion (Côté-Lussier, 2012). These emotions in 
turn were key in predicting behavioural intentions to attack and exclude criminals, as 
well as the extent to which individuals expressed support for harsh criminal justice 
policy. Perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth also inform causal attributions for 
                                                 
27
 This definition of punitive intuitions is based on Haidt’s (2001) definition of moral intuition.  
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crime, perceptions of intent and remorse, and punitive responses to specific crimes 
(Côté-Lussier, 2012a).  
In the present study, participants were presented pictures of purported convicted 
criminals and were asked to very quickly decide whether each criminal should receive a 
prison or non-prison sentence. The present study focused participants’ attention strictly 
on deciding how much a criminal should be punished in order to measure individuals’ 
intuitive desire to punish criminals harshly. The main hypothesis is that criminals’ low 
perceived warmth will lead to a higher probability of giving convicted criminals harsh 
sentences, and will lead to quicker decisions to punish harshly. 
Participants 
Participants (N = 60), were university students in the city of London (UK) who 
completed the study in a lab setting for £10 ($15USD). Participants were recruited 
through previous studies and by distributing advertisements directly to students through 
departmental e-mails. Only 58 participants reported demographic information. For these 
25 men and 33 women, mean age was 23.52 (min = 18, max = 47). White British 
students made up 23% of the sample, while 21% were White students from a non-
British background. The remainder of the participants were 22% Asian British (e.g., 
Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 3% British African or Caribbean and 31% were from 
other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-British, Mixed or Other). In terms 
of social class, 35% reported being from the working-class or lower-middle class, 41% 
from the middle-class and 24% from upper-middle and upper class.  For the 58 
participants who reported handedness, 86% were right-handed and 14% left-handed.  
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Stimuli 
Pictures (N = 52) were of wanted or suspected criminals’ faces, however participants 
were told that the pictures were of men who were found guilty of committing a street-
crime (e.g., theft, minor assault).
28
 In a separate study, university students (N = 145) in 
the city of London (UK) completed an online survey in which they rated the same 
pictures on a range of dimensions including age, ethnicity, warmth, competence and 
social status (see Table 1). Completion of the study gave participants the chance to win 
one of 8 cash prizes (ranging from £20, $30USD, to £150, $225USD). Participants each 
rated a subset of 10 pictures drawn from a total pool of 80 pictures, and these ratings 
were used to select the final 52 pictures.  
Because the main hypothesis was that low perceived warmth would generate 
more punitive intuitions, mean ratings of warmth were used to create two groups of 
pictures: a low perceived warmth group (LW) (N = 26) (M = 2.87) and a high perceived 
warmth group (HW) (N = 26) (M = 3.47) (p ≤ .001). The LW and HW groups do not 
differ on perceived competence (p = .99) nor on perceived social status (p = .41). 
Procedure 
Participants were told that we were interested in their gut reactions to people who have 
 
                                                 
28
 Pictures of real suspected or wanted criminals were used as opposed to staged pictures in order to 
provide pictures with some external validity. Pictures were found on police, prison and probation websites 
based primarily in the USA and UK. A disclosure indicating that it was unknown whether any of the 
pictured individuals were actually found guilty of any crime was accessible by clicking on a link present 
at the very bottom of the website welcome page that participants first visited. Only pictured individuals in 
frontal head-shots with neutral expressions were selected. Pictures were also selected on the basis of their 
visual quality (i.e., pictures with a high Dots Per Inch [DPI] resolution were preferentially selected) and 
size (i.e., larger pictures were preferentially selected). A graphic designer color corrected each picture 
(e.g., adjusting brightness and contrast) and modified all of the pictures so that the background color was 
grey, and so that the face of each criminal appeared approximately in the same location.  
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Table 1 
Means, Range and Bivariate Correlations of Perceptions of Criminals. 
 
 Warmth Competence Age Social 
 status 
Mean Range 
Warmth - .13 .03 .40** 3.17 2.32 -
4.12 
Competence  - .42** .63** 3.92 2.88 -
4.88 
Age   - .43*** 2.87 1.67 -
4.62 
Social status    - 1.94 1.19 - 
3.66 
 
Note. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .01. 
 
 
committed a crime. They were asked to decide, very quickly, whether to send people 
convicted of either ‘minor assault, property theft, tax evasion, drug dealing, vandalism, 
drunk driving, fraud or burglary’ to prison or to give them a non-prison sentence. If a 
participant decided to sentence an offender to prison, this meant that the offender would 
receive the typical prison sentence length for the type of offence they committed 
(ranging from 2 months to 5 years in prison), although participants were not told which 
crime each offender committed. If they decided that an offender should receive a non-
prison sentence, this meant that the offender would receive a sentence that is typical for 
the type of offence they committed, such as probation or community service, but would 
not be sent to prison. 
 Pictures of offenders (see Figure 1) were presented in a structured-randomized 
order, such that each of the 13 blocks of 4 pictures contained pictures of 2 HW and 2 
LW criminals. Participants responded to a total of 52 target trials, completed a short 
practice task beforehand in order to become familiar with the Direct RT computer 
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software (i.e., they identified fruits and vegetables), and completed a survey at the end 
of the study.  Participants pressed either the ‘F’ or ‘J’ key to provide their punishment 
decisions; a slip of paper indicating which key represented each response type was 
located on the table in front of the keyboard. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of 4 conditions that varied the assignment of keys and order of presentation of ‘prison’ 
and ‘non-prison’ sentence options, in a counterbalanced design.  
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of target trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analytical Strategy 
The first set of analyses uses binary logistic regression modelling to estimate the 
probability of sending criminals to prison. This first step establishes whether 
stereotypical criminals are more likely to be punished, before moving on to identifying 
when in the decision making process criminal stereotypes come to shape punitive 
decisions.   
The second set of analyses uses multilevel quantile regression modelling to 
estimate the speed with which individuals decided to send criminals to prison. 
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Multilevel quantile regression modelling was used for two reasons: first, to take into 
account issues with analyzing response time data, and second, to take into account the 
clustered nature of the data. Response time (RT) distributions are not normally 
distributed and typically take an ex-Gaussian distribution (Heathcote et al., 1991). The 
positive skewness of the data can either be due to the process of interest, which requires 
taking into account the shape of the distribution in analyses, or due to nuisance variables 
(e.g., a lapse of attention, an eye blink) which can be removed using data trimming 
methods or rescaling response times. Response time is additionally influenced by 
learning curves, such that responses tend to be slower in the beginning, speed up and 
then plateau (Logan, 1992). Quantile regression modelling allows for the analysis of 
non-normal distributions and to model entire distributions rather than simply modeling 
the mean, which in the case of RT data can be heavily influenced by outlier responses.  
Multilevel regression modelling takes into account the clustered nature of a given data 
set by estimating parameters for correlations induced by the repeated measures nature of 
the data. Multilevel modeling provides better estimates of the standard errors and 
improves inferences about the observed effects. Multilevel quantile regression 
modelling therefore allows for modeling the entire response time distribution while 
controlling for the clustered nature of the data, providing insight into the importance of 
explanatory variables at different stages of decision-making.   
Results 
On average, participants were more likely to give convicted criminals prison (N = 1708) 
as opposed to non-prison (N = 1412) sentences, and were quicker to decide to send a 
convicted criminal to prison (M = 1524.25, SD = 1005.04) than to give criminals a non-
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prison (M = 1729.48, SD = 1174.36) sentence (t = 5.26, p ≤.001). The median harsh 
punishment decision was made in 1182ms (see Table 2). Approximately 30% of harsh 
punishment decisions were made under 1-second, with approximately 23% of 
punishment decisions taking over 2-seconds to make. Response times therefore varied 
quite substantially and suggest that different factors may have come to shape decision-
making processes.  
 
Table 2 
Quantiles for Prison and Non-Prison Decision Response Time  
   
 RT Prison RT Non-Prison 
Quantiles   
10 712.80 840.30 
20 832.80 985.00 
30 941.70 1096.80 
40 1046.00 1238.20 
50 1182.00 1386.50 
60 1375.40 1619.80 
70 1641.00 1865.40 
80 2042.40 2227.80 
90 2768.70 2968.00 
 
 
Controlling for criminals’ perceived ethnicity and age, the results of the first 
binary logistic regression model (Model 1, Table 3) suggest that individuals are less 
likely to send HW criminals to prison compared to LW criminals (exp(β) = .18, p ≤ 
.001). Because perceived social status is an important component of criminal stereotypes 
that influences perceptions of criminals’ warmth and competence (Côté-Lussier, 2012b), 
criminals’ perceived social status was added as a potential predictor of punitive 
decisions in Model 2. When taking into account criminals’ perceived social status, the 
results remain comparable to Model 1 with social status having no measurable impact 
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on the probability of giving convicted criminals a prison as opposed to a non-prison 
sentence. In other words, the effect of warmth on rapid harsh punitive decisions is not 
weakened by social status.  
 
Table 3 
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Probability of Giving a Convicted  
Criminal a Prison as Opposed to Non-Prison Sentence 
 
     Model 1 Model 2 
Warmth             .18***            .19***   
Competence          1.04             1.17      
Age         1.47***          1.47***   
Black          1.50*            1.40      
Asian        3.58               .55      
Hispanic         1.20            1.13      
Other         2.10**           1.95*     
Status --          .85     
Random effects 
σ Picture   .31          .31 
σ Participant 1.30       1.30 
   
 
Note. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
 
The next step is to test whether the observed effect of warmth on punitive 
intuitions appears early on in the decision-making process. The second set of analyses 
consist of two multilevel quantile regression models predicting the speed with which 
individuals decided to give criminals prison sentences, with the second model 
additionally taking into account criminals’ perceived social status. 29  The estimated 
quantiles were picked based on previous research on facial processing and decision-
making response times. Evidence suggests that facial recognition can take as little as 
                                                 
29
 The same models were estimated while controlling for participants’ age, gender and handedness. The 
results were comparable and so these participant-level controls were removed from the final models due 
to the small sample size and for the sake of parsimony. 
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50ms, with brain activity suggesting identification or categorization occurring at roughly 
150ms and actual identification (e.g., through button-release) occurring around 300ms 
(VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001). Higher order decisions such as identifying famous among 
unfamiliar faces takes approximately 700ms-800ms (Bentin & McCarthy, 1994) and 
distinguish male from female faces takes approximately 1,300ms (O’Toole et al., 1998). 
The estimated quantiles were therefore the 20
th
 (~800ms), 40
th
 (~1,000ms), 60
th
 
(~1,400ms) and 80
th
 (~2,000ms) quantiles.  
 In the first multilevel quantile regression model (Model 3, Table 4) the results 
suggest that perceptions of criminals’ warmth have an effect on harsh punitive decisions 
early on in the decision making process and taper off when participants take longer to 
respond (~1,500ms).  In the second model (Model 4), criminals’ perceived social status 
was found to weaken the effect of perceived warmth on intuitive punitive decisions and 
was a comparatively stronger predictor of individuals’ rapid decisions to punish 
criminals harshly. The effect of social status remained significant even when intuitive 
processes were less at play, suggesting a robust effect. Criminals’ perceived competence 
also emerged as a significant predictor in participants’ slower punitive decisions, 
although this effect is difficult to interpret as it was not significant across quantiles. 
The results suggest that in general, low warmth criminals are more likely to be 
punished harshly. However, the results also seem to suggest that criminals’ perceived 
social status weakens the effect of warmth by slowing punitive intuitions. When 
individuals perceive a low status and low warmth criminal, they very quickly decide that 
this person should be sent to prison. However, when they perceive a higher status  
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Table 4 
Multilevel Quantile Regression Models Predicting Speed of Decisions to Give Convicted 
Criminals a Prison Sentence.    
             
  Model 3 Model 4 
20
th
 percentile (Intercept)       875.95 (118.98)       1046.18 (127.48)     
 Warmth 58.17* (25.77)         20.55 (29.62)     
 Competence 11.15 (26.82)            -56.05 (45.96)    
 Age  -16.96 (17.17)           -10.05 (17.41)    
 Black   -154.66*** (27.66)       -113.92*** (34.17)    
 Asian 10.47 (52.19)        32.48 (49.26)     
 Hispanic  -60.41** (23.97)           -30.73 (29.16)    
 Other  -80.17* (38.03)           -48.82 (43.76)    
 Status       --                    --        88.78* (43.09)     
40
th
 percentile (Intercept) 896.94 (125.86)           988.29 (159.21)     
 Warmth 62.11* (30.89)             27.43 (32.18)     
 Competence 48.07 (27.82)            -25.65 (52.18)    
 Age  -25.07 (18.14)           -16.79 (20.13)    
 Black       -135.61*** (34.17)           -72.57* (36.89)    
 Asian -64.29 (68.24)            -32.34 (82.98)    
 Hispanic -63.23* (29.46)            -10.06 (31.16)    
 Other -85.94* (44.21)            -31.96 (48.58)    
 Status              -- --        131.04* (65.73)     
60
th
 percentile (Intercept) 1082.46 (237.95)          1500.37 (278.91)     
 Warmth 110.63* (53.08)             -1.26 (53.20)    
 Competence 32.33 (51.75)          -163.99 (93.85)    
 Age  -30.76 (30.87)        -16.01 (31.31)    
 Black  -184.29*** (55.30)           -64.02 (52.70)    
 Asian  -86.10 (140.86)          -36.51 (150.83)    
 Hispanic  -148.46** (53.58)           -74.87 (53.48)    
 Other  -185.02** (75.03)            -53.75 (101.37)    
 Status         -- --       310.33** (121.89)     
80
th
 percentile (Intercept)  1473.20 (571.47)        2440.09 (597.16)     
 Warmth  56.82 (129.34)        -118.07 (137.86)    
 Competence  93.33 (113.51)          -391.91* (171.80)    
 Age   -9.78 (66.11)          22.90 (64.26)     
 Black   -283.82* (129.29)          -72.41 (146.85)    
 Asian   -143.04 (298.37)        -108.75 (265.14)    
 Hispanic   -144.80 (121.66)     -55.49 (136.65)    
 Other   -144.23 (150.81)       129.84 (184.47)     
 Status         -- --       670.12** (239.75)  
 
Note. This model allowed for random effects for each participant.  * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
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individual, their responses are slowed down and they take into consideration how warm 
the individual appears to be before deciding to sentence them to prison. So while 
perceptions of warmth ultimately determine the likelihood of punishing criminals 
harshly, criminals’ social status can slow this intuitive punitive response. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The findings are the first empirical evidence that fundamental dimensions of social 
perception can engender intuitive punitive responses. The present research aimed to 
expand on research about the role of intuition in shaping social judgment by considering 
the effects of social perception on intuition. Previous research suggests that perceptions 
of fundamental dimensions of social perception elicit affective responses that motivate 
functionally relevant behaviour (Cuddy et al., 2007). The present findings contribute to 
research on the functional role of these dimensions by revealing that they can have 
direct effects on intuitive responses to others. 
The results suggest that individuals are more likely to very quickly – in 
approximately 1.5 seconds – decide to punish others harshly if they are perceived as 
lacking warmth, although  punitive intuitions are slowed when cues suggest that a 
criminal has a high social status.  In previous research, a high social status has been 
found to be positively associated with criminals’ warmth and competence, which can 
elicit fondness and admiration. These positive emotions may conflict with negative 
emotions associated with low warmth such as anger and hate (Côté-Lussier, 2012; 
Cuddy et al., 2007).   
The findings provide evidence that punitive intuitions are associated with 
criminals’ perceived lack of warmth but also with their low perceived social status, key 
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features of criminal stereotypes (Côté-Lussier, 2012b). These findings are important as 
they suggests that a complex social construct such as social status – which is related to 
individuals’ economic, educational and employment achievements – can be judged very 
quickly, and that this judgment informs intuition. Thus, this research suggests that the 
tendency to punish those in the margins of society more harshly – a trend noted by 
theorists such as Marx, Rusche and Kirchheimer, and evidenced for instance by the 
propensity to convict poorer criminals with less evidence (Curry & Klumpp, 2009) – 
takes root in individuals’ punitive intuitions. In this sense, intuitive social judgments are 
intimately tied to socio-political factors in addition to being associated with affective 
responses and fundamental dimensions of social perception.  
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On the Role of Affect and Intuition in Generating Punitiveness Toward Crime 
 
The previous paper built on the results of the third paper, which suggested that crimes 
committed by stereotypical criminals were perceived as being more harmful, wrongful 
and serious, and tended to engender harsher punitive responses. The results of the fourth 
paper suggested that stereotypical criminals were punished more harshly even before 
individuals had the time to formulate justifications for why these individuals should be 
punished more harshly. Individuals demonstrated an intuitive desire to punish a criminal 
harshly simply on the basis of facial cues which suggested that they resembled the 
stereotypical low status, low warmth criminal.  
These results are important as they are the first to demonstrate that criminals’ 
low perceived warmth, a key feature of criminal stereotypes, generates punitive 
intuitions. Surprisingly, the findings suggested that criminals’ low social status can also 
directly shape punitiveness by slowing the intuition that criminals should be punished 
harshly. This study has interesting policy implications, notably that improving 
criminal’s actual or perceived social status could have the effect of reducing public 
punitiveness toward crime.  
The following study addresses an important gap in the literature and fourth 
paper, that is, the failure to identify some of the affective pathways linking criminal 
stereotypes to punitive intuitions. In the second paper, the results suggested that punitive 
attitudes are associated with affective responses such as anger and a lack of compassion. 
This final paper expands on findings from the second paper by identifying which 
affective responses are most important in shaping punitive intuitions – anger or 
sadness/empathy. This study uses measures of criminals’ perceived emotion to predict 
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individuals’ punitive decisions. The idea is that perceiving criminals as being angry 
should elicit an angry response in the observer, whereas perceiving criminals as being 
sad should elicit compassion. 
This paper draws on theory and research discussed in the literature review where 
it was argued that, in the broader context of social life, punishment is associated with 
interpersonal and intergroup competition and cooperation. In this context, individuals 
are especially sensitive to information relating to whether others are empathetic or not, 
and are faster to process this information (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006). Some research 
in cognitive neuroscience suggests that individuals very rapidly identify others’ 
emotional states based on facial cues, in order to draw inferences regarding their intent 
and to simulate these emotional responses (e.g., to experience empathy) (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The following study does not directly 
test the hypothesis that perceiving criminals as being angry, for instance, elicits anger in 
the individual. Rather, punitive decisions are considered to be a behavioural outcome 
that results from functionally relevant affective responses (e.g., anger, lack of 
compassion). In other words, it is hypothesized that perceiving angry criminals elicits a 
punitive intuition in the individual, in part because experiencing anger and a lack of 
compassion motivates punitive responses.  
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Paper 5 
Fight fire with fire: The effect of perceived anger on punitive intuitions 
 
Carolyn Côté-Lussier 
Methodology Institute and Mannheim Centre for Criminology 
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK 
 
The human ability to ‘mind-read’ is fundamental in social interactions, for 
instance contributing to the experience of empathy. The present research tests the 
hypothesis that perceiving anger in others, based on facial cues, is sufficient to 
elicit very rapid punitive responses toward crime. The results suggest that 
individuals are faster to harshly punish criminals who appear to be angry, and 
that this effect emerges early on in the decision-making process. And while 
Black criminals elicit faster punitive responses, the effect of ethnicity is 
weakened at high levels of perceived anger. The results are discussed in terms of 
the human ability to simulate and experience others’ emotional responses, and 
the role of anger in eliciting hostile aggression. The findings also have important 
policy implications, as they suggest that drumming up anger toward crime could 
engender punitive intuitions.  
Keywords: intuition, affect, punishment, crime 
 
The ability to mind-read is important in human social interactions, for instance to predict 
others’ behaviour and to experience empathy (Adolphs, 2009). Cognitive neuroscientists 
have made strides in explaining individuals’ ability to ‘read’ the minds and attribute 
intent and goals to others. Individuals pay particular attention to whether others are 
empathetic or not, and experience specific affective responses and behavioural 
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motivations based on perceptions of others’ warmth, kindness and trustworthiness 
(Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; see also Adolphs, 2009, and de Waal, 2008, on the neural 
substrates of empathy in humans and other species). 
The present research investigates individuals’ rapid or intuitive punitive 
responses to perceived affect. This study takes as its starting point individuals’ ability to 
very rapidly identify others’ facial emotional displays and simulate these emotions in the 
self. The hypothesis is that, in the context of crime, perceiving anger in others engenders 
angry responses in the self, and in turn leads to intuitive punitive responses. Previous 
research on punitiveness toward crime suggests that emotions of anger (or moral 
outrage) tend to increase punitiveness (Côté-Lussier, 2012; Gault & Sabini, 2000; 
Johnson, 2009; Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005), while emotions of compassion tend to 
decrease punitiveness (Côté-Lussier, 2012a; Feather et al., 2001; Graham et al., 1997). 
However, to date there is no research investigating the association between affect and 
intuitive punitive responses – that is, the sudden appearance in consciousness of a desire 
to punish crime harshly without being consciously aware of inferring that a specific 
crime should be punished (e.g., on the basis of searching and weighing evidence).
30
  
In this study participants were presented faces of convicted criminals and were 
asked to very quickly decide whether the pictured individual should receive a prison or 
non-prison sentence.  The results suggest that individuals are faster in making harsh 
punitive decisions (i.e., giving criminals a prison sentence) when a convicted criminal is 
perceived as being angry. The findings are discussed in terms of behavioural responses 
                                                 
30
 This definition of punitive intuitions is based on Haidt’s (2001) definition of moral intuition.  
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to perceived affect, the role of affect in shaping punitive responses and in terms of the 
social policy implications.  
Perceived Emotion and Behavioural Responses 
Individuals are apt at perceiving emotions of anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, fear 
and disgust (Adolphs, 2002). Some evidence suggests that separate neural systems exist 
strictly to recognize and identify facial expressions of emotional states (Fox et al., 
2000). Over the past twenty years, research has investigated what is being called ‘mirror 
neurons’, a set of neuronal substrates hypothesized to aid with learning by imitation and 
‘mind-reading’ or representing the specific mental states of others (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Mirror neurons are argued to be the link providing 
continuity between human cognition and that of other species (Gallese, 2001). 
Dysfunction in the mirror neuron system, for instance among children with autism 
spectrum disorders, has been linked with deficits in imitation, theory of mind and social 
communication (Dapretto et al., 2006)  
Facial recognition of emotion involves both identifying the geometric 
configuration of facial features and recognizing the emotional meaning of a stimulus, 
with coarse recognition of emotion occurring after ~100ms (Adolphs, 2002). Within 
facial expressions, individuals pay particular attention to threatening or angry faces 
which tend to ‘pop out’ in visual searches (Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Pinkham et al., 
2010). Recognizing emotion in facial features is associated with the activation of 
emotional responses in the observer through simulation processes or through the 
generation of a somatosensory image of the body state (Adolphs, 2002). More generally, 
reactions to affective stimuli can be relatively automatic (Zajonc, 1980).  
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Perceived emotions in others elicit specific behavioural responses in the self. 
Evidence suggests that perceiving others as being angry is sufficient to elicit very rapid 
– under 500ms – angry facial reactions in the observer (Dimberg, Thunberg & Elmehed, 
2000). Anger is perceived as being an emotion over which individuals have control 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and is more likely to occur as an affective response in the 
observer when individuals are perceived as having control over the anger-inducing 
situation (Weiner, Graham & Chandler, 1982). Anger itself is a strong negative 
emotional reaction that has been linked to reduced cognitive functioning (Lerner, 
Goldberg & Tetlock, 1998) and increased reliance on intuitive as opposed to reasoning 
processes (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Anger is an active emotion that motivates 
harmful approaching behaviour such as attacking and excluding (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 
2007; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994). It is therefore hypothesized that perceived 
anger in criminals will generate punitive intuitions.  
 In the context of crime, criminals’ perceived sadness is also likely to be an 
important predictor of punitiveness as it can signal remorse. Sadness is an emotion in 
which individuals perceive little control and is more likely to be attributed to situational 
factors (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Perceiving sadness in others, for instance based on 
dilated pupils, is a good predictor of empathetic responses by the observer (Harrison et 
al., 2007). While sadness is a passive emotion (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994), 
sympathy or pity can elicit helpful approaching behaviour (e.g., helping) (Cuddy, Fiske 
& Glick, 2007). It is therefore hypothesized that perceiving an offender’s sadness will 
elicit compassion and diminish harmful approaching behaviour, having the effect of 
reducing punitive intuitions.  
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The following study simultaneously estimates the effect of perceived anger and 
sadness on rapid punitive responses in order to test whether individuals’ anger or 
compassion is more important in shaping intuitive punitive responses. 
Method 
Participants 
Students (N = 60) from London (UK) universities completed the study in a lab setting 
for £10 ($15USD). Only 25 men and 33 women reported demographic information, for 
these participants mean age was 23.52 (min = 18, max = 47), 86% were right-handed 
and 14% left-handed. White British students made up 23% of the sample, while 21% 
were White students from a non-British background. The remainder of participants were 
22% Asian British (e.g., Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 3% British African or 
Caribbean and 31% were from other ethnic categories (e.g., Chinese British and non-
British, Mixed or Other). In terms of social class, 35% reported being from the working-
class or lower-middle class, 41% from the middle-class and 24% from upper-middle and 
upper class.  
Stimuli and measures 
Participants were presented pictures (N = 52) of criminals’ faces who were said to be 
found guilty of committing a crime (see Figure 1). In a separate pilot study, London 
(UK) university students (N = 145) completed an online survey in which they each rated 
10 of 80 pictures of criminals on a range of dimensions, including perceived emotion, 
for the chance to win one of 8 cash prizes (ranging from £20 or $30USD, to £150 or 
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$225USD).
31 ,32  
Participants rated pictured criminals on age, attractiveness,
33
 general 
emotions such as happiness, sadness and anger, and emotions more pertinent to the 
context of crime such as remorse, shame and tension.  
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of target trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
In the present study, mean ratings obtained from the pilot study were used to 
predict punitive intuitions. Because of high correlations between emotions of remorse, 
shame and sadness, only the more basic emotion of sadness will be used in the analyses 
(see Table 1). Because of high correlations between happiness and tension, tension will 
also be excluded from the analyses. The analyses will therefore take into account how 
                                                 
31
 Pictures were found on police, prison and probation websites based primarily in the USA and UK. A 
disclosure indicating that it was unknown whether any of the pictured individuals were actually found 
guilty of any crime was accessible by clicking on a link present at the very bottom of the welcome page 
that participants first visited. Only pictured individuals in frontal-head shots with neutral expressions were 
selected. Pictures were also selected on the basis of their visual quality and size. Each picture was color 
corrected and modified so that the background color was grey, and so that the face of each criminal 
appeared approximately in the same location.  
32
Of the 80 pictures, 52 were retained on the basis of their representation of stereotypical (N = 26) and 
atypical (N = 26) criminals. See Côté-Lussier (2012b) for more on the selection procedure.  
33
 Evidence suggests that attractiveness can influence response times, and so this variable was entered as a 
statistical control (Imhoff et al., 2010; van Hooff, Crawford & van Vugt, 2011).  
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perceived emotions of happiness, sadness and anger influence rapid decisions to punish 
criminals harshly.   
 
Table 1 
Means, Range and Bivariate Correlations of Perceptions of Criminals 
 
 Happy Sad Remorse-
ful 
Ashamed Angry Tense Mean Range 
Happy - -.57** -.31** -.32** -.50** -.77** 2.31 1.61- 
4.10 
Sad  - .82** .84** -.11** .55** 3.49 2.26- 
4.68 
Remorseful   - .91** -.44** .36** 3.09 2.00- 
4.08 
Ashamed    - -.44** .41** 3.04 2.06- 
4.33 
Angry     - .47** 3.49 2.23- 
5.03 
Tense      - 4.15 2.66- 
5.29 
         
Attractive .13** -.21** -.11** -.21** -.11** -.25** 2.48 1.53- 
4.27 
 
Note. * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
 
Procedure 
Participants began by completing a short practice task in order to become familiar with 
the Direct RT computer software (i.e., they identified fruits and vegetables),  next they 
responded to a total of 52 target trials in which pictures of criminals’ faces were 
presented in a structured-randomized order, and lastly they completed a survey.
 34
 
During the target trials, participants were asked to very quickly decide whether to send 
people convicted of either ‘minor assault, property theft, tax evasion, drug dealing, 
                                                 
34
  Pictures were presented such that each of the 13 blocks of 4 pictures contained pictures of 2 
stereotypical and 2 atypical criminals. 
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vandalism, drunk driving, fraud or burglary’ to prison or to give them a non-prison 
sentence. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 4 conditions that varied the key 
used to assign a prison sentence (‘F’ or ‘J’) and order of presentation of ‘prison’ and 
‘non-prison’ sentence options, in a counterbalanced design.  
Offenders sent to prison were said to receive the typical prison sentence length 
for the type of offence they committed (ranging from 2 months to 5 years in prison). 
Offenders receiving a non-prison sentence were said to receive a sentence that is typical 
for the type of offence they committed, such as probation or community service, but 
would not be sent to prison. In this study, decisions to send criminals to prison will be 
treated as a harsh punitive decision and response times to make these decisions will be 
used as the dependent variable.  
Results 
The analysis consists of a multilevel quantile regression model estimating the effect of 
perceived emotion on the speed with which individuals decided to punish criminals 
harshly. Multilevel quantile regression modelling estimates the effect of perceived 
emotion on the entire response time distribution while adjusting standard errors based on 
the clustered nature of the data (i.e., to account for a participant effect). This method of 
analysis provides insight into the importance of explanatory variables at different stages 
of the decision-making process (Côté-Lussier, 2012).   
Preliminary analyses revealed that perceived happiness had no significant effect 
on punitive intuitions and so it was removed from the final model (all p’s > 0.50). 
Results are comparable when happiness is included in the model. Preliminary analyses 
also suggested that the only ethnic category that had a reliable effect on punitiveness 
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was whether a criminal was Black or not. The model therefore compares Black to non-
Black criminals. 
Punitive response times were regressed on criminals’ perceived anger, sadness, 
age, attractiveness, ethnicity (Black compared to non-Black) and a BlackXAnger 
interaction term (see below).
35
 The results suggest that perceived anger was a robust 
predictor of punitive intuitions, with no variables having a significant effect on 
participants’ slower punitive responses. Early on in the decision-making process, 
participants were faster to harshly punish criminals perceived as being angry (20
th
 
percentile: β = -58.78, p ≤ .01), with a comparable effect observed in the 40th and 60th 
quantiles (see Table 2). The results also suggest that criminals’ perceived sadness had a 
smaller positive but significant effect on punitive decisions (20
th
 percentile:  β = 37.13, p 
≤ .05). The findings suggest that criminals’ perceived anger is a better predictor of 
punitive intuitions than criminals’ perceived sadness, which has a comparatively smaller 
effect size.  
Criminals who were Black were punished much more quickly (20
th
 percentile:  β 
= -338.76, p ≤ .01) than non-Black criminals. Separate analyses revealed that Black 
criminals were perceived as being angrier than White criminals, an interaction term 
between being Black and appearing angry was therefore included in the model. 
Marginally significant BlackXAnger interactions emerged in the 20
th
 and 60
th
 
percentiles, with a significant effect emerging in the 40
th
 quantile (β = 79.59, p ≤ .05). 
The interaction effect suggests that while being Black significantly predicts rapid 
punitive responses, the effect of being Black is weakened when a criminal is perceived  
                                                 
35
 The same model was estimated while controlling for participants’ age, gender and handedness. The 
results were comparable and so these participant-level controls were removed from the final model due to 
the small sample size and for the sake of parsimony.  
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Table 2 
Multilevel Quantile Regression Model Predicting Response Times in Assigning Prison 
Sentences to Convicted Criminals 
 
  Model 1 
  B SE 
20
th
 
percentile 
(Intercept) 1046.34 154.33 
 Age 0.51 16.52 
 Black -358.76** 135.55 
 Attractive 25.89 19.45 
 Sad 37.13* 17.95 
 Angry -58.78** 22.94 
 BlackXAngry 60.51
a
 34.34 
  - - 
40
th
 
percentile 
(Intercept) 1107.98 180.46 
 Age 13.92 16.85 
 Black -395.84** 147.06 
 Attractive 40.40 25.44 
 Sad 33.87 21.53 
  Angry -53.36* 26.13 
 BlackXAngry 79.59* 38.55 
    
60
th
 
percentile 
(Intercept) 1324.34 336.54 
 Age 35.12 27.43 
 Black -551.37* 280.82 
 Attractive 59.12 42.96 
 Sad 63.39
b
 34.08 
 Angry -108.19* 54.00 
 BlackXAngry 118.06
c
 71.51 
    
80
th
 
percentile 
(Intercept) 1899.49 707.24 
 Age 32.91 57.93 
 Black -1066.29 676.42 
 Attractive 81.72 91.18 
 Sad 107.77 69.92 
 Angry -165.37 128.06 
 BlackXAngry 210.45 183.02 
 
Note. This model allowed for random effects for each participant. *p  ≤ .05. ** p  ≤ .01.  a = .08. b = .06. c 
= .10. 
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as being high on anger (see Figure 2). In other words, the effect of anger trumps the 
effect of ethnicity at high levels of perceived anger. 
 
Figure 2 
Plotted Regression Lines for BlackXAnger Interaction 
 
Note. Plot is for a right handed 22 year old man, with values for perceived age, attractiveness and sadness 
held at the median.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The pattern of results found across the reaction time distribution suggested that 
perceiving anger in criminals’ faces was associated with a rapid harsh punitive response. 
The results provided evidence that behavioural responses to perceived affect occur 
relatively quickly and that intuitive punitiveness, in the context of crime, was associated 
with the emotion of anger.  
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How can perceiving anger elicit a rapid or intuitive punitive response in the 
observer? The ability to recognize, simulate and experience emotional responses is a key 
feature of human cognition. The presence of neural substrates dubbed ‘mirror neurons’ 
appear to aid in representing the mental states of others, such as anger (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Appraisals of anger and experienced 
anger are key motivators of hostile aggression and have been linked to action tendencies 
related to moving against others (e.g., assault, attacking, kicking) (Cuddy, Fiske & 
Glick, 2007; Fridja, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Rule 
& Nesdale, 1976). 
Similarly, in the context of punishment of crime, anger has been found to be a 
robust predictor of support for harsh criminal justice policy and punishment of specific 
crimes (Côté-Lussier, 2012; Côté-Lussier, 2012a; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Johnson, 2009; 
Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005). The present findings are the first to demonstrate that 
appraisals of anger are sufficient to elicit an intuitive punitive response toward crime. 
The implications of this research are important. First, the findings suggest that the 
experience of anger is strongly associated with punitive intuitions. The tendency to 
drum up anger against crime, for instance by suggesting that criminals are not punished 
harshly enough or by suggesting that crime is on the rise, may contribute to strong 
public punitive intuitions. Second, the results suggest that to the extent that individuals 
perceive criminals as committing crime with a certain degree of callousness or anger, 
individuals’ mirrored anger could contribute to punitive intuitions.  
The findings are in line with cognitive neuroscience research which suggests that 
individuals are apt at rapidly identifying others’ emotional states and tend to simulate 
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these emotional states themselves. This research contributes to a growing body of 
research the role of affect in generating intuitive behavioural responses, and provides 
some credence to the adage ‘fight fire with fire’ as criminals’ perceived anger is met 
with an intuitive desire to punish criminals harshly.  
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Conclusion 
Growing prison populations and staunch public support for harsh criminal justice 
policies has spawned renewed interest in explaining public punitiveness toward crime 
(King & Maruna, 2009; Loader, 2009; Roberts & Hough, 2005; Tonry, 2009). This 
punitive tendency stands in contrast to earlier 18
th
 century movements to reform 
punishment of crime and more modern rehabilitative and liberal movements that 
dominated the USA political landscape throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Ignatieff, 1981; 
Tonry, 2007). Support for harsher criminal justice policies also stands in contrast to 
evidence of falling crime rates in countries such as Canada, the USA and UK. The 
interest in explaining punitiveness toward crime has a longstanding history as evidenced 
by 18
th
 century utilitarian (e.g., in the works of John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and 
Cesare Beccaria) (Donohue, 2007; Jenkins, 1984) and moral theories (e.g., in the works 
of Durkheim and Kant) (Garland, 1990; Oswald et al., 2002) of punishment. 
Contemporary theories of punishment of crime remain, for the most part, in line with 
these two main theoretical streams and work toward explaining both national level 
punitive trends (McCann, 2008), as well as individuals’ punitiveness toward crime 
(Carlsmith, 2008). This thesis is most in line with moral theories of punishment but 
makes no functional claim regarding punishment of crime. The aim of this thesis was to 
identify some of the key predictors of individuals’ strong desire to punish wrongdoers, 
which Kateb (2007) argues precedes any theory of punishment.  
This thesis sought to answer a key question: How do criminal stereotypes come 
to shape individuals’ punitive response to crime? Criminological research on 
punitiveness has identified several cognitive and affective pathways that predict punitive 
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responses, such as the judged wrongfulness and harmfulness of crime, and moral 
outrage (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Yet it was unclear how criminal stereotypes could 
come to shape these perceptions, judgments and responses. Moreover, research on 
criminal stereotypes was largely atheoretical and had not caught up with current social 
psychological research on social stereotypes, intergroup perception and relations. The 
present research relied heavily on leading social psychological theories in the area of 
social and intergroup perception and relations – namely the Stereotype Content Model 
(SCM) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002), the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and 
Stereotypes (BIAS) Map (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007) and the Motivated Social 
Cognition Perspective (Jost et al., 2003) – to identify the cognitive, affective and 
behavioural pathways that link social perception to punishment in the context of crime. 
The SCM suggests that criminal stereotypes are not arrived at simply on the 
basis of criminals’ behaviour, but rather that these stereotypes are derived on the basis 
of criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for power and resources) 
and low social status (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). A key implication of the SCM 
is that social structural changes, such as economic recessions, social and criminal justice 
policies, can have the effect of shaping how the public perceive criminals. The first aim 
of this thesis was to establish the origins and underlying dimensions of criminal 
stereotypes, which have both social psychological as well as socio-political implications. 
According to the SCM and BIAS map, social stereotypes reflect two 
fundamental dimensions of social perception – warmth and competence – that answer 
questions necessary for survival (i.e., what are others’ intentions and can they carry out 
those intentions) (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; 
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Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Judd et al., 2005; Wiggins, 1979; Wojciszke & Abele, 
2008). Perceptions of these fundamental dimensions of social perception elicit 
functionally relevant emotions that motivate specific behavioural responses, such as 
desires to exclude disliked social groups (e.g., the homeless). Yet the SCM and BIAS 
map have rarely been applied to study broader attitudes captured by social policy 
preferences. Studying the content of criminal stereotypes can provide unique insights as 
criminals are one of the few social groups that are routinely targeted by aggressive 
social policies and laws. 
By identifying the dimensions underlying criminal stereotypes, this research 
brings a broad criminological literature on criminal stereotypes in line with social 
psychological research on social and intergroup perception. In doing so, this thesis has 
two related aims. First, the aim is to make a broader theoretical argument regarding the 
nature of punishment of crime and its association with basic cognitive and affective 
processes. Second, the aim is to broaden the scope of the study of criminal stereotypes 
and punitiveness toward crime, for instance, by considering evidence and theories 
emerging from literatures on intergroup relations, developmental psychology, 
neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology. Some evidence emerging from the study 
of neural substrates suggests that the prefrontal cortex, a defining feature of the human 
brain, is associated with key features of punishment such as the acquisition of social and 
moral knowledge, and with basic cooperative and competitive social behaviour 
(Adolphs, 2009; de Quervain et al., 2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Spitzer et al., 2007). By referring to these literatures, the present research speaks more 
directly to the association between basic cognitive and affective processes reflected in 
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the punishment of crime. The study of public punitiveness is therefore not strictly a 
criminological area of inquiry, but also one with important social psychological bases 
and implications.   
The five papers presented in this thesis provide a comprehensive study of the 
predictors and content of criminal stereotypes, and of the associations between criminal 
stereotypes and their outcomes with punitiveness toward crime. The findings suggested 
that although individuals’ stereotypes about criminals include thoughts relating to the 
types of crime criminals commit, these stereotypes also reflected dimensions of warmth 
and competence, the same dimensions underlying stereotypes about various social 
groups such as the rich, Asians and feminists (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999). 
Thinking that criminals are cold, unkind and untrustworthy was found to be related not 
only to criminals’ perceived competitiveness against society (e.g., for power) but also to 
their perceived low social status. Criminals’ low perceived competence, intelligence and 
skilfulness were also predicted by their perceived low social status. And although 
criminals were perceived as being both low on warmth and competence, their perceived 
warmth was significantly lower and was a defining feature of the criminal stereotype. 
These results are therefore the first to demonstrate that inferences regarding criminals’ 
internal traits relate not only to their criminal behaviour, but also to their position in 
society. According to Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007), a functional relation can develop 
between perceived social status and warmth, to the extent that these stereotypes justify a 
group’s social exclusion. The present findings supported this functional relation between 
stereotypes about warmth and social status, and have important socio-political 
implications that will be discussed in more detail below.  
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At a cognitive level, the results presented in this thesis suggest that stereotypes 
about criminals influenced not only the attributions individuals made about the causes of 
crime, but also normative judgments, for example, pertaining to the wrongfulness, 
harmfulness and seriousness of crime. In turn, these judgments were associated with the 
degree to which individuals expressed moral outrage and sought to punish specific 
crimes. These findings bridge criminological research and the interpersonal perception 
and relations literature by identifying the pathways that link criminal stereotypes to 
strong cognitive and affective responses toward crime.  Criminal stereotypes can 
therefore have the effect of shaping perceptions of the very nature of crime, and in turn 
engender strong affective and punitive responses.  
At affective and behavioural levels, criminal stereotypes were found to partly 
explain individuals’ angry, uneasy and lack of empathetic responses toward criminals. 
These functionally relevant emotions were in turn found to motivate behavioural 
tendencies such as exclusion and attacking. However, affective responses to criminals 
were found to be more important in predicting punitive attitudes than cognitive or 
behavioural factors. Specifically, individuals’ lack of empathy toward criminals was a 
key predictor of support for harsh criminal justice policy, along with political ideology. 
These findings support previous criminological research that suggests that punitiveness 
is associated with negative emotions such as anger, and contributes to findings which 
suggest that positive emotions such as empathy are key in reducing punitiveness toward 
crime (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Johnson, 2009; Xiao, Houser & Smith, 2005). 
Where the criminological research was weaker, however, was in measuring 
individuals’ intuitive punitive desire – that is, the sudden appearance in consciousness of 
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a desire to punish crime without any conscious awareness of having gone through the 
steps of inferring that crime should be punished. The criminological interest in punitive 
intuitions is in line with recent psychological research that has turned toward studying 
intuition as a main determinant of social judgment (e.g., moral judgment) (Haidt, 2001). 
Although it has been argued that punitiveness toward crime reflects an automatic or 
intuitive retributive desire to punish crime (McKee & Feather, 2008; Robinson & 
Darley, 2007), little research has used a methodology that allowed for the measurement 
of individuals’ rapid punitive responses. By using a methodology suited for capturing 
rapid decision-making, this thesis provided evidence that criminal stereotypes and 
affective responses are key in engendering punitive intuitions. Before individuals even 
had time to consciously process why a criminal should be punished, they tended to be 
more punitive toward criminals who fit the criminal stereotype (i.e., who were low on 
perceived warmth and social status). Some of the evidence also suggested that the key 
affective pathway to punitive intuitions was anger. Together these findings suggest that 
the processes that engender punitive decisions and attitudes take origin in individuals’ 
intuitive punitive responses.  
This research is therefore the first to provide empirical evidence that punitive 
intuitions are associated with criminal stereotypes, and the affective responses that these 
stereotypes engender. Although this thesis makes no claim about the functionality of 
punishment, these findings support research which suggests that punitiveness toward 
crime reflects a rapid retributive response to crime. The results suggested that even 
before individuals had time to think about why they should punish, they showed 
retributive tendencies. The findings therefore lend strong support to Robinson and 
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Darley’s (2007) claim that the discrepancy between explicitly endorsing utilitarian goals 
but implicitly endorsing retributive goals is associated with an intuitive, automatic 
response to crime. This thesis provides evidence that this intuitive punitive response is 
associated with criminal stereotypes and strong affective responses.   
This thesis also considered political ideology as a dispositional factor that shapes 
both the endorsement of criminal stereotypes and individuals’ affective, behavioural and 
attitudinal responses to these stereotypes. Political and ideological positions such as 
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are 
important predictors of both stereotyping and public punitiveness (Bassett, 2010; Cohrs 
& Asbrock, 2009; Duriez et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, 
Federico & Napier, 2009; Kreindler, 2005; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007).  By 
simultaneously estimating the effects of ideology, cognition, affect and behaviour on 
punitiveness, this research was able to tease apart the ideological component of these 
responses. For instance, when controlling for RWA, angry responses toward criminals 
were found to no longer have a significant effect on punitive attitudes. Rather, a lack of 
compassion emerged as a significant predictor of support for harsh criminal justice 
policies. However, political ideology had only small effects on social perception of 
criminals at both the group and individual level. The failure to observe strong effects of 
political ideology on the endorsement of social stereotypes could be due to several 
factors, including the somewhat apolitical and individuating nature of some of the 
studies.  
Together these findings make several contributions to the social stereotype and 
criminological literatures, as summarised below. First, this research contributes to the 
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overall finding that perceptions of warmth are more important than perceptions of 
competence in influencing diagnostic attributions for behaviour and strong affective 
responses to stereotypes (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). 
When thinking about who and what a criminal is, individuals spontaneously thought 
about criminals’ perceived lack of warmth, a defining feature of the criminal stereotype. 
In turn, criminals’ low perceived warmth was key in predicting strong emotional 
responses such as hate, anger and disgust. Perceptions of criminals’ lack of warmth were 
also found to have direct effects on individuals’ punitive decisions. And although 
perceptions of competence were found to have some impact on cognition and affect, 
these responses were not found to have significant effects on punitiveness.  
A second key contribution to the social and intergroup perception literature is the 
finding that negative emotional responses toward a social group can be more nuanced 
than the umbrella emotion of contempt identified by the SCM. The findings of this 
research suggest that negative stereotypes about a group’s lack of warmth and 
competence can lead to feelings of anger, hate and disgust, but also to feeling uneasy 
and fearful. In this thesis, the distinguishing element that set apart angry and uneasy 
emotional responses appeared to be criminals’ perceived competence. When criminals 
were perceived as being low on both warmth and competence, but slightly higher on 
competence, they elicited emotions of uneasiness and fear. When criminals were 
perceived as being similarly low on both dimensions, they elicited strong negative 
emotional responses such as anger and disgust, and more punitive attitudes. It remains 
an empirical question whether distinguishing between emotions of anger and fear is 
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helpful in explaining behavioural responses to other negatively stereotyped social 
groups.  
This thesis also made important methodological contributions by moving beyond 
the methodologies typically used to apply the SCM, and studying the effects of criminal 
stereotypes and affect on perceptions of faces, punitive intuitions and social policy 
preferences. This thesis also made a methodological advancement by using multi-level 
quantile regression to address issues with the analysis of response-time data and study 
the predictors of intuitive responses. In doing so, this research makes a strong 
contribution to the criminological literature on punitiveness, as well as to the social 
psychological literature on interpersonal relations and behaviour. The present findings 
build on research on the effect of stereotypes on rapid decision-making and impression 
formation (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998; Ybarra et al., 2008) by 
demonstrating that stereotypes can shape intuitive and attitudinal responses. This thesis 
suggests that the same social psychological processes that predict support for harsh 
criminal justice (i.e., perceptions of criminals`lack of warmth and negative affective 
responses) also predict individuals’ intuition that a crime should be punished harshly. 
The findings therefore provided evidence that punitiveness toward crime was associated 
with very rapid punitive intuitions, as opposed to resulting from a strict reliance on a 
careful consideration of the merits of punitiveness toward crime.  
One of this thesis’ major contributions to the criminological literature is the 
finding that criminals’ perceived social status plays an important role in shaping 
stereotypes about criminals. Since the 19
th
 century, criminologists have argued that 
punishment of crime is done through the lens of social class (Chapman, 1968; Foucault, 
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1979). Discourse analyses, but also a simple assessment of the empirical data, suggest 
that the poor and disadvantaged have historically been overrepresented in criminal 
justice systems in countries such as the UK, USA and Canada (Bazemore, 2007; Curry 
& Klumpp, 2009; Helms, 2009; Pettit & Western, 2004). Theories of punishment have 
also emphasized the role of those in power in targeting the disadvantaged with unfair 
criminal justice policies (e.g., Marx, Foucault) (Garland, 1990).  
The evidence presented here suggests that the social processes observed by 
criminologists, that is, the tendency to punish low status others, also hold at the 
cognitive, affective and intuitive level in the individual. The results suggested that 
criminals’ low social status is a defining feature of individuals’ stereotypes about 
criminals. The results also suggested that inferences regarding criminals’ evil or cruel 
nature resulted in part from perceptions of their low social status. In other words, 
criminals are not perceived as being bad people simply because they commit crime – 
rather, individuals who think criminals are bad also tend to think thay they are poor, 
uneducated and unsuccessful. Crucially, some of the evidence presented here suggests 
that criminals’ low perceived social status can engender intuitive desires to punish 
criminals harshly. Criminals’ perceived low social status therefore has direct and 
indirect effects through stereotypes on strong cognitive, affective and punitive responses 
to crime.  
A criticism of this thesis could be that individuals are correct in inferring that 
criminals are generally not very kind or warm, and that harsh punishment is the 
appropriate response to crime. The aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that there is 
variance in the extent to which individuals seek to punish crime, and that this variance is 
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partly explained by the endorsement of criminal stereotypes. The main argument 
presented in this thesis is that making a categorical and generalized inference that all 
criminals are cold, cruel, unintelligent and incompetent is the result of systematic 
cognitive and social structural processes. These same processes are responsible for 
generating stereotypes about various social groups (e.g., women, the elderly, 
immigrants) and help explain prejudice and the social exclusion of groups. The present 
findings help explain why the public continues to support increasingly harsh criminal 
justice policies despite their social, political and fiscal costs. 
This thesis faces some limitations. Namely, because all of the research was 
conducted on student samples based in the UK it is difficult to generalize the findings to 
broader populations in the UK, Canada and the USA. Much of experimental social 
psychological research must contend with such sampling limitations. It is therefore 
important to bear in mind that the key object of study in this and other research are basic 
social psychological processes, with the idea being that many of these processes are 
stable features of social cognition and are comparable across populations. For instance, 
the association between fundamental dimensions of social perception and social 
structural determinants has been observed across 10 non-US nations (Cuddy et al., 
2009). The findings presented in this thesis can therefore provide some insight into the 
association between criminal stereotypes and specific cognitive, affective and attitudinal 
outcomes in broader populations in countries such as the UK, Canada and USA. Indeed, 
previous research using representative samples have already established that the 
endorsement of criminal stereotypes is linked to public punitiveness (Roberts, 1992).  
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This research also relied strictly on quantitative research methods. The aim of 
this research was to provide empirical evidence in support of specific testable 
hypotheses. The use of methods such as surveys and social psychological experiments 
allowed testing of these hypotheses. A limitation of this research is that participants’ 
responses were limited by the specific questions that they were asked in each study. The 
present studies therefore do not provide participants with the opportunity to explain their 
beliefs or attitudes toward criminals. Future research could, for instance, use open ended 
questions to explore individuals’ beliefs about the association between endorsing 
criminal stereotypes and supporting harsh criminal justice policy.  
Overall, however, the findings provide strong evidence that stereotypes about 
criminals contribute to punitiveness toward crime. This thesis suggests that criminal 
stereotypes and punitiveness toward crime do not result from strictly reasoned cognitive 
processes. Contrary to the belief that individuals form perceptions of criminals on the 
basis of criminals’ behaviour, the present findings demonstrate that criminal stereotypes 
are influenced by systematic cognitive and social structural determinants.  These 
stereotypes in turn engender punitive intuitions, strong negative affective responses and 
the desire to exclude, attack and punish criminals. However, the present findings also 
suggest that public punitiveness toward crime is malleable and depends on a range of 
factors including the endorsement of criminal stereotypes, affective responses to crime, 
beliefs about the nature of crime (e.g., seriousness) and political ideology.  
Using different methodologies, and at different levels of analysis, the findings 
converge to demonstrate that criminal stereotypes affect individuals’ cognitive, affective 
and behavioural responses to specific crimes and toward crime more generally. This 
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thesis worked to systematically address the association between criminal stereotypes and 
punitiveness in terms of explicitly endorsed attitudes, decision-making and intuition. In 
doing so, this thesis provides robust evidence that endorsing criminal stereotypes is 
associated with being more punitive toward crime. As a whole, this thesis reconciles a 
great deal of the criminological literature on punitiveness with the social psychological 
literature on interpersonal perception and relations.  
On a methodological note, this thesis does not claim that asking people to 
express their punitive attitudes or make punitive decisions provides a wholly inaccurate 
picture of public punitiveness toward crime. But in drawing conclusions from measures 
of expressed punitive attitudes, for the purpose of putting into place criminal justice 
policy, politicians should be aware of what processes come into play and what these 
measures actually reflect. Researchers and politicians should be especially careful in 
using measures that not only conflate punitive dimensions (e.g., by asking individuals if 
‘court sentences are too lenient’ which conflates actual punitiveness with assessments of 
the criminal justice system), but also when using measures that facilitate intuitive 
punitiveness, for instance by appealing to rapid, affect-laden responses. 
The broader issue at stake is of course whether public endorsement of criminal 
stereotypes has a measurable impact on the implementation of harsh criminal justice 
policies and actual punishment of crime. Previous research suggests that politicians play 
on individuals’ ‘knee jerk’ reactions to crime and turn to public opinion to support the 
implementation of harsh criminal justice policies (Hutton, 2005). In handing down 
sentences, judges consider the public’s reaction and attempt to match sentences to the 
public’s perceived desire for harsher sentences (Hutton, 2005). By identifying some of 
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the social psychological processes that contribute to punitive attitudes, the present 
findings help explain why the government’s reliance on public opinion can lead to the 
implementation of harsh criminal justice policies despite decreasing crime rates (e.g., in 
countries such as Canada) (Statistics Canada, 2010). That is, the public will continue to 
demand harsher punishment so as long as they endorse stereotypes which suggest that 
criminals have a low social status, and are cold and untrustworthy. 
In moving forward, the present findings and theoretical framework could be 
expanded by considering the potential ‘ratchet effect’ that the adoption of harsh criminal 
justice policies could have on public punitiveness. Some evidence suggests that public 
punitiveness can be amplified by politicians’ and the media’s tendency to expound the 
evil nature of criminals and law-and-order rhetoric (see Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, for 
a review). Little research has, in contrast, considered the effect of criminal justice 
policies on shaping public perceptions of criminals. Yet policy firmly establishes 
accepted behavioural, affective and social responses to criminals. Because stereotypes 
flow from social structural factors, criminal justice policies can play an important role in 
shaping individuals’ stereotypes about criminals, and in turn public punitiveness toward 
crime. For instance, increasing spending to build prisons could suggest that there is a 
growing need to detain dangerous violent criminals, and therefore that criminals are 
increasingly threatening (or competitive). But also, criminal justice policies that 
systematically disenfranchise and disadvantage convicted criminals could have the 
effect of lowering criminals’ perceived social status and in turn increase stereotypical 
perceptions of criminals.  
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A more troubling conclusion of this thesis is that it is not clear when individuals 
will feel that criminals are punished harshly enough given the seemingly intuitive desire 
to punish crime and the strong affective responses that criminal stereotypes engender. 
Current punitive trends and the effects of criminal stereotypes on responses to crime 
could have the devastating outcome of contributing to the increasingly harsh treatment 
of criminal offenders. The trouble with relying on simple measures of public 
punitiveness is that these measures will favour people’s rapid responses to the 
stereotypical evil, poor and disliked criminal. These responses may in practice run 
counter to the distinctions individuals make between the severity of crimes, the 
acceptability of punishments and deep-seated notions of fairness and justice (Carlsmith, 
2008; Cushman, 2008). The findings presented in this thesis suggest that great care 
should be exercised when using public opinion as the basis for implementing aggressive 
social policies against groups that are marginalized and disliked, such as criminals.  
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